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Viewing cable 04TAIPEI4016, MEDIA REACTION: CHINA'S "ANTI-SECESSION" LAW

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04TAIPEI4016 2004-12-20 07:13 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 004016 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - 
ROBERT PALLADINO 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: CHINA'S "ANTI-SECESSION" LAW 
 
A) "Beijing Elevates the Level [of Its Countering 
Taiwan Independence Moves] and Do It to Show to the 
United States" 
 
Journalist Yu Hui-chen said in the centrist, pro-status 
quo "China Times" (12/18): 
 
". Sources said actually China is not afraid of using 
force against `Taiwan independence,' but China is 
afraid to fight with the United States.  Beijing's move 
to legislate the `anti-secession law' is to elevate the 
level of its countering Taiwan independence moves and 
strategically speaking, to define China's `bottom line' 
in the U.S.-China negotiations.  [Beijing's purpose is 
that] once a war breaks out across the Taiwan Strait 
due to Taiwan's provocative actions, the United States 
would have nothing to say [about the war.] 
 
"It could be a decision out of more important concerns 
for China to choose to propose the `anti-secession law' 
after Taiwan's legislative elections and to `show it to 
the United States.'  Sources said many Chinese 
government agencies and personnel involved in Taiwan 
affairs consider that the biggest reason for the Pan- 
Blue alliance to win the legislative elections is 
because the United States had openly expressed its 
attitude not to support Taiwan independence, and, thus, 
influenced the voters in Taiwan. 
 
"Beijing believes that in the current stage, the most 
effective way to oppress Taiwan independence is have 
the United States constrain Taiwan.  As a matter of 
fact, China is rather proactive on the strategy of 
`collaborative management' of the situation in the 
Taiwan Strait with the United States. . 
 
"Based on strategic considerations, Beijing is 
unwilling to see the `fantasy' held by the outside 
world, thinking that the situation in the Taiwan Strait 
is mitigating after the Pan-Blue alliance won a victory 
in the legislative elections.  However, it will be 
difficult for China to articulate the bottom line of 
`One China' when it wants to further negotiate with the 
united States in terms of the Taiwan issue since 
Beijing cannot even clearly define `rhetorical Taiwan 
independence,' `de-jure Taiwan independence,' and `de- 
facto Taiwan independence.'  The timely proposal of the 
`anti-secession law' not only represents that China's 
struggle with Taiwan independence, headed by Hu Jintao 
as the leader of the fourth generation, will enter a 
new level, but also signifies an important tool that 
will be used in the future U.S.-China negotiations on 
Taiwan issue." 
 
B) "No More Room for Strategic Ambiguity across the 
Taiwan Strait" 
 
Journalist Wang Ming-yi said in the centrist, pro- 
status quo "China Times" (12/18): 
 
". At the present stage, the two great rivals that 
[Chinese President] Hu Jintao faces when dealing with 
the Taiwan issue are: the re-elected Bush 
administration and Taiwan's minority administration 
headed by President Chen Shui-bian.  As already hinted 
in the `May 17 statement' issued by Beijing, in which 
China said it `does not fear or believe in ghosts and 
evil practices,' the `U.S. ghost' and the `evil 
practices of Taiwan independence' are the two barriers 
confronting Beijing when it deals with the Taiwan 
issue.  Beijing's plan to `work with the United States 
in fighting against Taiwan independence' - namely, it 
informed Washington in advance saying that its proposed 
anti-secession law is consistent with its one China 
principle - is a move to prevent Washington from 
turning into a factor that will interfere with China's 
anti-Taiwan independence policy." 
 
C) "China's Proposed `Anti-Secession Law' Is Not Only 
an Attempt to Intimidate Taiwan But Also a Public 
Challenge to the United States; Both [Taiwan's] Ruling 
and Opposition Parties Should Join Hands to Address the 
Move" 
 
The pro-independence "Taiwan Daily" said in an 
editorial (12/20): 
 
". No matter whether it is called the `National 
Reunification Law' or the `Anti-Secession Law,' the 
proposed bill has exposed the ridiculous mindset of the 
Chinese government in treating Taiwan as a `special 
administrative region under the PRC.'  Beijing's 
attempt is both intimidation against and an insult to 
Taiwan's dignity and its sovereignty that is shared by 
all Taiwan people.  [Our] government should closely 
monitor any follow-up moves by Beijing and raise a 
solemn protest to the international community [about 
Beijing's attempt]. ." 
 
D) "Ultimatum - Or Just More Propaganda from Mainland?" 
 
The conservative, pro-unification, English-language 
"China Post" editorialized (12/19): 
 
". But there is surely another aspect to the proposed 
[anti-secession] law involving the United States, which 
Beijing views as the key stumbling block to gaining 
possession of Taiwan despite the overwhelming 
opposition to reunification under Beijing's terms among 
the people of Taiwan. 
 
"Ever since the Taiwan Relations Act was passed by the 
U.S. Congress in 1979 to provide a basis for 
`unofficial' substantive relations with Taipei, Beijing 
has complained about alleged U.S. `interference' in the 
PRC's `internal affairs.' 
 
"Passage of a so-called `anti-secession' law by 
Beijing's rubber-stamp parliament would give [Chinese 
President] Hu the rhetorical tool he needs to counter 
the Taiwan Relations Act, which American government 
officials unceasingly cite as the basis for their 
continued support of our government and people. 
 
"As long as this proposed legislation remains just as a 
rhetorical tool or a `bone' to throw to some hard- 
liners that remain a vocal minority within the ranks of 
the Chinese Communist Party, we will not need to worry 
too much about the law's potential impact on cross- 
strait relations. 
 
"But we will need to pay close attention to the wording 
of the bill, and not just to gauge whether Hu is really 
in charge.  If the law is worded so strictly as to 
mandate military action at the slightest provocation, 
we should prepare our armed forces and public to deal 
with the possibility of military action against us. 
 
"Even though we believe such action would be likely to 
end in defeat for the communist forces on the 
battlefield, an outbreak of military conflict in the 
Taiwan Strait would have horrific consequences for our 
security, as well as regional stability and the entire 
world's economy. ." 
 
E) "China's Dangerous Leap Backwards" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" 
commented in an editorial (12/20): 
 
". The new [anti-secession] law might have the benefit 
of waking the US up to how it has let itself be 
hopelessly manipulated by Beijing for the last year or 
so into putting pressure on Taiwan and working against 
its better, strategic interests. 
 
"But the important message that has to be understood in 
Washington and broadcast to Beijing is that the new law 
will be a disaster for any kind of cross-strait 
dialogue.  Taiwan has been willing to talk for a long 
time.  It simply wants to do so without preposterous 
preconditions which nobody could possibly find 
acceptable. 
 
"This leaves the ball in Beijing's court to soften its 
stance and allow talks to take place.  Actually Beijing 
needs an internal debate about how best to woo Taiwan. 
But all the regime understands is pressure.  It thinks 
pressure works and it is about to go some way toward 
criminalizing the suggestion that pressure should be 
abandoned.  This is a great and dangerous leap 
backwards." 
 
PAAL