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Viewing cable 05HANOI149, VIETNAM - CONDITIONS FOR DPRK REFUGEES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05HANOI149 2005-01-19 10:02 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Hanoi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 000149 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PREL PHUM KN VM HUMANR DPRK ASEAN
SUBJECT:  VIETNAM - CONDITIONS FOR DPRK REFUGEES 
 
REF:  A. 04 STATE 275712 B. 04 STATE 275820 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Vietnam has not signed any international 
refugee convention and does not officially recognize North 
Koreans as refugees in need of protection.  Several thousand 
North Koreans, however, have passed through Vietnam en route 
to other Southeast Asian countries where they have received 
protection, or in some cases, en route to South Korea 
directly.  Most North Koreans passing through Vietnam do not 
stop; those who do require assistance from and sometimes the 
protection of foreign embassies against refoulement.  The 
U.S. Embassy in Hanoi has not experienced any incidents 
involving North Koreans requesting asylum or assistance, but 
other western embassies have.  The Embassy and the Consulate 
General in Ho Chi Minh City are ill-equipped to accommodate 
asylum seekers, especially those who might not be able to 
leave the grounds for days or weeks pending diplomatic 
resolution of their cases.  Vietnam would not accept any 
official USG assistance program for North Koreans on 
Vietnamese soil.  End Summary. 
 
International Refugee Protection 
-------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) North Korean refugees in Vietnam have no access to 
formal international refugee protection.  The UNHCR has an 
office in Hanoi, but the Vietnamese authorities do not 
recognize North Koreans as refugees, and Vietnam is not a 
signatory to any international refugee convention.  As a 
result, North Koreans who appear in Vietnam and attempt to 
present themselves to the UNHCR or foreign embassies or 
consulates run the risk of arrest and deportation (most 
likely to China) for immigration violations.  UNHCR Hanoi 
notes that no North Korean has ever presented himself at the 
UNHCR and requested assistance.  The UNHCR is involved, 
however, with quiet negotiations between the South Korean 
Embassy, the GVN and some foreign embassies that have 
received asylum-seeking North Koreans.  In most cases, the 
GVN agrees to a quiet departure for the North Koreans.  In 
some cases, however, North Koreans have been deported to 
China, according to UNHCR officials. 
 
3. (SBU) Many hundreds of North Koreans have successfully 
contacted South Korean institutions (churches, businesses, 
community organizations or the Embassy) and been able to 
travel to South Korea, according to ROK Embassy contacts. 
Hundreds (or possibly thousands) have ended their journeys 
by exiting Vietnam and then flying to South Korea from 
Cambodia, Singapore or Thailand, and hundreds have made the 
trip directly, including 468 North Koreans who flew from Ho 
Chi Minh City to Seoul on a charter flight in July 2004. 
Following this incident, the GVN cracked down on North 
Koreans in Vietnam illegally; however, in October 2004 and 
again in January 2005 the GVN again permitted groups of 
North Koreans who had taken refuge in the South Korean, 
Swedish and French Embassies in Hanoi to travel directly to 
Seoul. 
 
4. (SBU) For years, the GVN has attempted to reconcile its 
political friendship with Pyongyang with its responsibility 
to protect vulnerable populations, including North Korean 
refugees entering Vietnam overland from China.  The uneasy 
compromise has been to turn a blind eye to North Korean 
refugees as long as they do not stop and request asylum or 
refugee status while in Vietnam.  This allows the GVN to 
facilitate the travel of North Korean refugees without 
politically antagonizing the North Korean government. 
 
Challenges when/if North Koreans Present Themselves at the 
U.S. Embassy or Consulate 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
5. (SBU) The initial challenge we have at the U.S. Embassy 
in Hanoi is that there is physically no space to shelter 
securely any potential asylum-seekers.  The employee 
lunchroom or the conference room might suffice for a brief 
period, but these areas lack sufficient sanitary facilities 
(a single toilet in a hallway nearby) and are behind the 
hardline and would therefore require full-time security 
escorts.  North Koreans presenting themselves at the U.S. 
Embassy could need shelter inside U.S. facilities to avoid 
being arrested and deported (most likely to China) by GVN 
security forces.  If this happened, resolution of the 
situation through negotiation with the GVN and other 
relevant actors could take two weeks or more. 
 
6. (SBU) The U.S. Embassy does not have the funds to supply 
food and other necessities to any long-term visitors.  We 
currently lack policy guidance on this possibility.  U.S. 
Consulate General Ho Chi Minh City shares the same problems 
as Embassy Hanoi with regard to a lack of facilities, 
personnel and funds to care for any North Koreans who might 
need refuge on USG property. 
 
Host Government Attitude towards Vietnam-based Programs 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
7. (SBU) The GVN would not support the establishment of a 
U.S. refugee resettlement program for North Koreans on 
Vietnamese territory.  Vietnam officially considers North 
Korea a "traditional friend" and views the recognition of 
North Koreans as refugees to be a kind of interference in 
North Korea's internal affairs.  The GVN's (often 
overlooked) policy is to arrest and deport any North Korean 
who requests asylum in Vietnam; it would not cooperate in a 
program to resettle them officially. 
 
8. (SBU) Similarly, the GVN would reject the suggestion of 
overt U.S. assistance to North Koreans in its territory. 
The GVN refuses to acknowledge the presence of North Korean 
refugees in Vietnam, saying only that some North Koreans 
enter Vietnam illegally by posing as Chinese.  To allow the 
USG to provide assistance to North Koreans would complicate 
Vietnam-North Korea relations and would require the GVN to 
ignore its fears of pull factors attracting more refugees to 
Vietnam. 
 
9. (SBU) Previous practice indicates, however, that the GVN 
is willing at times to turn a blind eye to the efforts of 
South Korean organizations to assist North Korean refugees 
in Vietnam.  U.S. programs that assisted these organizations 
discreetly and indirectly through their parent organizations 
in South Korea could have a positive impact on the situation 
of refugees in Vietnam. 
 
MARINE