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Viewing cable 05PANAMA277, PANAMA: FISCAL REFORMS PASS WITH A GRIMACE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05PANAMA277 2005-02-07 21:50 2011-05-29 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Panama
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 PANAMA 000277 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ETRD PM LABOR HUMAN RIGHTSPOLMIL
SUBJECT: PANAMA: FISCAL REFORMS PASS WITH A GRIMACE 
 
REF: A. PANAMA 00235 
 
     B. PANAMA 00089 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
1.  (SBU) In a show of political courage and discipline, and 
despite yelps of pain from business and white collar groups, 
President Torrijos and his Democratic Revolutionary Party 
(PRD) swiftly passed a fiscal reform package on January 31 
that was signed into law February 2 (see Reftels).  After two 
weeks of seemingly constant civil society consultations, 
sporadic but peaceful protests, and three required 
legislative debates, the sometimes reluctant PRD legislative 
delegation shepherded the package through the National 
Assembly substantially intact.  According to a senior GoP 
official, the new law's revenue increases and public payroll 
cuts should generate an additional $350 million through 2006, 
80% of which will go to infrastructure (roads, housing, 
drinking water), education, and health care.  Opposition 
politicians predictably blasted the bitter medicine of a tax 
increase but nearly everyone acknowledged the need for one. 
Public opinion seems cautiously optimistic that the GoP will 
not squander the increased revenue and will keep its promise 
to cut payroll spending.  The GoP's performance on fiscal 
reform signals its determination not to flinch when it cracks 
the much tougher nut of social security reform.  End Summary. 
 
Key Aspects 
----------- 
2.  (U) Despite some modifications, and with several 
defections from opposition legislators, the Torrijos 
administration succeeded in passing pretty much the fiscal 
reform package it wanted.  While the actual revenue and 
savings effects of the fiscal reform package for 2005 are 
still unclear, a senior GOP official told EmbOffs that 
reforms should generate an additional $350 million by 2006, 
80% of which will fund infrastructure (roads, housing, 
drinking water), education, and health care. 
 
Spending 
-------- 
3.  (U) Key features of the public spending component of the 
reform include: 
 
- reducing the GOP payroll (except education, health, 
security) by January 2008 to the level of December 31, 1999; 
 
- taxation of previously tax-free "representational expenses" 
as salary (Many public and white collar employees have 
received up to half their salaries as tax-free 
"representational expenses," basically a tax dodge that 
exploited an existing loophole and fenced off varying amounts 
of salary from the tax man and from social security levies); 
and 
 
- yearly spending increases cannot exceed the percentage 
increase in the previous year's current revenues (starting in 
2006). 
 
Taxes 
----- 
4.  (U) On the tax side, key features include: 
 
- an alternative minimum tax on corporations of 1.4% of gross 
revenues (30% of an imputed profit rate of 4.6%, which can be 
appealed by audit); 
 
- increases in Colon Free Zone (CFZ) license fees, services, 
and a per-container levy (expected to raise $30 million in 
2005); 
 
- an increase in registration fees for corporations; 
 
- a selective consumption tax applied to casino and gambling 
activities, with a 5% rate on slot machine winnings; and 
 
- a phasing out of certain industrial incentives. 
 
The additional revenue generated by the alternative minimum 
income tax could reach as much as $135 million according to a 
senior GOP official, who noted that the current method to 
calculate income tax is too "deduction friendly." 
Carping on Consultations 
------------------------ 
5.  (SBU) Faced with the need for reform, opposition 
Panamenista party critics and prominent business leaders 
lamented the Torrijos government's lack of "consultation" to 
build a broad consensus.  In fact, the GoP and its PRD 
legislative majority conducted an ambitious, two-week-long 
schedule of consultations that ended with an almost endless 
stream of ten-minute speakers before the legislature. 
 
6.  (SBU) Shortly before the law passed, Torrijos met with 
members of the National Council for Private Enterprise 
(CoNEP), an umbrella business organization, which opposed the 
alternative minimum tax.  Holding firm, Torrijos reportedly 
said that he was "elected to make decisions."  The GoP 
further stated that it would adjust reforms quickly if they 
proved ineffective.  Some business and labor interests in 
Panama City and the provinces continued to demonstrate 
peacefully against the reforms and the Torrijos government's 
limited consultations. 
 
Money Down the Drain... 
----------------------- 
7.  (SBU) Nearly all non-PRD politicians were highly 
skeptical about how the GoP would spend its new revenues. 
While most business leaders conceded the need for 
infrastructure improvements, they questioned the GoP's 
ability to curb corruption and spend new revenues wisely. 
 
or Class Warfare? 
----------------- 
8.  (SBU) Former Democratic Change (CD) presidential 
candidate and supermarket magnate Ricardo Martinelli 
portrayed the reforms as a cynical attempt to divide rich and 
poor, circulating an email about GoP plans to provide a $100 
subsidy to poor Panamanians.  (Panamenista politician Juan 
Carlos Varela also took this line, even disingenuously 
comparing Torrijos with Venezuela's Hugo Chavez.)  To 
Martinelli's consternation, all three CD legislators voted 
for the reforms. (Note:  CD legislator Dalia Bernal is the 
sister of Torrijos's Education Minister.  End Note.) 
 
A Middle Class Tax... 
--------------------- 
9.  (SBU) Panama's highly leveraged, smallish middle class 
found itself in the crosshairs of the reform, which will tax 
it more heavily by eliminating the tax-free status of 
"representational" expenses.  One CoNEP leader claimed that 
the reforms were a "grave error" because they would reduce 
the income of professionals by up to 10%.  Former MOLIRENA 
legislator, lawyer Jorge Alberto Rosas, said the legal 
community predicts the reforms will prompt company mergers to 
reduce costs, causing layoffs of middle-class technical and 
professional employees. 
 
or a Failed Canal Referendum? 
----------------------------- 
10.  (SBU) Opposition and PRD supporters agree that the GoP 
took a great risk by tackling fiscal reform and many predict 
it will pay a political price, possibly in a failed 
referendum for Canal expansion (expected in late 2005). 
 
Comment 
------- 
11.  (SBU) Reactions to the fiscal reform package have been 
predictable, with opposition pols trying to score points, 
weaken the Torrijos government, and deflect attention from 
their own internal problems.  Similarly, the business 
community, with a few enlightened exceptions, attempted to 
paint a specter of lower growth and higher consumer prices. 
 
12.  (SBU)  Nonetheless, in pushing through fiscal reform 
with an intact alternative minimum tax, Torrijos succeeded in 
holding the party line in the first of the three great 
challenges that his administration has set itself, which also 
include social security reform and Canal modernization. 
Although some critics say that Torrijos should have pushed 
Canal expansion first, Torrijos perhaps wisely chose to 
create momentum with the easiest of his ambitious projects 
(not to mention that the Canal proposals are not yet in final 
form).  Also, by passing a new law that takes action against 
"the rich," Torrijos puts himself in a better light with 
Panamanians of more modest means as he gears up to put social 
security on a more secure footing. 
 
MCMULLEN