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Viewing cable 05BOGOTA118, COLOMBIA: 2004 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BOGOTA118 2005-01-05 22:16 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bogota
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BOGOTA 000118 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR S/CT, TTIC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC PBTS CO
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA: 2004 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT 
 
REF: 04 STATE 245841 
 
1. (U) Embassy Bogota's contribution to the 2004 Patterns of 
Global Terrorism report follows.  Responses are keyed to 
questions in reftel's paragraph 15.  Embassy POC is Poloff 
Dana Brown, (phone) 571-315-2129, unclass email 
browndml@state.gov. 
 
2. (SBU) (A) SUPPORT FOR THE GLOBAL COALITION AGAINST 
TERRORISM:  The Government of Colombia continued to support 
the Global War Against Terrorism through bilateral, 
multilateral, military, and economic activities against three 
domestic terrorist groups -- the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and 
the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) -- that have 
been designated by the United States as Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations.  In 2004, Colombia continued to work with 
neighboring countries to combat terrorist expansion, 
investigate terrorist activities outside Colombia, and bring 
terrorists to justice. 
 
(SBU) B) HOST NATION COUNTERTERRORISM ACTIONS: 
 
DIPLOMATIC: Colombia has signed eight of the international 
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism and is party 
to six.  The remaining four are in different stages of the 
Congressional ratification process.  The Colombian Government 
issued a statement condemning the alleged paramilitary plot 
against Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in May.  Colombia 
also supported the Venezuelans by releasing prison records 
and criminal information on all individuals arrested. 
 
LAW ENFORCEMENT: The U.S.-Colombia extradition relationship 
continued to be the most successful one we have; Colombia 
extradited 90 fugitives to the United States in 2004.  The 
Colombian Government remained fully cooperative in cases and 
investigations involving Americans; it sought an exchange of 
hostages held by the FARC to release the three U.S. citizens 
kidnapped in February 2003.  In December, Colombia extradited 
Gilberto Rodriguez-Orejuela, who founded the Cali drug cartel 
in the 1970s and at one point was responsible for 80 percent 
of the global cocaine trade.  In late December, the GOC also 
extradited Juvanal Oviedo Ricardo Palmera, "Simon Trinidad," 
the most senior FARC commander ever held by the Colombians, 
to the United States on charges of kidnapping, providing 
material support to terrorists and narcotics trafficking. 
The threat of extradition has been cited as a significant 
concern for leaders of the FARC, ELN, and AUC. 
 
INTELLIGENCE: In 2004, all adult terrorist group deserters 
were debriefed by the military for detailed information on 
their terrorist cell before they entered the 
demobilization/reinsertion program.  Moreover, the 3,000 AUC 
members demobilized in the collective events have given 
useful information about their organizational structure and 
culture during Government processing. 
 
FINANCIAL ASSETS: The Colombian Government fully cooperated 
in blocking terrorist assets.  Throughout 2004, the Colombian 
Financial Information and Analysis Unit (UIAF) assisted the 
U.S. Embassy and the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign 
Assets Control (OFAC) in closing suspicious bank accounts. 
In August, the Colombian military, police, and investigative 
units combined efforts to produce an estimate of FARC 
finances.  The GOC planned to continue this research and 
expand it to include the two other main terrorist groups in 
Colombia.  In September, the U.S. Secret Service and the 
Colombian National Police seized 3.6 million counterfeit U.S. 
dollars from the FARC, which had planned to use it for 
weapons and explosives purchases.  The Colombian Government 
also took steps to reorganize and streamline its 
Inter-Institutional Committee Against Subversive Finances. 
 
MILITARY: President Uribe increased military pressure on 
illegal armed groups in 2004, facilitating the military's 
nation-wide campaign to retake national territory.  Although 
FARC-dominated southern Colombia was the primary target for 
the inter-service military action, the military also carried 
out actions against the ELN and the AUC throughout the year. 
 
(SBU) C) HOST NATION LAW ENFORCEMENT, INTELLIGENCE/SECURITY 
SERVICE, AND MILITARY ACTIONS TAKEN AGAINST AL-QAIDA AND 
OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS; ENACTMENT OF NEW PERTINENT CT LAWS, 
EXECUTIVE ORDERS, OR REGULATORY ACTIONS:  There were no GOC 
actions taken against Al-Qaida in 2004 but the military 
conducted ongoing actions against the FARC, ELN, and AUC as 
outlined in (B), (J) and (Q).  Military and police units 
around the country seized weapons caches, impounded narcotics 
stocks, infiltrated abandoned FARC camps, and rescued kidnap 
victims.  In August, Congress approved a major anti-terrorism 
statute that would have allowed the Government to conduct 
wiretaps, search residences, and detain suspects more easily. 
 In September, however, the Constitutional Court found the 
statute unconstitutional and struck it down before 
implementation.  The Government drafted a "Law of Justice and 
Reparations," which would offer alternative sentences, 
including mandatory prison time and victim reparation, to 
former members of illegal armed groups who committed serious 
crimes prior to demobilizing.  It will be presented to 
Congress in 2005. 
(SBU) D) RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM TO ACTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND/OR SIGNIFICANT ACTS OF DOMESTIC 
TERRORISM DURING 2004:  As detailed in answer B, GOC 
authorities had successful extradition processes with the 
United States and other nations.  Colombia requested the 
Government of Chile to extradite FARC front leader Jairo 
Cuarn Collazos, who was issued a one-year resident visa in 
November.  Colombia also requested the Cuban Government to 
extradite Luis Fernando Gomez Bustamante, a narcotics 
trafficker arrested in Cuba.  There was no impediment to 
extradition for terrorist acts occurring outside Colombia. 
 
(U) E) HOST NATION LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES, SPECIFICALLY 
IN SURVEILLANCE, INTEL COLLECTION, AND INVESTIGATION: 
Colombian law allows wire, oral, and electronic 
communications interception by the security forces and law 
enforcement officials with the permission of a prosecutor. 
 
(SBU) F) HOST GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO INVESTIGATE TERRORIST 
INCIDENTS OR ASSIST WITH INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
INVESTIGATIONS, TO REDUCE THE ABILITY OF TERRORISTS TO CROSS 
NATIONAL BORDERS:  The Colombian Government was generally 
willing to assist in investigations of terrorist activity by 
Colombians in bordering nations.  Border controls remained 
weak to non-existent, however, and neighboring countries 
routinely complained that both illegal armed group members 
and displaced persons crossed the borders unhindered.  The 
GOC entity responsible for immigration controls, the 
Administrative Department of Security (DAS) entered into a 
cooperative agreement with Diplomatic Security and Department 
of Homeland Security offices at post to form a vetted 
investigation unit to combat identity document fraud and 
alien smuggling. 
 
(U) G) MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN IN 2004 BY 
THE HOST GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING STEPS TAKEN IN INTERNATIONAL 
AND REGIONAL FORA:  See (A), (B). 
 
(U) H) DEVELOPMENTS IN HOST NATION CT EFFORTS, FOCUSING ON 
ANY NEW ORGANIZATIONS OR PROCESSES CREATED, TO INCLUDE 
EFFORTS TO UPGRADE BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY:  In early 
December, the Army announced a new Caribbean Joint Command 
center for military operations along the north coast of 
Colombia.  The new command will coordinate Army, Navy and Air 
Force operations along the Caribbean, making the maritime 
border more secure and improving operations against 
terrorists in the area.  Brazil and Colombia signed an aerial 
interdiction agreement similar the US-Colombia Air Bridge 
Denial Program. 
 
(U) I) EFFORTS TO COMBAT EXTREMIST, VIOLENCE-SUPPORTING 
IDEOLOGY, BOTH BY GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL OR RELIGIOUS SOCIETY. 
See (B), (C) and (D). 
 
(SBU) J) IDENTIFY WHERE HOST GOVERNMENT HAS DEPLOYED MILITARY 
OR PARAMILITARY FORCES FOR COMBAT, COUNTER INSURGENCY OR CT 
ACTIVITIES:  The Colombian Armed forces fought the FARC, ELN, 
and paramilitaries throughout Colombia.  The largest 
coordinated campaign in Colombian history, Plan Patriota, 
focused on the FARC in south-central Colombia, but other 
forces and police units were active in every department in 
the country against all illegal armed groups. 
 
(U) K) DESCRIBE MAJOR CHANGES, POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE, IN THE 
HOST GOVERNMENT'S STANCE TOWARDS TERRORISM, INTERNATIONAL OR 
DOMESTIC:  The GOC continued its hard stance against 
terrorists throughout 2004.  Uribe's Administration, 
inaugurated in 2002, entered office on a "get tough with 
terrorists" platform and has maintained its focus to 
demobilize or defeat Colombia's terrorist groups. 
 
(SBU) L) CONSTRAINTS ON CT PERFORMANCE, INCLUDING LACK OF 
CAPACITY OR POLITICAL WILL:  The Government of Colombia 
remained focused on combating thousands of terrorists 
domestically but lacked both the military and financial 
resources to extend the fight to outside terrorist 
organizations.  Colombia made extraordinary progress against 
terrorism in 2004 by processing more than 6,000 deserters of 
illegal armed groups and over 3,000 paramilitaries in a 
collective demobilization program.  However, continued 
success will require significant financial and military 
resources.  The GOC has requested assistance from the 
international community to help support demobilization and 
peace process programs.  Politically, the Colombian public 
became increasingly divided over the controversial issues of 
"humanitarian exchange" (a guerrilla-GOC prisoner swap) and 
extradition ) two issues that could influence the GOC's 
future negotiations with illegal armed groups. 
 
(SBU) M) HOST GOVERNMENT SUPPORT (OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL) 
FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, TERRORISTS, OR TERRORIST GROUPS: 
The Uribe Administration maintained ) in both theory and 
practice - its position against terrorism, and continually 
condemned all terrorist actions.  Select members of Congress, 
however, showed sympathies for either the paramilitaries, the 
ELN, or the FARC.  One result was a Congressional invitation 
for AUC leaders to address the plenary session in July and 
imprisoned ELN leader Francisco Galan was released for one 
day to address Congress in June.  Nevertheless, members of 
Congress usually limited any signs of support to unofficial 
actions. 
 
(U) N) PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF A TERRORIST-SUPPORTING 
COUNTRY ON A TERRORISM ISSUE.  (THE SIX GOVERNMENTS 
DESIGNATED BY THE SECRETARY AS STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM 
ARE CUBA, IRAN, LIBYA, NORTH KOREA, SUDAN, AND SYRIA.) 
None. 
 
(U) O) STATUS OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN HOST COUNTRY, 
INCLUDING EXISTENCE OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, THEIR GOALS 
AND HOW THEY FIT INTO REGIONAL OR GLOBAL EFFORTS:  Terrorist 
groups were once again active throughout the country in 2004. 
Car bombs, kidnapping, political murders, the indiscriminate 
use of landmines and economic sabotage were common 
occurrences. 
 
FARC: The FARC continued to pursue terrorist and 
narcotrafficking activities despite the military campaign 
against them.  Although 2004 was a relatively "quiet" year 
for the FARC, the group still executed significant attacks in 
urban areas.  The FARC bombed a popular nightclub in 
Apartado, Antioquia Department killing five and injuring 
almost 100 in May.  In August, a suspected FARC bombing of 
Medellin's annual flower festival injured 35 in the Antioquia 
capital.  The FARC orchestrated an attempted mass kidnapping 
in February at an upper-class condominium complex in Neiva, 
Huila Department (one hostage was released two months later 
and three remain in captivity).  The group also kidnapped 
seven people on Christmas Eve in Antioquia Department and 
massacred 16 for suspected paramilitary sympathies on New 
Year's Eve. Both the FARC and ELN continued attacks against 
the country's infrastructure and oil pipelines in 2003, 
albeit at reduced levels. 
 
ELN:  In June, the ELN showed some signs of being willing to 
negotiate with the GOC using the Mexican Government as a 
mediator.  The group continues fighting but has limited 
resources and dwindling membership.  The most noteworthy ELN 
terrorist act of the year was the July kidnapping of the 
Roman Catholic Bishop of Yopal, allegedly conducted to send a 
political message to the nation. 
 
AUC and other paramilitaries: The AUC declared a cease-fire 
in November 2002.  Since that time AUC murders and massacres 
are down by approximately 70 and 80 percent, respectively, 
according to GOC figures.  Although the overall number of 
displacements caused by paramilitaries fell, paramilitaries 
continued to forcibly displace civilians residing along key 
drug and weapons transit corridors or suspected of being 
guerrilla sympathizers.  For example, on April 18, 
paramilitaries displaced 600, killed 12, and "disappeared" 30 
indigenous Wayuu in Bahia Portete, La Guajira Department.  In 
late-June one AUC leader kidnapped former Senator Jose 
Eduardo Gnecco and his family at an illegal checkpoint on a 
highway between Magdalena and La Guajira. 
 
(U) P) AREAS IN HOST NATION WHERE TERRORISTS ARE RELATIVELY 
FREE TO OPERATE (I.E., TERRORIST SANCTUARIES) EITHER BECAUSE 
HOST GOVERNMENT CANNOT OR WILL NOT INTERVENE:  Although the 
GOC had established a state presence in every municipality by 
February (under the auspices of President Uribe's Democratic 
Security Strategy), terrorists used remote jungle areas, poor 
rural and urban municipalities, cattle ranches, and mountain 
strongholds as operating bases throughout the year. 
 
(SBU) Q) MAJOR CT DEVELOPMENTS INCLUDING ARRESTS, TRIALS AND 
IMPRISONMENT OF TERRORISTS AND TERRORIST ATTACKS THAT WERE 
PREVENTED:  The FARC had the most killed and captured for the 
year: 
 
-- Extradited FARC General Staff Member Ricardo Palmera, 
"Simon Trinidad" (extradited to the U.S. on December 31), 
 
-- Imprisoned FARC drug-runner/financier Omaira 
Rojas-Cabrera, "Nayibe Rojas Valderrama" or "Sonia," 
 
-- Killed FARC Teofilo Forero Mobile Column (TFMC) operations 
chief Humberto Valbuena, "Yerbas" (replacing El Mocho, killed 
in 2003), 
 
-- Arrested FARC international liaison chief Rodrigo Granda. 
 
Numerous attacks against President Uribe and urban centers 
were thwarted by the security forces, but it is impossible to 
cite a definitive number.  The most recent FARC attempt 
against President Uribe was uncovered by the police on 
December 15 when they found a cache of 330 pounds of the high 
explosive anfo intended to be used in a strike against the 
presidential aircraft during a visit to Cartagena. 
WOOD