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Viewing cable 05KINSHASA283, CONGO-KINSHASA NIV FRAUD OVERVIEW
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 05KINSHASA283 | 2005-02-17 14:00 | 2011-08-25 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Kinshasa |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 KINSHASA 000283
SIPDIS
FOR CA/FPP/ENAF, CA/VO
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CMGT CG
SUBJECT: CONGO-KINSHASA NIV FRAUD OVERVIEW
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. Nonimmigrant visa (NIV) fraud in Congo-Kinshasa is
commonplace, but on the whole not highly sophisticated.
Fake or falsified documents from private and government
applicants are its main sources. The ease with which
passports and other state-issued documents such as birth
certificates and diplomas can be obtained or forged demands
careful examination of all papers. Bank statements and
attestations of employment from businesses and NGOs also are
easily fabricated or falsified rendering untrustworthy much
of the support documentation submitted by Congolese visa
applicants. Furthermore, post has not been immune to
internal fraud. All these factors call for vigilance to
detect NIV malfeasance and facilitate the travel of bona
fide applicants. The challenges that fraud presents for the
NIV process in Congo-Kinshasa will carry over to the
immigrant visa (IV) process when post this year resumes
issuing IVs after a seven-year suspension. End summary.
----------
BACKGROUND
----------
¶2. Post currently processes only NIV applications. The IV
function was suspended in 1998 in response to repeated
Embassy evacuations due to civil war and resulting
instability. IV issuance, however, is scheduled to resume
in April 2005.
Post NIV workload is relatively small for a nation the size
of Congo -- the third largest country in Africa.
Approximately 4,500 NIV applications were received in FY
2004, a 33 percent increase compared to FY 2003. Post
attributes the rise in applications to several factors,
including an increase in demand for official GDRC travel
following the installation in 2003 of a large government of
transition, increased stability in the country brought on by
the peace process, and the overall worldwide increase in
visa applications following the decline witnessed after the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The NIV refusal rate
averages about 54 percent. Post believes this relatively
low rate of refusal for a developing country reflects the
high proportion of official travelers from the GDRC and the
local United Nations peacekeeping operation (MONUC) as well
as decreased numbers of frivolous applications deterred by
the $100 non-reimbursable application fee and post's
reputation for stringent adjudication.
There has been significant progress in advancing the peace
process in Congo following the installation of the
transitional government and plans for national elections in
¶2005. Nevertheless, the security situation remains tenuous.
Armed military activity by rebel militia continues
sporadically in the east. In 2004 rioting and looting
occurred in several cities throughout the country.
Likewise, while the DRC economy has registered moderate
growth in recent years, Congo remains one of the poorest
nations in the world. Personal income is extremely low,
public institutions are weak and much of the country's
infrastructure either does not function or has been
destroyed. The general population copes with inadequate
basic education, substandard health care and few job
opportunities. These factors cause many Congolese to seek
better conditions elsewhere, including the United States.
These compelling incentives to emigrate lead to pervasive
fraud in nonimmigrant visa applications.
--------------
DOCUMENT FRAUD
--------------
¶3. False documentation is the principal form of fraud
among Congolese NIV applicants. From passports to birth
certificates, all documents can be forged or falsified
whether by corrupt officials, professional forgers or clever
visa applicants. This necessitates scrupulous inspection of
all credentials and, where possible, cross checking with
local authorities to confirm authenticity.
In 2000, the DRC introduced a newly designed passport and
pronounced all previous versions invalid. The new passport
has a security laminate feature, but is not machine
readable, rendering it relatively unreliable. Cases of photo
substitution have been detected. Usually this entails
imposters placing their photos into legitimate passports
that show a documented history of prior travel to the United
States or Europe. The donor passport can be from a friend
or relative. However, there are confirmed instances where
male fide applicants have paid as much as several thousand
dollars on the street for photo-substituted travel
documents. Suspicious passports are usually evaluated using
three tactics: (a) the document is rigorously examined by
the naked eye and under UV light for signs of alteration;
(b) the supposed traveler is asked to provide details about
their prior trips; and (c) the applicant is asked to
reproduce the bearer's signature in the passport.
Another persistent concern is that Congolese birth
certificates and other forms of identity can be easily
obtained with fake names and biographic information, thereby
facilitating the issuance of genuine passports containing
the same false biodata. The extent to which Congolese
applicants submit valid passports containing false
identities cannot easily be discerned, though several such
cases have been detected. Post has relied on reviewing the
CLASS name-check results for similar name variations and
close dates of birth. Often an applicant will apply under
the name of a sibling. For possible matches, the photos and
handwriting from the two application forms can be compared
to determine if the person has previously applied under
another identity. The launching last year of biodata
collection for all applicants will go a long way toward
detecting imposters. Already, post has identified two
applicants whose fingerprint results showed that they had
previously applied under different identities.
Another concern is that Congolese civil certificates,
including birth, death, marriage and divorce documents,
rather than being centralized, are issued at the local
level. This decentralized system poses serious difficulties
when verifying authenticity. Because of the impracticality
of collecting vast numbers of specimens of authorizing
signatures and stamps from town officials (except perhaps
for the most common issuing authorities in the capital
Kinshasa), most civil documents must be individually checked
at the local level. However, the huge size of Congo
(approximately the same area as the United States east of
the Mississippi River) and the lack of road and
communication infrastructure, make verification nearly
always impossible.
Moreover, civil authorities issue two types of certificates,
an "acte" (of birth, marriage or death), or an "attestation"
of the same. An "acte de naissance," or certificate of
birth, for example, is issued at the time and place of the
actual birth. However, an "attestation de naissance," or
attestation of birth, could be recorded and issued years
later at any location. Thus, a birth that occurred in a
remote area of the country 25 years ago could be
"registered" in the capital Kinshasa based simply on
testimony, and an accompanying "attestation" of birth would
then be issued by Kinshasa officials.
Additionally, Congolese civil documents are not necessarily
uniform in design, nor do they contain the simplest anti-
forgery elements. Birth certificates, for example, are
typed on plain common paper. The town hall insignia or seal
can be easily printed on any home or office printer, and wet
seals can be made or altered to appear genuine. This ease
of forgery combined with the decentralized system of
archiving and the wide use of "attestations" calls into
question the legitimacy of nearly all Congolese civil
records.
Private-sector documents are also highly susceptible to
forgery in Congo. A good example is pay stubs, which NIV
applicants could submit in order to demonstrate income.
Because there are no payroll companies in Congo, most pay
stubs are issued by the organization using a home or office
computer. Often they will be stamped with a corporate seal
and signed by a supervisor or financial officer. Because
they are so easily produced in any variation, post is forced
to give them little weight as convincing proof of income.
The same can be said for attestations of employment. Any
letterhead and rubber seal can be fabricated to issue a
letter from any company attesting to employment and salary.
Congolese NIV applicants have the best chance of proving
income and financial assets by submitting bank records.
Unfortunately, however, Congo has a history of an unreliable
banking system. Under the Mobutu regime many people
regularly lost funds deposited in banks. As a result, and
despite reform in recent years, most Congolese do not trust
the banking system and have no bank accounts. High fees are
a further deterrent to their widespread use. But even those
banking statements that are submitted must be scrupulously
examined for authenticity. The statements issued by local
banks are not sophisticated and are regularly forged with
quality color laser printers. Post has made efforts to
visit the most popular local banks to learn how best to
determine the genuineness of statements. This usually
entails observing the statement for clarity and conformity
while paying particular attention to the letterhead color to
ensure that it matches exactly the sample provided by the
bank. Nonetheless, periodic checking for accounts and
balances remains a necessity.
---------
NGO FRAUD
---------
¶4. Post sees occasional fraud stemming from real or
fictitious Congolese NGOs. Development, health and human
rights NGOs are the most frequently cited in this type of
fraud, which usually takes one of two forms - forged
documents from legitimate organizations, or documents from
phantom groups. The purpose of travel is usually to attend
a conference or to receive training. For legitimate NGOs,
genuine letterhead can be used to produce documents alleging
employment and travel orders. The letterhead may have been
obtained and used either with or without the knowledge of
organization officials. With the availability of high-
quality printers, official-looking letterhead can be easily
reproduced or forged. Likewise, documents from imaginary
NGOs can easily be created and are frequently submitted in
support of visa applications.
The conference destinations themselves can be either real or
fictitious. Male fide travelers search the Internet for
conferences, workshops or trade shows for which anyone can
register on line, often for a nominal fee. Legitimate NGO
conferences in the U.S. also attract male fide applicants as
"tag ons" with legitimate attendees. This can often be the
case with large well known yearly conferences, such as the
Lions Club or Rotary Club. Verification is key to
determining the legitimacy of the purported conference. The
venue and theme must be verified as must the employment of
the applicant. In addition, post must rigorously question
applicants to verify their expertise in the field of NGO
work and the value that would come to the organization out
of the proposed travel.
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STUDENT VISA FRAUD
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¶5. Student visa fraud in Kinshasa is not generally of the
type that is organized or systemic. There was, however, one
such instance in 2004 that stemmed from the Brazzaville side
of the house. [Note: Post shares office space with Embassy
Brazzaville, which processes visas for Republic of Congo
(ROC) applicants every Monday in Kinshasa]. The case
involved a pastor in Brazzaville who was helping prospective
students prepare their visa applications for a particular
college in Nebraska. Approximately eight applications for
the same school were submitted within one month -- two of
them from Congo-Kinshasa and six from Congo-Brazzaville.
After remarking the similarities of the applicants'
supporting documents, a fraud investigation revealed that
while the students' admission letters and I-20s were
legitimate, the financial support documents, including bank
statements, were forged. Additionally, all the students
produced letters from various government ministries
promising employment after finishing their education in the
United States. The unlikely possibility of a government
ministry promising employment four or five years down the
road further raised suspicion of an organized scheme. The
pastor who organized the fraud was never found, but
interviews of the student applicants as well as admissions
officials at the college in the United States revealed that
he apparently took payment for helping young Congolese
procure student visas to this particular college.
Other student visa fraud concerns individual cases of
applicants submitting fraudulent supporting documentation.
These include financial papers such as bank statements and
employment letters, as well as state-issued baccalaureate
(high school) diplomas. Like other Congolese documents, the
"diplome d'etat" can be easily forged or falsified. In
addition, grade reports, though fairly standardized, are not
sophisticated and are easily susceptible to forgery or
alteration.
Many Congolese student applicants have sponsors who reside
in the United States. Oftentimes they are family members
who pledge financial support. Other times, the relationship
of the prospective student and the U.S. sponsor is less
clear. There are instances where students have applied with
letters from sponsors whom they have never met in person,
but with whom they had corresponded over the Internet.
Sometimes students produce financial support documents of
colleagues of close or extended family whom they have never
met. As with all applications, rigorous questioning and
document verification is necessary to determine the
prospective student's seriousness, academic ability and
financial resources.
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OFFICIAL FRAUD
--------------
¶6. Visa fraud at the official level occurs in three
general categories: passport fraud, travel order fraud, and
imposters. GDRC ministries and agencies have in the past
issued passports and travel orders to male fide applicants
and presented imposters as legitimate government workers.
The establishment in 2003 of a large interim government of
transition poses further concern. With four vice
presidents, dozens of ministers and vice ministers, a
sizable parliament and accompanying staff, the prospects for
fraud at the official level have increased concomitantly.
Official GDRC passports have only marginally better issuance
criteria and control that do regular passports. Congolese
service passports are issued to anyone connected to the
government, from ministry and presidential staff members to
professors at state universities and employees of
parastatals. Moreover, for a fee official passports can be
obtained by just about anyone with a connection to the
government. Diplomatic passports have a stricter issuance
criteria. However, there have been instances from the past
where diplomatic passports were issued to unqualified
bearers such as extended family of Congolese diplomats or
other high-level government officials. Again for the right
price or with the right connection it is possible to gain
access to these more prestigious travel documents. For these
reasons, post rarely waives the personal appearance
requirement for Class A or Class G visas for Congolese
officials. Only for cases where the applicant has a history
of documented prior travel and/or is known to the consular
officer or other Embassy personnel might the interview
requirement be waived.
For official government travel, applicants must submit two
documents with their applications: an "ordre de mission" and
a "note verbale." The "ordre de mission," or travel order,
is issued by the relevant ministry or department and
outlines information about the mission, including who is
traveling, their position, the dates of travel and the
purpose of travel. The "note verbale" is a pro forma note
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requesting that the
Embassy issue the visa.
Here again, fraud takes two tracks - forged documents or
legitimate documents issued to male fide applicants.
Usually, it is the latter, particularly the "ordres de
missions" as few forged ones have been detected. Post has
little faith that the GDRC authorities issuing the documents
go to any great lengths to verify the validity of the
proposed mission. Again, for a price authentic travel
orders can probably be easily obtained. The "note verbale"
issued by the MFA is usually of poor quality, the original
having been photocopied many times over. Mistakes are often
corrected with liquid paper and retyped. The "ordres de
missions" vary from each ministry and can be either of high
quality with a raised or embossed ministry seal and clearly
typed, or they too can be faded photocopies with liquid
paper corrections.
More often than not, conoff must take the time to verify
that the meeting or conference stated in the travel order is
in fact taking place. For example, the applicant will be
asked to provide the name and telephone number of the person
at the World Bank in Washington, D.C., with whom they are to
have "consultations" as stated in the "ordre de mission."
Those that never call back to submit the information --
which happens -- were most likely male fide travelers.
Finally, because official passports can be obtained with
ease, government staff has in the past presented
questionable applicants as legitimate government works with
bona fide travel orders. Additionally, there have been
instances where diplomats have claimed extended family or
others as children or dependents entitled to derivative
status. In another instance of fraud at the official level,
the permanent representative to the United Nations of a west
African nation supported the G1 application of a Congolese
citizen to work as the receptionist at that country's
mission in New York. Inquiries revealed that the applicant,
who had no office work experience, was the relative of a
close Congolese friend of the permanent representative.
Large official delegations to UN conferences and workshops
must be thoroughly screened to determine that applicants are
legitimate employees, have worked at the relevant ministry
for a reasonable length of time, and that each applicant has
a clear purpose for attending the conference.
---------------------
POST VALIDATION STUDY
---------------------
¶7. Post uses a validation callback procedure to ascertain
levels of nonreturn to Congo of NIV travelers. Selected
participants are asked to choose a convenient day shortly
after their projected return to country in order to present
in person at the Consular Section and verify their return.
At the time their visas are issued, participants are given a
dated ticket, which permits access to the Consular Section
on that day. Criteria for selecting participants vary.
Some are selected completely at random. Others are chosen
due to particular circumstances, such as a first-time
traveler to the United States. Post periodically places
GDRC delegations on callback to ascertain the legitimacy of
official travel.
Callback results are tabulated quarterly. The total number
of participants due to report for a given quarter are
reviewed to determine the percentage that reported back as
required. Attempts are then made to contact "no-shows" to
either encourage them to present at the Consular Section, or
to at least verify by other means their return. "No-shows"
that cannot be contacted are assumed to be overstays. "No-
show" rates have varied from as low as 4 percent to as high
as 14 percent. Post reviews the DS-156 of each "no-show" to
discern any patterns or commonalities that could be useful
for future adjudication. For the most part, they are
individuals traveling for business or pleasure. Recent
studies have revealed no notable group patterns of intending
immigrants.
--------------
INTERNAL FRAUD
--------------
¶8. Another area that must be continually monitored is
internal fraud. Last year two incidents at Embassy Kinshasa
underscored the vulnerability of any Consular Section to
fraud from the inside. In the spring, post discovered that
one of the local guards was coaching applicants on how to
answer certain questions posed by the consular officer. In
one instance he had instructed an applicant not to reveal a
prior visa refusal on the application form. The guard was
dismissed, and as a result conoff redrew guard duties and
organized a staff meeting, which included the guards, to
review their duties and to emphasize the expectation that
staff must report any and all suspicious activity, even
among fellow staff members. Post recognizes the importance
of officers monitoring the activities of FSNs, including the
local guard force. However, the current physical design of
the Consular Section makes this difficult, a problem that
will be improved with a planned renovation of the Consular
Section this year.
More disquieting was the discovery this past summer that a
Kinshasa FSN consular clerk had been accepting money as part
of a broader scheme by others outside the Embassy to procure
NIVs from Congo-Brazzaville by introducing false documents.
The scheme was discovered when the employee was arrested
following an investigation by local police. Police were
tipped off by a Congolese who paid to benefit from the
scheme, but who apparently became concerned when he was
given a photo-substituted Congo-Brazzaville passport in
order to make his application. Following an investigation
by the RSO and Congolese authorities, the FSN was
terminated. Post could not ascertain the exact number of
visas that might have been secured under the scheme.
However, it was determined that the extent of collusion by
the FSN was limited to providing advice on what types of
fake mission orders and other supporting documents were
likely be accepted by the Congo-Brazzaville consular
officer. As a result, that officer now routinely verifies
all government travel orders from the Republic of Congo.
These two examples of internal malfeasance underscore the
need for vigilance and spot checks of consular functions.
The Consular Section works closely with the RSO and reports
any unusual activity.
-------------------------
IMPLICATIONS FOR IV FRAUD
-------------------------
¶9. Post has not processed IVs since 1998, but clearly
understands that the fraud patterns that make NIV work so
challenging in Congo-Kinshasa will carry over to this
process when post resumes issuing IVs visas in April 2005.
Post already has a feel for some of the specific areas of
IVs that will require scrutiny. Where possible, Embassy
Kinshasa has helped neighboring posts that are processing
IVs for Congolese applicants to verify the authenticity of
local Congolese documents. (Note: Embassy Yaounde has been
processing the largest number of Congo IV cases during the
past seven years). This assistance usually takes the form of
verifying birth and marriage certificates for applicants as
well as diplomas and other academic credentials for DV
winners and dependents.
Relationship verification and the authentication of academic
records will be the foundation of IV fraud work and
investigation in Congo-Kinshasa. The recent hiring of an
EFM Consular Associate will allow post to conduct more
investigations and to establish better contacts with local
issuing officials. In addition, post plans to build an
extensive library of document samples, including, where
possible, exemplars of authorized signatures and seals of
principal issuing authorities. Post's fraud FSN has
attended a fraud workshop at FSI, but post would welcome a
regional fraud seminar that would bring together FSN
investigators from eastern, central and southern Africa to
share information and experiences.
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COMMENT
-------
¶10. In general, NIV applicant fraud in Congo-Kinshasa is
both prevalent and, to a large extent, ineffective. The
bulk of fraud consists of the submission of bogus documents
purporting employment, salary and assets, or travel orders.
Post sees examples daily of applicants submitting what are
presumed to be fabricated, or least suspicious, support
documents. Because false credentials are so pervasive in
Congo-Kinshasa, they usually carry little weight when
adjudicating a visa applicant's ties to Congo. In general,
only bona fide prior travelers with convincing documentation
of employment and financial assets from an established bank
-- sometimes verified by the consular officer -- are issued
nonimmigrant visas.
Against this background, the visa interview is key to the
adjudication process. Even applicants that appear well
qualified on paper must talk convincingly to the officer of
their employment, purpose of travel and other ties to Congo
in order to be issued an NIV. For detecting NIV fraud,
there is no substitute for meticulous adjudication in
conjunction with document verification. The same vigilance
will be required with the resumption of the IV process this
year. End Comment.
¶11. Bujumbura minimize considered.
Meece