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Viewing cable 05HARARE147, SUPPORTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: THE U.S.

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05HARARE147 2005-01-27 12:25 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Harare
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000147 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
AF/S FOR BNEULING 
NSC FOR D. TEITELBAUM 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
DRL/PHD FOR MICHAEL ORONA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ELAB KDEM PREL PGOV PHUM EAID ZI HURI
SUBJECT: SUPPORTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: THE U.S. 
RECORD - ZIMBABWE REPORT 
 
REF: A. 04 STATE 267453 
     B. 04 HARARE 2046 AND PREVIOUS 
     C. 04 HARARE 2035 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  The Zimbabwe Report for the 2004-2005 
edition of Supporting Human Rights and Democracy:  the U.S. 
Record, is found in paragraphs 2 through 14.  Due to the 
sensitive nature of U.S. assistance in Zimbabwe, few specific 
activities were included.  Additional material, which is not 
for publication, appears in paragraphs 15 and 16.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2. (U) The Government of Zimbabwe,s human rights record 
remained poor and it continued to commit abuses.  Since its 
disputed victories in 2000 parliamentary and 2002 
presidential elections, the ruling Zimbabwe African National 
Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) has pursued repressive 
policies designed to restore its dominant position in the 
country.  In the process, it has ignored the rule of law and 
the welfare of its citizens.  In the run-up to parliamentary 
elections in the spring of 2005, which it is determined to 
win, the regime has closed independent newspapers, harassed 
opposition and civil society activists and passed repressive 
legislation.  Instances of political violence did, however, 
decline in 2004 compared to previous years and government 
officials issued statements that political violence would not 
be tolerated, a potentially significant departure from 
rhetoric in past pre-election periods.  In addition, and 
under regional and international pressure the regime did 
start to provide the opposition with more democratic space 
early in 2005.  However, in the last week of January 2005, 
government harassment of the opposition and civil society 
increased; the government,s intentions and future actions 
remain unclear. 
 
3. (U) In recent months, Parliament passed a spate of 
repressive legislation, including a bill that restricts 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and bans foreign 
funding for NGOs engaged in human rights or governance, and a 
bill that the President recently signed imposing harsh 
criminal penalties on journalists for not registering. 
Although the ruling party has embarked on modest electoral 
reforms, these reforms fall short of complying with the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) standards for 
free and fair elections, and the Government continues to bar 
the opposition from access to the state media.  The only 
independent daily newspaper remains closed, and the 
Government closed a semi-independent daily.  Independent 
weeklies and a semi-independent daily continue to operate. 
Zimbabwean civil society remains a vibrant force in the 
country, despite ever-greater restrictions. 
 
4. (U) Instances of judicial integrity can be found such as 
the acquittal of MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai on charges 
of treason.  Nevertheless, instances of political 
manipulation of the judicial system by the ruling party 
remain commonplace, and the Government ignores the decisions 
of the courts when it is in its perceived interest to do so. 
 
5. (U) The Government continued to use the state media to 
denigrate Western, especially U.S. and U.K., criticisms of 
human rights violations as a neocolonial effort to quash 
Zimbabwe,s sovereignty.  However, the Government,s 
anti-Western rhetoric moderated during the last half of 2004, 
one of several signals that the regime wanted to reduce 
Zimbabwe,s international isolation and to seek international 
assistance in restoring its economy. 
 
6. (U) The U.S. human rights strategy in Zimbabwe focuses on 
supporting efforts to further open democratic space. 
Resolving Zimbabwe,s political turmoil is necessary for 
improvement of its human rights situation.  The United States 
continues to communicate to the ruling party the importance 
of improving the political situation, including cessation of 
human rights abuses.  U.S. financial and travel sanctions on 
key Zimbabwean officials expanded to additional ruling party 
and government officials.  Statements by U.S. officials 
received prominent coverage in the government-controlled and 
quasi-independent local media.  U.S. diplomats emphasized in 
substantive contacts with government and party officials the 
importance of reducing human rights abuses in Zimbabwe.  The 
Embassy widely circulated its human rights-related reports 
among civil society, Government, and party officials. 
 
7. (SBU) Although the ruling party maintains its monopoly on 
the Executive branch, other institutions, including 
especially parliament and the courts, also exert influence on 
the political landscape and the Embassy continues to engage 
with them.  Moreover, civil society, the political 
opposition, and the media also still serve to balance the 
regime,s power, and the United States supports their 
activities.  In order to bring pressure on the regime, U.S. 
diplomats also continued to engage other governments, 
particularly those of the Southern African Development 
Community, on issues of governance and human rights in 
Zimbabwe. 
 
8. (U) In response to human rights abuses in Zimbabwe, the 
United States gathered information about cases of alleged 
abuses, and U.S. diplomats interviewed victims of political 
violence.  U.S. diplomats maintained a visible presence at 
significant events, such as trials, including the treason 
trial of Morgan Tsvangirai, the President of the opposition 
Movement for Democratic Change.  U.S. officials observed 
parliamentary by-elections and the pre-election environment 
in contested areas.  The Department sponsored a Zimbabwean on 
a Hubert H. Humphrey Fellowship to study human rights law. 
 
9. (U) The United States disseminated information in order to 
counter Government propaganda.  The Embassy provided access 
to information through the Public Affairs Section and other 
vehicles and supported efforts to increase public debate. 
USAID provided support to local citizen groups and local 
authorities to improve transparency and municipal service 
delivery.  A USAID-funded program to strengthen Parliament 
has resulted in increased debate in Parliament and stronger 
participation by the committees in amending legislation 
drafted by the Executive.  The United States hosted a 
Zimbabwean on a Humphrey Fellowship to study independent 
media and two Zimbabwean journalists on an International 
Visitors Program on the role of non-governmental 
organizations in press freedom.  The Embassy sponsored six 
other International Visitors on programs related to human 
rights, democracy, and leadership and two others on the role 
of civil society. 
 
10. (U) To encourage respect for the rights of women, 
children, minorities, and people with disabilities, USAID and 
the Democracy and Human Rights Fund (DHRF) supported programs 
by NGOs on a wide variety of social welfare issues.  A DHRF 
grant helped furnish a center for victims of rape, abuse, and 
domestic violence who are pursuing legal action.  The 
Embassy,s Public Affairs Section sponsored teleconferences 
with speakers from the U.S. and audiences of Zimbabwean women 
on women,s rights and women coalition building and brought 
in an American judge to engage jurists and activists on 
sexual harassment. 
 
11. (U) In support of religious freedom, the United States 
widely disseminates relevant reports on religious rights, and 
U.S. officials privately and publicly emphasize concern 
regarding intimidation and harassment of religious officials 
who are critical of the Government.  The United States 
supports efforts by religious leaders to sustain dialogue to 
resolve Zimbabwe,s political situation. 
 
12. (U) The United States funded a Solidarity Center program 
to support workers rights.  The program was aimed at 
assisting trade unions in Zimbabwe respond to and represent 
their members, interests. 
 
13. (U) The United States promoted efforts by the Government 
to combat trafficking in persons.  U.S. officials met with 
government representatives to convey U.S. interest in the 
issue and promote cooperation and sharing of best practices. 
U.S. officials widely disseminated relevant reports and 
participated in local and regional meetings to address the 
issue. 
 
14. (U) The return of a stable political environment that 
respects the rule of law and allows democratic institutions 
to function is crucial to improving the human rights 
situation in Zimbabwe.  The United States must support and 
sustain democratic elements and institutions in Zimbabwe to 
build the base for democratic change in the future.  U.S. 
efforts are key to creating an atmosphere that enables 
political participation and gives voice to those who call for 
an end to human rights abuses. 
 
15. (SBU/NOFORN) In addition to the activities mentioned in 
the foregoing paragraphs, which are suitable for publication, 
the United States engaged in other sensitive assistance, 
which cannot be published publicly.  The passage by 
Parliament and likely signing of the NGO Act (ref B) makes it 
illegal for democracy and human rights NGOs to receive 
foreign assistance so we need to be circumspect about 
mentioning specific assistance to affected groups.  The 
Government remains sensitive about assistance of any type to 
certain groups and could use our assistance to crack down on 
these groups.  Roughly two-thirds of the democracy and 
governance assistance the United States gives to Zimbabwe 
falls into this category.  As the largest and most visible 
donor in Zimbabwe, U.S. actions send messages to other donors 
about what is feasible and appropriate in Zimbabwe.  Our 
robust support to civil society, democratic forces, and some 
national institutions signal the continuing importance and 
viability of such assistance. 
 
16. (SBU/NOFORN) Examples of sensitive assistance include the 
following: 
     Voice of America and Shortwave Radio Zimbabwe, which 
provides alternatives to the state-run radio. 
     AFL-CIO,s Solidarity Center, which supports the 
independent labor union, ZCTU. 
     The State University of New York,s parliamentary 
capacity building program, which has enhanced debate in 
parliament and helped develop a functioning committee system; 
Parliament remains the only public venue for debate and an 
opportunity for both ZANU-PF and MDC legislators to exercise 
independence from the executive branch. (Ref c) 
     The democratic local government program, which supports 
the effectiveness and responsiveness of municipal 
governments, many of them opposition-controlled. 
 
The strategy discussed in our country report above depends on 
the continued funding of these sorts of activities. 
 
17. (U) List of USG-funded human rights and democracy 
programs of $100,000 will be by septel. 
DELL