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Viewing cable 04TAIPEI3959, MEDIA REACTION: TAIWAN'S LEGISLATIVE ELECTION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04TAIPEI3959 2004-12-13 23:35 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 003959 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - 
ROBERT PALLADINO 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: TAIWAN'S LEGISLATIVE ELECTION 
 
 
A)  "Politics [Should] Return to Basics" 
 
Professor Chu Yun-han of National Taiwan University's 
Department of Political Science said in the centrist, 
pro-status quo "China Times" (12/13); 
 
"The spokesperson of the U.S. State Department said 
`the United States salutes the people of Taiwan' 
immediately after the outcome of [Saturday's] 
legislative elections was revealed, and one can easily 
see [Washington's] excitement behind that statement. 
The outcome of the elections, to a certain extent, has 
excluded the possibility of `overall rule' by the DPP 
government headed by President Chen Shui-bian for the 
next three years.  It has also significantly cut back 
on the room the Pan-Green alliance has for political 
operations intended to promote `a referendum on the new 
constitution' and `the name changes [plan] for Taiwan.' 
As far as Washington is concerned, the outcome of the 
elections is equivalent to the de-fusing of a bomb by 
the majority of Taiwan voters -- [a bomb] which might 
finally have triggered a military showdown between the 
two sides of the Taiwan Strait.  Also, for the time 
being, it has saved the United States from having to 
take the trouble to impose serious measures that might 
jeopardize Taiwan in order to de-fuse the bomb by 
itself.  Moreover, the outcome of the elections has 
offered the United States a special warrant based on 
`respect for the majority opinion in Taiwan' to monitor 
Chen's [words and behaviors] in the future. . 
 
"Compared with the March presidential election, nearly 
3.5 million voters [chose to be] absent from Saturday's 
legislative elections because they are disinclined to 
[get involved in] politics and they are disappointed 
with Taiwan's future political direction.  . The 
majority of voters chose to let the Pan-Blue alliance 
retain the majority of [seats in] the Legislative Yuan 
[as a way] of buying themselves a package of 
comprehensive insurance.  They hoped to rule out the 
risk of intensified conflict across the Taiwan Strait 
that might be caused by the DPP [controlling both the 
Presidential Office and Legislative Yuan].  They also 
wanted to rule out the risk of accelerating corruption, 
abuses of power, and violation of laws - a natural 
consequence resulting from the defeat of the Pan-Blue 
alliance as the DPP would become dominant as the ruling 
party.  They hoped to keep the development of Taiwan's 
future political situation open so that the legislative 
elections in 2007 and the presidential election in 2008 
will remain an undetermined chess game for both the Pan- 
Blue and Pan-Green alliances. 
 
"Those roughly 2.2 million voters who supported 
President Chen with regard to his re-election half a 
year ago did not come out to vote or even chose to vote 
for Pan-Blue alliance candidates or independent 
candidates this time.  This means that the issues that 
Chen focused on during the [presidential election] 
campaign failed to meet their expectations as priority 
policies that Chen should deal with in his second term 
of office. .  But Chen's administration still tried to 
use the illusionary `national identity' issue . . 
[This strategy] simply failed to work this time. 
 
"Public opinion revealed by the outcome of Saturday's 
legislative elections contains significant revelations 
for future leaders of both the Pan-Blue and Pan-Green 
alliances.  For the future leaders of the Pan-Green 
camp, Saturday's election results have proved that the 
political power of the Pan-Green camp has not grown as 
fast as expected. .  Whether the DPP should choose the 
middle-of-the road approach again will definitely 
become the focus of arguments within the party.  The 
most important revelation of Saturday's elections is 
that ... it takes real political achievements to expand 
the political power [of a political party] and [a 
political party] cannot rely on political schemes and 
flair. ." 
 
B) "Make a Choice between the Pan-Blue Alliance's 
Completing Legislation for a Referendum on Taiwan 
Independence and the DPP's Abolishing Its Party 
Platform on Taiwan Independence" 
 
The conservative, pro-unification "United Daily News" 
editorialized (12/13): 
 
"The Pan-Blue alliance has secured a majority of seats 
in the Legislative Yuan [following Saturday's 
legislative election].  The first task that the new 
legislature, which will start operating next spring, 
should do is to pass legislation and make `the 
referendum on Taiwan independence' a legal mechanism. . 
 
"Objectively speaking, the Pan-Blue alliance's reserved 
attitude toward the referendum on Taiwan independence 
and the United States' attempts to restrain such a 
referendum are both a result of their good intentions, 
hoping that the DPP will not put itself in an 
unfavorable position.  President Chen, however, 
distorted and took advantage of these good intentions, 
which in the end have become an amulet for Chen to 
manipulate the Taiwan independence issue 
unscrupulously. . 
 
". In other words, both the United States and the Pan- 
Blue alliance hope to hold back the holding of a 
referendum on Taiwan independence, but instead, they 
have been held hostages by the Taiwan independence 
issue. . 
 
"To change this situation, the first thing [the new 
legislature] should do is to complete legislation for 
holding a referendum on Taiwan independence.  The only 
resolution [to such a dispute] is to return the right 
to decide whether Taiwan should declare independence 
back to the Taiwan people.  If the majority of Taiwan 
people decide that Taiwan should declare independence, 
then we should move ahead [toward such a goal] in full 
gear; if not, then the President should no longer 
trample upon the constitutional rule. . 
 
C) "Taipei-Washington Ties in the Aftermath of the 
Legislative Election: the United States [Had Better] 
Talk Less" 
 
Lin Cheng-yi, Research Fellow at the Institute of 
International Relations, National Chengchi University, 
said in an op-ed piece in the conservative, pro- 
unification "United Daily News" (12/12): 
 
". Perhaps the Bush administration may think that since 
the Pan-Blue alliance won the majority of seats in the 
Legislative Yuan, the movements to push for Taiwan's 
constitutional reform and name changes will face more 
obstacles, thus reducing the opportunities for the Chen 
Shui-bian administration to provoke Beijing.  But 
Washington should also review its inconsistent position 
toward Taiwan's democratic development. 
 
"[The United States] used to use its arms sales to 
Taiwan as a means to pressure the KMT to lift martial 
law, and now it is citing security as a reason to 
pressure the DPP to restrain its political reforms. 
Washington's way of handling the Taiwan referendum 
issue seems to fall into a predicament along the lines 
of  `[We] don't like it but [we] cannot stop it.' . The 
Bush administration now tends to make a more public and 
more immediate response when reacting to unfavorable 
behavior from Taipei, leaving the latter no room for 
imagination.  Given the [fact that the] Pan-Blue 
alliance won the majority in the Legislative Yuan, the 
United States may have less chance to make such 
hegemonic responses." 
 
D) "More Work Needs to Be Done" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" 
noted in an editorial (12/13): 
 
. "The election is being interpreted everywhere as a 
rejection of Taiwan separatism.  Certainly there was a 
sense that themes from Chen's campaigning would, if 
realized, raise tensions with China.  But there was 
also a wide realization that many of these would be 
impossible to attain, given that the pan-greens would 
never win the super-majority needed to make 
constitutional changes on their own.  So there was a 
strange hollowness about the DPP's Chen-centered 
campaign, an emptiness that resulted in some 2.25 
million who voted green in March - a third of the total 
votes for Chen - not showing up at the polls Saturday. 
 
"But while voters might have balked at the risky road 
the DPP seemed to be taking, Taiwan consciousness is 
not going to go away.  Remember it was the strongly pro- 
reunification People First Party that was the big loser 
in the election, seeing a quarter of its seats go to 
the more moderate Chinese Nationalist Party. ." 
 
PAAL