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Viewing cable 04TAIPEI3904, CHINA TIMES" EDITORIAL ON U.S.-TAIWAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04TAIPEI3904 2004-12-08 10:05 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 003904 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - 
ROBERT PALLADINO 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KPAO TW
SUBJECT: "CHINA TIMES" EDITORIAL ON U.S.-TAIWAN 
RELATIONS 
 
 
Summary: The Chinese-language "China Times" ran an 
editorial Wednesday (12/08/04) discussing the 
confidence crisis in interactions between Taiwan and 
the United States following President Chen's recent 
remarks on the timetable for Taiwan's new constitution 
and the Taiwan government's plan to replace `China' 
with `Taiwan' in the names of all its overseas 
representative offices and state-owned enterprises. 
Full text translation of the editorial follows. 
 
"Confidence Crisis in Taiwan-U.S. Interactions" 
 
The centrist, pro-status quo "China Times" 
editorialized (12/8): 
 
"For two consecutive Sundays during campaign rallies 
for the legislative elections, President Chen Shui-bian 
has been throwing out a timetable for [Taiwan's] new 
constitution and the government's plan to replace 
`China' with `Taiwan' in the names of all its overseas 
representative offices and state-owned enterprises. 
Immediately following Chen's remarks, the U.S. State 
Department promptly gave its response during its 
regular news briefing the next Monday (Washington 
time).  With regard to [Chen's plan] to hold `a 
referendum on [Taiwan's] new constitution,' State 
Department Spokesman Richard Boucher said the Monday 
before the last that the United States takes President 
Chen's Four No's pledge seriously and Chen has to offer 
a clarification regarding whether his remarks have 
violated his pledge.  As for Chen's latest remarks on 
Taiwan's name-change plan, State Department Deputy 
Spokesman Adam Ereli responded last Monday, in a more 
direct and impolite manner, [by saying] that regarding 
the name change, `Our view is, frankly speaking, we do 
not support it.' 
 
"Within just one week, the State Department addressed 
Chen's so-called campaign rhetoric by first asking him 
to clarify [his remarks] and then by clearly indicating 
that Washington does not support Taiwan's plan to 
change names because it believes this will unilaterally 
change the status quo of Taiwan.  As far as we can 
recall, the U.S. government has never made one response 
after another in such a short period of time with 
regard to the words and behaviors of an R.O.C. 
president.  Judging from the context of its responses, 
Washington was already very impolite and had gone 
beyond the [bounds of] international courtesy or 
protocol by asking in public for Chen's clarification 
the Monday before last.  This week, Washington's clear 
indication of its attitude of not supporting [Taiwan's 
name change] was [a type of response] rarely ever seen 
in the engagements of the international community. 
[Washington's response last Monday] can be viewed as a 
rough intervention with regard to Taiwan's domestic 
affairs and a public insult for the Republic of China, 
including President Chen himself. 
 
"Why did the United States want to adopt such an 
unusual measure?  Why was it so strict with Taiwan? 
These are topics that require serious attention and 
reflection from the Taiwan people as well as President 
Chen.  The United States' response was actually 
understandable if [we] analyze it under the large 
framework of the international situation.  To put it 
simply, in the face of a China whose national strength 
is on the rise, it is in the United States' strategic 
interest to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan 
Strait; but under circumstances where Beijing will not 
renounce the use of force against Taiwan, Washington 
naturally will have to do whatever it can to prevent 
either side of the Taiwan Strait from altering the 
status quo so that the [cross-Strait] situation will 
not get out of hand and, as a result, drag the United 
States into a war. 
 
"It is exactly because of such a consideration of its 
strategic interests [that] the United States not only 
will do all it can to ensure that the status quo will 
not be changed, but has also announced in public that 
whether the status quo is changed will be defined by 
the United States.  The State Department's public 
articulation yesterday clearly stating that it will not 
support Taiwan's name change is, in fact, a result of 
the United States' subjective definition [of what 
constitutes a change in the status quo].  Washington 
believes that not only Taiwan's plan to change the name 
of its overseas representative offices, but also the 
move to replace `China' with `Taiwan' in the names of 
its state-owned enterprises, are attempts to change the 
status quo. 
 
"Even though the underlying reasons for Washington's 
immediate responses to Chen's words and behaviors 
which, according to the United States, might result in 
a change in the status quo are the U.S. national 
interests and the tacit agreement it reached with 
Beijing after negotiations, it is still regrettable and 
embarrassing for Taiwan to see such a strict response 
from the United States.  Former President Lee Teng-hui 
got so angry that he even shot back with [the words:] 
`the United States is not Taiwan's father.'  While 
feeling angry and embarrassed, what deserves our 
consideration is that even if the United States wants 
to respond, why can it not adopt a more indirect or 
gentle way but had to do it in such a straightforward 
manner and with total disregard for Taiwan's feelings? 
 
"To find out the reason, we believe that the ultimate 
source of Washington's tough and direct attitude is 
that over the past few years, our leaders have more 
than once exhausted the United States' confidence in 
and goodwill toward Taiwan.  Let's first put aside what 
happened earlier when former President Lee paid a visit 
to Cornell University and [spoke of] his `special state- 
to-state relationship' doctrine that he had given no 
warning about to Washington in advance.  During the 
four years of the Bush administration, Chen's doctrine 
of `one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait' and 
his insistence on holding a referendum by using 
loopholes both triggered new tensions across the Taiwan 
Strait and thus put the United States under heavy 
pressure from Beijing.  The remarks, behaviors, and 
policies of [Taiwan's] former and incumbent leaders 
have woven into a picture of which the surface is 
Taiwan's consciousness of its sovereignty while 
internally it is actually moving towards Taiwan 
independence and building a new country.  Such a 
picture, as seen in the eyes of the United States, is 
exactly an attempt to change the status quo.  As a 
result, even though the United States has reiterated 
its basic stand that it does not support Taiwan 
independence and is opposed to any attempt by either 
side [of the Taiwan Strait] to change the status quo, 
it obviously felt that it has not done enough.  Finally 
it has to use a preventive diplomatic approach to adopt 
a more severe standard for judging if the status quo 
has been changed.  [What the United States] looks into 
is not only whether the move has really changed the 
status quo; instead, it will clearly and firmly stop 
any attempt to change the status quo by either side 
just to take precautions. 
 
"After Chen announced a timetable for Taiwan's new 
constitution, Washington asked publicly for Chen's 
clarification.  Chen's only argument was that the new 
constitution might not possibly pass the threshold of 
the Legislative Yuan.  Washington said this week that 
it does not support Taiwan's name changes, believing 
that [the plan] is a move to change the status quo. 
This time it was Taiwan's premier and the Presidential 
Office that responded [to Washington], stressing that 
the plan is merely meant to highlight Taiwan's entity 
and it has nothing to do with changing the status quo. 
We are not sure whether such an explanation will 
satisfy the United States.  But it is certain that the 
United States' confidence in Taiwan is quickly eroding 
and its goodwill is obviously gone.  Now the United 
States can only closely monitor the words and behaviors 
of Taiwan's leaders as if it is guarding against a 
thief; it has to make immediate and necessary responses 
and has no time to judge whether its manner is rough 
and strict or not. 
 
"After we analyze the pattern of the latest interaction 
between the United States and Taiwan, which, in a way, 
demonstrates the difficult situation Taiwan is in, we 
cannot help but ponder why the Taiwan-U.S. interaction 
has changed this way.  Who has caused it and who has 
made it happen?  Doesn't Taiwan have a better way of 
expressing itself other than acting and pushing 
recklessly?  Can Chen take on all the consequences of 
his pushing the envelope?  Or will it be all the Taiwan 
people who have to shoulder the consequences?" 
 
PAAL