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Viewing cable 05BRASILIA233, AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BRASILIA233 2005-01-26 11:00 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000233 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2015 
TAGS: PREL BR
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY 
MARCOS AURELIO GARCIA, 24 JANUARY 2005 
 
REF: A. BRASILIA 210 
 
     B. STATE 11483 
     C. LA PAZ 193 AND 194 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN J. DANILOVICH. REASONS: 1.4(B)(D). 
 
1. (C) Ambassador, accompanied by PolCounselor, met on 24 
January with Marcos Aurelio Garcia, Senior Foreign Affairs 
Advisor to President Lula da Silva.  Garcia had just returned 
from a weekend meeting in Caracas with President Chavez and 
provided a briefing on Brazil's efforts to facilitate a 
resolution to the dispute between Venezuela and Colombia 
following the rendition to Colombia from Venezuela of a 
senior FARC official. 
 
2. (C) Garcia said Lula's conversations with Presidents Uribe 
and Chavez last week (ref A) had been positive and the GOB 
believes both sides want a resolution.  Garcia met on 
Saturday, 22 January in Caracas with President Chavez (a 
meeting previously scheduled to advance Lula's February 
official visit).  Garcia said that he, speaking for Lula, had 
suggested "rather insistently" that both sides needed to 
lower the tone at once.  Chavez seemed receptive and, in 
Garcia's presence, made a phone call directing the leaders of 
a demonstration planned for that weekend to avoid passing in 
front of the Colombian embassy (Note: We have no further 
information on this. End note.)  Chavez told Garcia that he 
does not want to aggravate the crisis, saying a lack of 
progress in resolving the dispute will result in continued 
cool relations, but not in a deterioration beyond that. 
 
3. (C) Garcia said the GOB has told both sides that they need 
to work toward "common language" for a communique or 
statement that will serve as the basis for a face-saving 
closure to the dispute.  The GOB is prepared to serve as the 
communication channel and informal facilitator to work out 
that language, although Garcia said the GOB will not draft 
texts itself for the two sides to consider.  Progress toward 
the common statement needs to occur in the next 10 to 15 
days, in the GOB's view, and it is paramount that there be no 
new incidents that exacerbate tensions between the countries, 
Garcia said.  Once a common statement is agreed, the next 
step probably should be a meeting between the presidents, 
Garcia said. 
 
4. (C) Ambassador noted Brazilian news stories suggesting 
that a USG paper sent on 19 January to the GOB regarding the 
crisis and supporting Peru's mediation was a criticism of 
Brazil's efforts.  He said the articles were unfounded, that 
the nonpaper reflected general points made to a number of 
capitals early last week, and that Brazil's efforts are 
welcome.  Garcia dismissed the news reports as erroneous and 
irrelevant, and indicated he had taken pains to say as much 
to the media.  He claimed not to know when or how the 
journalist who instigated the story had received access to 
the U.S. paper.  The GOB welcomes Peru's efforts as well, 
Garcia said, and noted also that both President Lagos of 
Chile and President Zapatero of Spain (who visited Brasilia 
on 24 January) had indicated to the GOB their desire to help 
resolve the dispute. 
 
5. (C) Ambassador asked Garcia for his views of Chavez's 
relationship with opposition leader Evo Morales in Bolivia, 
and for his assessment of the situation there.  Garcia (who 
has traveled to Bolivia as Lula's envoy) said the GOB is 
deeply concerned that political dialogue seems to have 
degenerated to "high-stakes bluffing" and that the country is 
floating along on this "stream of radical discourse."  The 
GOB will continue to try to positively influence Morales and 
opposition figures toward staying on the democratic path, 
Garcia said.  Garcia added he does not believe there is 
particularly strong connection between Morales and Chavez, 
claiming that Chavez had said to Garcia in the recent past 
that "Evo is crazy" for his insistence on heavy taxation on 
hydro-carbon operations. 
 
 
6. (C) Comment.  Per above and ref a, the GOB is confident 
that this dispute can be managed and that both sides want a 
resolution.  Brazil is well-positioned to play a facilitator 
role and seems committed to doing so in a focused if informal 
way.  We will stay in touch this week with Garcia's deputy, 
Marcel Biato, to monitor possible further GOB contacts on the 
issue with Chavez, who will be speaking at the Porto Alegre 
Social Forum on 30 January (Lula speaks on 27 January). 
Garcia has met several times with Chavez, and would appear to 
have established some degree of rapport, so we hope his 
optimistic assessment of Chavez's willingness to lower the 
tone of his rhetoric on Colombia will be borne out, 
especially when Chavez ascends to the pulpit this week in 
Porto Alegre.  We also find Garcia's assertion that there is 
little meaningful connection between Chavez and Morales to be 
a curious one, in light of rather different assessments by 
informed observers, including Brazil's own diplomats in La 
Paz (ref C). 
 
DANILOVICH