Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 04TAIPEI4075, CHINA'S "ANTI-SECESSION LAW," AND U.S.-TAIWAN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #04TAIPEI4075.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04TAIPEI4075 2004-12-27 07:32 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 004075 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - 
ROBERT PALLADINO 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: CHINA'S "ANTI-SECESSION LAW," AND U.S.-TAIWAN 
RELATIONS 
 
 
A) "The Premises Have Been Destroyed and How Can the 
Four Nos Remain Unchanged" 
 
An article in the pro-independence "Liberty Times" said 
(12/27): 
 
". China's `anti-secession law,' if correctly expected 
by the government, provides the basis to use force 
against Taiwan, then the law explicitly challenges the 
premises President Chen Shui-bian set for the promises 
of `Four Nos and One Will Not.' 
 
"The Taiwan government is forced to face a critical 
problem, that is whether President Chen Shui-bian's 
promises on `Four Nos and One Will Not' still be 
effective in the future? 
 
"To answer the question is extremely difficult for 
Taiwan, especially when current U.S-China relations 
consistently improve `to the best status for the last 
30 years.'  Since there are several unexpected 
situations in U.S-Taiwan relations, however, the 
question would more easily irritate the sensitive 
nerves of the United States. 
 
"After all, this is not a question concerning the 
fundamental position of cross-Strait relations.  If the 
grand direction is not ascertained, any repairing or 
mending [the cross-Strait relations] will end up with 
no rewards.  If Taiwan ignores this question, the next 
challenge [from China] is the position of Taiwan's 
sovereignty. ." 
 
B) " `Anti-Taiwan Independence' Does Not Equal `Anti- 
Taiwan'- the Crisis and the Turning Point in the `Anti- 
Secession Law'" 
 
Political Critic Nan Fang-suo said in the centrist, pro- 
status quo "China Times" (12/27): 
 
". The purpose [of China] is not to legislate the 
`Unification Law,' but to legislate the negative, 
passive, and even the defensive `anti-secession law.' 
On one hand, to legislate from a negative sense is 
technically easier; and on the other hand, the `anti- 
secession law' may stimulate the independent faction in 
Taiwan, but expresses good will toward the non- 
independent faction in Taiwan and by so doing reduces 
the negative effect of the legislation to the minimum. 
Most important of all, to abandon the `unification law' 
and to choose the `anti-secession law' reflects that 
other than `anti-independence,' Beijing currently is 
not urgent on `promoting unification' since there is no 
time table and, thus, there is elasticity toward 
unification. 
 
"As the degree of internationalization increases, 
Beijing knows more and more each day how to utilize the 
international environment.  In the `anti-secession 
law,' Beijing's action has been defined as a kind of 
`defense,' instead of `offense.'  More critically, 
President Chen Shui-bian in the past year made several 
moves intended to make use of the disparity that the 
United States at the same time asserts `One China' and 
upholds the `Taiwan Relations Act.'  President Chen 
tried to manipulate the `Taiwan Relations Act' in the 
hope that the United States will change its `One China' 
policy.  However, President Chen's intention caused 
negative feelings in the United States, and forced 
Secretary of State Colin Powell to say `Taiwan is not 
 
SIPDIS 
an independent sovereign state,' and Deputy Secretary 
of State Richard Armitage to say `there is no need to 
defend Taiwan,' and `Taiwan is a part of China.'  All 
of these indicate that China and the United States have 
become consistent on the position of `anti-Taiwan 
independence.' It is a signal worth noting that China 
informed the United States before drafting the `anti- 
secession law,' and to some extent China got the 
`understanding' from the United States.  At the current 
stage, the United States' `anti-independence' not only 
focused on the perspective of `de-jure Taiwan 
independence,' but started to pay attention to 
`contextual Taiwan independence' as well.  When China 
and the United States moved toward the same position of 
`anti-Taiwan independence,' the space in which to 
manipulate `Taiwan independence' is incrementally 
decreased. 
 
"President Chen Shui-bian has used up the credit that 
U.S. diplomacy afforded, and left the United States 
with no choice but to stand together with China 
regarding the issue of `anti-independence.'  In the 
past few years the DPP government persistently, 
implicitly or explicitly, played the `Taiwan 
independence card' and now it is `game over.' 
 
"As to Taiwan independence, however, the situation that 
the `Taiwan independence card' leads to a dead end may 
be the biggest crisis.  Not only does Taiwan 
independence lose the legitimacy in the international 
community, it also becomes an illegal activity as well. 
But the situation is a major turning point for the non- 
independent fraction. 
 
"Hence, the `anti-secession law' and the statements by 
Secretary of State Colin Powell and Deputy Secretary of 
 
SIPDIS 
State Richard Armitage may cause the end of Taiwan 
independence, but certainly not the end of Taiwan. 
 
"People in Taiwan are not allowed to hate the same 
enemy [i.e. China] with the DPP under DPP's dominance. 
People in Taiwan should realize with optimism that 
whenever Taiwan independence diminishes, that is the 
time for the hope of Taiwan to actually start. ." 
 
C) "This Legislation Hands the Hot Potato Back to the 
United States; China Will Have More Room for 
Manipulation and the Right to Define the `Cross-Strait 
Status Quo' Will Be the Target for Bilateral Struggle 
in the Future" 
 
Journalist Sun Yang-ming wrote in the conservative, pro- 
unification "United Daily News" (12/26): 
 
". The real issue is that once this anti-secession bill 
becomes a law, there will be a struggle between 
Washington and Beijing over who has the dominant right 
to define the so-called `status-quo' in the future. 
The basic strategic thinking and attitude of China 
toward how to deal with the Taiwan issue has changed. 
As a result, which direction Taiwan will be moving and 
the issue of independence will become a burden for the 
United States.  The concept of an anti-secession law 
coincides with this [new] attitude. 
 
"The Neo-Conservatives of the Bush administration have 
been trying to use Taiwan as a means to delay China's 
rise [as a power] and let Taiwan become a burden for 
China.  However, China is passing back this hot potato 
and having the United States accountable for the 
consequences should Taiwan cross the red line.  This is 
why Beijing only wants an `anti-secession law' rather 
than a `unification law.'." 
 
D) "Criticizing Chen Shui-bian? Taiwan is not the 
problem, but China is" 
 
The pro-independence "Liberty Times" said in its 
editorial (12/27): 
 
"The United States is caught in between the democratic 
Taiwan and despotic China.  China always has used 
international negotiation and its domestic market to 
threaten the United States for concessions on the issue 
of cross-Strait relations. The United States 
consequently faces a dilemma in choosing between the 
two. 
 
"Theoretically, the United States is a democratic 
country, it should enhance its interaction with the 
democratic Taiwan and should express the respectfulness 
of the basic human rights to the people of Taiwan. 
Unfortunately, as leaders 
in the United States and Taiwan lack direct 
communication, unnecessary misunderstandings have 
occurred.  Such misunderstanding would be reduced 
significantly if the ban on contacts of high-ranking 
leaders were lifted. But if [the United States] 
continuously lets the `One-China'policy stymie 
arbitrarily, the situation could not be improved.  This 
is the structural problem between the United States and 
Taiwan. 
 
"Anyway, Taiwan is not the problem, but the China is. 
In the past twenty years, the long-term goal of the 
international investments to China, including 
investment from Taiwan, seeks to promote political 
reforms through economic development, and to push China 
to fulfill its international obligations.  The foreign 
capital brings the economic growth [in China], but it 
becomes the resources for China to build its military. 
In the meantime, China increases its political control 
internally, and prepares to use force to solve 
international disputes.  Furthermore,  China is playing 
`big nation diplomacy.'  By making use of the United 
States' needs for cooperation on North Korea, Iraq and 
anti-terrorism issues, China manipulates the United 
States with `cooperation but faction' strategy.  Taiwan 
is among the gains from this strategy." 
E) "U.S. Support for Taiwan May Not Be a Sure Thing" 
 
Chin Heng-wei commented in the pro-independence "Taipei 
Times"(12/26): 
". The U.S. true focus is not the Taiwan question but 
the threat of China, and Taiwan is merely a landmine 
placed between the two giants. It is only when the 
situation is looked at in this light that one can 
understand the U.S. standpoint on the Taiwan question, 
the TRA and U.S.-China-Taiwan relations. 
 
"Naturally, America has the choice of not defending 
Taiwan, should it relinquish its interests in the West 
Pacific Region. To put it more clearly, if the U.S. 
sells the `Taiwan landmine' down the river, and scraps 
the TRA, they will be losing the Western Pacific Region 
as a sphere of influence. This will be tantamount to 
making the same errors they committed 50 years ago, and 
creating a monster that they cannot control. ." 
 
PAAL