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Viewing cable 04TAIPEI3826, MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04TAIPEI3826 2004-12-02 07:34 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 003826 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - 
ROBERT PALLADINO 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
 
A) "A-bian's Pledge" 
 
Washington correspondent Vincent Chang said in the 
conservative, pro-unification "United Daily News" 
(12/2): 
 
". President Chen immediately reiterated his `four 
No's' pledge in response to the State Department's 
concerns.  The Chen Shui-bian administration has 
obviously discovered that unlike the past four years, 
the Bush administration in its second term will no 
longer tolerate Chen's willful remarks or behaviors 
that cause him to constantly step on the red line and 
trespass the bottom line set by Washington. 
 
"Yes, the bottom line has emerged.  Washington has put 
all the pledges that Chen has made over the past four 
years together and woven them into a big net. 
Washington will cast the net over Chen, lock him up and 
push him back every time when it feels that Chen has 
crossed the boundary of `Chen's pledge' as interpreted 
by the Americans.  It looks like the United States will 
not act carelessly or hesitate to inflict punishment 
against Chen's move this time. . 
 
"Having served as president for four years, Chen has 
grown accustomed to using the game of words to test 
Washington's bottom line, and he seems to quite enjoy 
doing so.  The Taiwan people have long become used to 
Chen's being a chameleon all the time and throwing out 
one promise after another.  What's quite unexpected is 
that the Americans take Chen's pledge seriously and ask 
him to stick to it.  Now the ever-changing A-bian has 
forced the Bush administration to show all its cards 
regarding the Taiwan policy.  As a result, Chen has 
also exhausted all the flexibility and space that 
Taiwan used to enjoy and left no room for vagueness. 
 
"This is something probably Chen has never expected." 
 
B) "Military Mutual Trust and Political Mutual Trust" 
 
Journalist Wu Ming-chieh noted in the centrist, pro- 
status quo "China Times" (12/2): 
 
"Since the end of last year, misunderstanding caused by 
lack of mutual trust between the United States and 
Taiwan has, several times, brought bilateral relations 
to an impasse.  But on the other hand, the mutual trust 
with regard to military between the two sides has been 
enhanced rather than been reduced.  Judged from this 
perspective, [it is evident that] Washington's current 
policy toward Taiwan is to separate politics with 
military.  Nonetheless, strengthening military mutual 
trust between Washington and Taipei is still in the 
United States' interests for the time being, but 
building political mutual trust has become a burden for 
the United States.  It remains to be seen whether these 
two kinds of mutual trust will affect each other in the 
future. . 
 
"Over the past year, Taiwan and the United States have 
maintained stable military exchanges even when both 
sides did not have sufficient political mutual trust. 
Obviously there is a certain force inside the United 
States that supports Taiwan security.  The foundation 
of such a force comes from the thinking that to 
maintain Taiwan's security is to maintain the United 
States' national interests.  Even though Taiwan can 
make use of this force in exchange for military 
bargaining chips to advance its self defense, it might 
end up in gaining nothing either politically or 
militarily if it hopes to use this bargaining chip to 
alter Washington's thinking about the Taiwan policy - 
namely, to renounce `one China' policy or to accept 
Taiwan independence. ." 
 
C) "An Independent Sovereign State Should Have the 
Autonomy to Either Institute or Amend Its Constitution" 
 
The pro-independence "Liberty Times" commented in an 
editorial (12/1): 
 
"[State Department Spokesman] Richard Boucher said `our 
primary interest is in maintaining stability across the 
Taiwan Strait, and the United States is opposed to any 
unilateral steps that would change the status quo.' `We 
are opposed to any referendum that would change 
Taiwan's status or move towards independence.' 
Boucher's remarks showed that Washington is concerned 
about Taiwan's push for constitutional reform because 
it misunderstands Taiwan's plan for a new constitution 
and thinks it is a referendum that will move toward 
independence.  Also, Washington's misjudgment of the 
cross-Strait situation makes it believe that Taiwan 
wants to change the status quo, a move that might lead 
to escalated tension across the Taiwan Strait.  But in 
reality, Washington's doubts about President Chen's 
timetable for the new constitution is totally 
unnecessary.  First, we have emphasized repeatedly that 
following several decades' of democratization and 
localization, ... Taiwan is already an independent 
sovereign state.  It does not need to seek to confirm 
its independent status by a referendum or a new 
constitution. .  The plan to give birth to a new 
constitution is actually a movement to make Taiwan a 
normal country.  The making of a timely, relevant and 
viable constitution will make Taiwan a country worthy 
of its name. 
 
"The goal for Taiwan's plan to institute a new 
constitution is to `de-Sanitize,' to get rid of 
everything that was made by the KMT, and to be a 
normalized country.  This is an internal restructuring 
of Taiwan's constitutional system and also a 
manifestation of Taiwan people's consciousness of their 
sovereignty.  The move will not jeopardize any other 
countries' interests and is unrelated to the 
international situation.  Thus, why do people outside 
Taiwan worry that it will unilaterally change the 
status quo and trigger tension across the Taiwan 
Strait?" 
 
D) "US Need Not Rein in Chen" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" 
editorialized (12/2): 
 
"US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said 
recently he thinks President Chen Shui-bian should 
clarify whether his latest statements about a 
referendum and a new constitution violate his `four 
no's' pledge. . 
 
"As the US is unable to distinguish between the 
political parties here, it is only natural for them to 
try to put down the brakes on referendum talk, and try 
to cool things down in order to avoid further tension 
in cross-strait relations. 
 
"So has Chen overstepped his boundaries? Judging from 
his inauguration speeches in 2000 and this year, as 
well as the '10 points' he made during a speech last 
month, he seems to be standing firmly on his promise 
not to declare independence, change the national flag 
or title, or hold a referendum on unification or 
independence.  But he has also promised the people of 
Taiwan a suitable new constitution during his term - 
and that it will be decided via a referendum.  At a 
quick glance, these two promises seem to be 
contradictory, but a more thorough look reveals his 
advocacy of amending the Constitution as being on the 
safe side of the US' `bottom line.' 
 
"First, the Constitution in its current form was 
created in China, in 1947.  It is a Constitution aimed 
at ruling the vast territories and population of China, 
Tibet and Mongolia, and as such it is of course 
unsuitable to the territory and people currently under 
its jurisdiction. . 
 
"Second, in his May 20 inauguration speech, Chen stated 
specifically that since there was no domestic consensus 
over what to do about the national flag, national title 
and the territories mapped out by the Constitution, 
these would not be subject to amendment.  As the 
symbols of the nation are not to be included in the 
discussions over constitutional amendments - and any 
amendment will be confined to restructuring the 
administrative and political system - then clearly Chen 
has not gone beyond the parameters set by the US. . 
 
"The DPP advocates a constitutional amendment that will 
retain the country's national emblems, while the Taiwan 
Solidarity Union advocates the creation of a new 
constitution for the nation of Taiwan.  Because of this 
divergence over amendments and the creation of a new 
constitution, Chen and former president Lee Teng-hui 
have aired their differences publicly.  Washington 
should not confuse the proposals of the DPP and the 
TSU, even though they are both a part of the pan-green 
 
SIPDIS 
camp." 
 
"Every country needs to make adjustments to its laws in 
response to a changing environment.  Although Taiwan's 
international situation is unusual and its often finds 
itself under international scrutiny, it retains the 
right to build a political system adapted to its needs, 
so long as this action does not negatively impact its 
security and that of the international community." 
 
E) "Warning from the U.S." 
 
The conservative, pro-unification, English-language 
"China Post" editorialized (12/2): 
 
". Although neither he [i.e. President Chen Shui-bian] 
nor the others in his administration explicitly 
mentioned it, the plan [to put a new constitution for 
Taiwan to a referendum in 2006] would amount to the 
declaration of Taiwan independence.  If implemented, it 
would be the realization of a long cherished goal of 
his. 
 
"The goal has proved unrealistic after all.  He had no 
sooner announced his plan than the U.S. State 
Department issued a warning that made him back away. . 
 
"Only the most nave will believe those denials.  The 
experts in the U.S. State Department certainly won't be 
fooled.  Washington have [sic] obviously seen through 
Chen.  In late October, Secretary of State Colin 
Powell, during a visit to Asia, said straightforwardly 
that `Taiwan is not independent. .' 
 
"The U.S. government's China policy used to be 
purposely fuzzy.  Powell's statement represented a 
clear departure from that long-time stand.  It is an 
indication that the U.S. government has grown tired of 
Chen's persistent pursuit of Taiwan independence, which 
has made the Taiwan Strait a trouble spot. 
 
"The Chen administration will only suffer more 
humiliations if it continues to make aggressive efforts 
toward independence." 
 
PAAL