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Viewing cable 05BRASILIA210, REGIONAL ISSUES: GOB VIEWS ON VENEZUELA-COLOMBIA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BRASILIA210 2005-01-24 15:35 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000210 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2015 
TAGS: PREL BR
SUBJECT: REGIONAL ISSUES: GOB VIEWS ON VENEZUELA-COLOMBIA 
DISPUTE AND SITUATION IN BOLIVIA 
 
REF: A. STATE 11483 
     B. BOGOTA 555 
     C. LA PAZ 193 AND 194 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN D. DANILOVICH. REASON: 1.4 (B)(D). 
 
 
 1. (C) Summary: Senior GOB officials told Ambassador and 
PolCounselor this week that Brazil is prepared to play an 
informal role in helping mediate a resolution to the 
Venezuela-Colombia dispute following the rendition of a FARC 
official from Venezuela to Colombia in recent days. 
President Lula da Silva met with President Uribe in Leticia 
on 20 January and spoke by phone to President Chavez the same 
day.  The GOB is counseling "good sense" and efforts to lower 
the tone and is optimistic that both governments want to 
avoid escalation.  Presidential envoy Marco Aurelio Garcia 
will see Chavez in Caracas on 22 January, and Chavez will 
attend the Porto Alegre Social Forum in Brazil next week, 
where he will meet Lula, affording other opportunities for 
GOB mediation.  On Bolivia, a senior presidency foreign 
affairs official said that the GOB does not believe there is 
imminent danger of a resignation by President Mesa, despite 
his threats, but remains intensely concerned about the 
unstable situation there.  End summary. 
 
 
VENEZUELA-COLOMBIA 
 
2. (C) On 20 January Ambassador raised ref a points on the 
Venezuela-Colombia dispute with Ambassador Antonio Aguiar 
Patriota, chief of staff to FM Amorim, and asked for MRE 
views on the state of play.  Patriota responded that Amorim 
had spoken by phone with both President Uribe and President 
Chavez prior to President Lula's meeting in Leticia with 
Uribe on 20 January.  Patriota said Lula and Uribe discussed 
the dispute for an hour during their meeting, and that Lula 
had spoken the same day by phone with Chavez.  Lula had 
subsequently expressed the view that Chavez needed to be 
"handled very calmly."  Patriota said Brazil needs to 
maintain friendly relations with both neighbors and is 
prepared to act in an informal capacity to try to facilitate 
a resolution.  Ambassador Danilovich stressed USG concern 
about Chavez/Venezuelan connections with FARC and other 
foreign terrorist organizations, and reiterated our 
commitment to fight terrorism in the region and globally.  He 
also noted the mediation efforts of Peru's government in 
leadership of the Andean Community and urged the GOB to be 
supportive.  (Note: PolCounselor also provided demarche 
points to the foreign ministry's Andean division chief and to 
the international affairs office at the Presidency. End note.) 
 
3. (U) On 20 January Presidential spokesman Andre Singer told 
journalists at Planalto that President Lula had discussed the 
dispute by telephone with Chavez and in Leticia with Uribe, 
and indicated that, "in as much as the two presidents took 
the initiative to touch on the subject with President Lula, 
it was understood that (Brazil) should act to facilitate a 
reapproximation between the two countries." 
 
4. (C) PolCounselor followed up Singer's statement on 21 
January with a call to Marcel Biato (strictly protect), 
deputy foreign affairs advisor to Lula.  Biato said that Lula 
had counseled "good sense" and the need to cool off tensions 
by lowering the volume on public statements and looking for 
good-will gestures.  Essentially, Brazil will offer an 
informal channel for communication and good offices for the 
two governments "to find a way out," according to Biato.  It 
is the GOB's assessment that both the GOC and GOV are 
inclined to seek a resolution, since the GOB sees no 
political advantage to either side in an escalation.  Biato 
confirmed Lula's senior foreign affairs advisor, Marco 
Aurelio Garcia, will travel to Caracas on 22 January to see 
Chavez, a trip previously scheduled as a planning mission for 
Lula's February visit to Venezuela, but Biato said Garcia 
will further discuss with Chavez resolution options for the 
dispute.  Biato also noted that Chavez will travel to Brazil 
next week for the Porto Alegre Social Forum, which Lula is 
also planning to attend, providing additional opportunities 
for GOB mediation.  Biato added Lula was promised on the 
phone by Chavez that he would not make inflammatory 
statements while in Brazil (presumably against either the GOB 
or Colombia). 
 
BOLIVIA 
 
5. (C) PolCounselor also asked Biato for views on the current 
tensions in Bolivia (Biato's boss, Marco Aurelio Garcia, has 
been to Bolivia as Lula's envoy).  Biato said he had talked 
to Brazil's Ambassador in La Paz, Antonino Mena Goncalves, at 
length on the evening of 20 January, and Goncalves indicated 
he had just consulted with other Ambassadors in La Paz 
(including, Biato presumed, Ambassador Greenlee) and the 
consensus was that there is not an imminent probability of 
Mesa's following through on his resignation threat.  Biato 
said that is the GOB view at the moment, but nonetheless 
there is intense concern that Mesa's concessions are 
weakening him, contributing to a situation so precarious that 
he sees a political necessity in "continuously threatening a 
plunge into chaos" (through resignation).  Biato confirmed 
Lula continues to try to "persuade by example" -- i.e., 
stressing to opposition leader Evo Morales the importance of 
patience and adhering to constitutional processes in pursuing 
political legitimacy, as reflected in Lula's own personal 
rise to the presidency.  PolCounselor replied that the U.S. 
Embassy and Brazil's embassy in La Paz have discussed their 
shared questions about the nature of Chavez's influence on 
Morales (ref C), and asked whether there is GOB concern that 
Chavez's "mentoring" of Morales may be less salutary in 
content and effect than Lula's. Biato demurred on discussing 
the question in depth, saying only that the GOB believes 
Chavez is, at bottom, enough of a democrat to not stoke up 
instability in fragile Bolivia. 
 
 
6. (C) Comment:  It appears the GOB, both in the Presidency 
and the foreign ministry, is willing to provide a 
conflict-resolution channel for Colombia and Venezuela, but 
wants to avoid a formalized, drawn-out role. We are seeking a 
meeting with Marco Aurelio Garcia, and will follow 
Chavez-Lula contacts on the issue in Porto Alegre (our Labor 
Attache will attend the forum and report for the Mission). On 
Bolivia, the GOB seems relatively hopeful that Mesa will 
remain; we anticipate the GOB would engage robustly, both 
politically and economically (e,g., taking steps to 
accelerate financial support) in the event of a dramatic 
deterioration. 
 
 
DANILOVICH