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Viewing cable 05CARACAS220, VENEZUELA CONTENT FOR "SUPPORTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05CARACAS220 2005-01-25 12:27 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Caracas
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 000220 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PREL VE
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA CONTENT FOR "SUPPORTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
DEMOCRACY" REPORT 
 
1.  (U) This cable contains post's proposed draft for the 
country narrative for the 2004 "Supporting Human Rights and 
Democracy: The U.S. Record" report. 
 
2.  (U) Begin text: 
 
In 1998 Venezuelans elected Hugo Chavez president. Since 
then, the political situation has become highly polarized as 
Chavez has pursued his &Bolivarian8 revolution. In 2002 
this polarization led to violent disturbances, a brief 
interruption of the constitutional order, and then a 
crippling national strike. Political violence, often by 
government supporters facing little resistance from security 
forces, became a part of the political landscape in 2003. In 
the first half of 2004, the opposition struggled to force the 
electoral authorities to call a presidential recall 
referendum. The U.S. government supported this electoral 
solution as the best way to implement Organization of 
American States (OAS) Resolution 833, which called for a 
peaceful, democratic, electoral and constitutional resolution 
to the political crisis in Venezuela. According to 
international observers, the National Electoral Council (CNE) 
behaved in a clearly partisan manner throughout this period, 
restricting avenues for the referendum, allowing massive last 
minute nationalizations, and manipulating the electoral rules 
to disadvantage the opponents of President Chavez. 
Nevertheless, the referendum took place on August 15, and 
President Chavez won 60% of the votes. The OAS and Carter 
Center ruled that the vote represented the will of the 
Venezuelan people, despite widespread opposition complaints 
of vote fraud and pre-referendum manipulations by the CNE. In 
the October regional elections pro-government candidates won 
20 of 22 governorships. These strengthened the Chavez 
administration, and weakened his opponents. 
 
The government also increased its control over the judicial 
system, and its interference in the administration of 
justice. The National Assembly passed a law in May increasing 
the number of Supreme Court justices from 20 to 32. This gave 
the pro-government majority in the National Assembly the 
power to pack the court with Chavez sympathizers. The law 
also makes it relatively easy for the National Assembly or 
the Moral Council (a body made up of the Attorney General, 
Comptroller General, and the Human Rights Ombudsman ) all 
personally loyal to President Chavez) to remove or 
indefinitely suspend Supreme Court justices for ill-defined 
violations. This is especially significant for the rule of 
law in Venezuela because the Supreme Court administers the 
entire court system. During the year the Supreme Court fired 
several judges for decisions the government did not approve 
of, while apparently political prosecutions against 
opposition and NGO leaders proceeded despite apparent 
violations of due process. Such prosecutions intimidated 
NGOs, including human rights groups who were subject to 
threats by government supporters. The Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights found sufficient evidence of 
threats that it issued a protective order for the leader of 
one such NGO in 2002 that remains in effect. The legislature 
also passed a law in December regulating the media. The law 
includes vague prohibitions against transmitting violent 
images, or statements that might lead to public disorder. It 
also includes stiff fines that have led to fears of 
self-censorship by media owners. The National Assembly also 
passed amendments to the penal code that provide for prison 
sentences for making statements through any media that 
&upset the public.8 The law also illegalizes noisy public 
protests (cacerolazos). 
 
The overall human rights situation continued to be poor. 
Police and military units continued to kill suspects in 
&confrontations8, which eyewitness testimony often 
categorizes as executions. Such actions were rarely 
prosecuted or punished. In February-March demonstrators were 
systematically tortured by National Guard troops. The 
condition of Venezuela,s prisons remained deplorable, and 
the authorities were unable to contain prisoner on prisoner 
violence that contributed to over 247 deaths. Child labor and 
violence against women and children continued to be a 
problem. The U.S. government sanctioned the Venezuelan 
government for inaction on the problem of Trafficking in 
Persons, by placing Venezuela in the Tier Three list of 
countries not doing enough to fight trafficking in persons 
during the year. This action drew attention to the issue in 
Venezuela, and the Embassy continues to express the U.S. 
government's concern on this subject to the Venezuelan 
government. 
 
The United States supports the efforts of the Venezuelan 
government and opposition to ease political polarization 
through dialogue and negotiation, based on mutual respect for 
the rule of law, democracy, the constitution, and human 
rights. The U.S. government's role in helping bring about 
this goal is hampered by the Venezuelan government's 
hostility to, and frequent distortion of, U.S. government 
statements and actions. President Chavez has publicly accused 
the U.S. government of hostile actions against his government 
on numerous occasions, and has attempted to discredit the 
political opposition by accusing them of being agents of the 
U.S. government. Venezuelan prosecutors have attempted to 
criminalize the funding of NGO,s by the National Endowment 
for Democracy (NED) through a criminal prosecution of the 
electoral watchdog NGO Sumate. Embassy access to the 
government of Venezuela is limited. 
 
Despite the hostility of the Venezuelan government to 
perceived U.S. government &interference8, high level 
government officials have spoken publicly on numerous 
occasions against human rights violations in Venezuela, in 
favor of freedom of the press, and in favor of a peaceful, 
democratic, electoral and constitutional solution to 
Venezuela,s political conflict. U.S. diplomats worked to 
coordinate support for democracy and human rights in 
Venezuela with other governments, especially to help build 
international support for the referendum process, as well as 
in defense of freedom of the press and to defend NGOs from 
government pressure. 
 
To defend human rights in Venezuela, and specifically to 
reduce the instance of extra-judicial killings and torture, 
Embassy law enforcement representatives included human rights 
segments in all their training programs with Venezuelan law 
enforcement agencies. The Public Affairs section of the 
Embassy also sent Venezuelan police officers to the United 
States on International Visitors programs, which included 
human rights components. In Caracas, Public Affairs began a 
series of four digital videoconferences with the Police Chief 
of San Jose, California for thirty police officers on 
protecting human rights in daily police activities. Various 
Embassy sections vetted all candidates for military training 
in the United States for human rights violations, in 
compliance with the Leahy Amendment. To help strengthen the 
relatively weak human rights NGOs working in Venezuela, under 
intense government pressure, Freedom House began a program to 
teach human rights organizations and practitioners successful 
strategies employed by human rights defenders in other 
countries, and to increase their institutional capacity 
through exchanges. This program also solidified links between 
Venezuelan human rights activists and other key human rights 
activists in Latin America. The Public Affairs section 
brought speakers from the United States to talk about prison 
reform, indigenous rights, and property rights as human 
rights. 
 
The Embassy worked to strengthen democracy and the rule of 
law by sending U.S. diplomats to criminal proceedings against 
opposition leaders to show U.S. government concern. 
Opposition leaders under investigation were invited to 
Embassy events, along with government supporters, to show 
U.S. government support for democracy and political 
tolerance, and rejection of judicial intimidation. State 
Department spokespersons called attention to the negative 
effect on judicial independence of the Supreme Court law. 
Embassy officers, Congressional delegations, and visiting 
State Department officials also delivered messages to 
Venezuelan government, judicial, and prosecutorial officials 
in defense of Sumate leaders accused of treason for accepting 
NED funding. The Public Affairs section arranged a series of 
digital videoconferences on the adversarial system to help 
train Venezuelan judges and lawyers. They also brought two 
judges and a mediator from the United States to talk about 
increasing the efficiency of court proceedings to insure 
swift and impartial administration of justice and a court 
mediator to discuss alternatives to judicial proceedings. 
 
The Embassy worked to help strengthen democracy in Venezuela 
through various electoral projects, including working with 
electoral observation groups. The Carter Center fielded a 
team of international monitors to observe the presidential 
recall referendum. Embassy officers also observed the 
referendum signature drive, the signature confirmation event, 
the referendum itself, and regional elections during the 
year. The Public Affairs section put together an 
International Visitor program on electoral procedures that 
included a pro-Chavez National Assembly Deputy and members of 
the opposition. 
 
To help strengthen political parties in Venezuela, the NDI 
promoted programs with political parties across the political 
spectrum focused on political party renewal and internal 
democratization. The International Republican Institute (IRI) 
continued to provide technical assistance to political 
parties, training its members in issues such as how to choose 
and position a candidate, how to reach the masses with a 
campaign message, and how to raise funds locally. The U.S. 
Agency of International Development (USAID) also worked to 
strengthen civil society groups, assisting local NGOs focused 
on supporting peaceful debate and conflict resolution, 
support for democratic institutions, promoting civic 
education, and providing/increasing platforms for individuals 
of differing political ideologies to come together to resolve 
issues. The Public Affairs section also sent a group of 
student political leaders to the United States on an 
International Visitors Program to study grassroots democracy, 
and another group to an OAS conference that taught them ways 
to strengthen democracy and learn more about their rights as 
citizens. 
 
State Department spokespersons publicly expressed the U.S. 
government's concern that the media law passed by the 
National Assembly could threaten freedom of the press. The 
Public Affairs section distributed this statement throughout 
the media, to send as strong a message as possible to the 
Venezuelan media that the U.S. government supported its 
struggle to maintain press freedoms. Public Affairs also 
hosted a digital videoconference on freedom of the press 
timed to coincide with the debate over the law. Embassy 
officials have also expressed the U.S. government's concern 
over the law in private conversations with Venezuelan 
officials. 
BROWNFIELD