Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 04TAIPEI3808, MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #04TAIPEI3808.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04TAIPEI3808 2004-12-02 00:00 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 003808 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - 
ROBERT PALLADINO 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
 
A) "The Actual Situation Regarding the Timeline for 
[Taiwan's] New Constitution and an Evaluation of Its 
External Effects" 
 
The centrist, pro-status quo "China Times" observed in 
its editorial (12/1): 
 
". We don't know if President Chen's clarification 
[regarding his plan to hold a referendum on a new 
constitution in 2006] can really eliminate Washington's 
worry that Taiwan will have a new constitution in the 
next few years.  But from [State Department Spokesman] 
Richard Boucher's remarks [Monday] . and the previous 
statement by a U.S. official that the status quo of the 
Taiwan Strait should be defined by the United States, 
[it is evident that] the United States cannot be rid of 
its doubts about Taiwan's intention to unilaterally 
change the status quo just because Chen argues that it 
agrees with Taiwan's constitutional procedures to hold 
a referendum on the new constitution.  Or to borrow 
Chen's words, what the United States cares about is not 
the argument about whether it is constitutional to hold 
such a referendum but whether the unilateral move by 
Taiwan will cause substantive changes to the status quo 
in the Taiwan Strait, a development that would give 
Beijing an excuse to adopt radical actions to force the 
United States to get involved in the unpredictable 
disputes across the Taiwan Strait." 
 
"Objectively speaking, Washington's doubts are 
reasonable because its intention is try to prevent 
anything from happening between the two sides of the 
Taiwan Strait.  But since the United States is reacting 
like this, it is expected that Beijing will react more 
strongly in the regular press briefing by China's 
Taiwan Affairs Office today.  President Chen's remarks, 
judged from Beijing's perspective, have actually proved 
his consistent position from de jure Taiwan 
independence to substantive Taiwan independence. 
Especially in the face of such a timetable for ... the 
new constitution, Beijing may be forced, in response, 
to talk about the timeline for reunification or even 
upgrading its military readiness to use force to stop 
Taiwan from moving toward independence." 
 
B) "Chen Shui-bian Is Exhausting the U.S. Trust in Him" 
 
Journalist Chang Hui-ying wrote in the centrist, pro- 
status quo "China Times" (12/1): 
 
". No one will trust the positive comments you make if 
you have gone back on your word too many times.  Only 
the negative ones will be heard.  The consequences will 
be the using up of one's credibility and the 
disqualification of one's privilege to make good-will 
promises.  It is because any good-will gesture will not 
be trusted.  As a result, there will be no space for 
policy [flexibility], and one [Chen] has to live on 
extremist remarks. 
 
"The United States has obviously shortened 
significantly the `time span of its trust' toward 
Taiwan.  In the past, Chen Shui-bian would have to have 
overstepped the bounds several times before the United 
States noticed.  But now every step or move by him is 
closely watched all the time.  Whenever he says 
something, he is asked to explain.  There is no time 
lag to play with.  However, at least for the time 
being, Chen Shui-bian has not been intimidated by the 
United States.  After all, there is still the ... lag 
between U.S. pressure and Taiwan's elections." 
 
C) "It Is Not in the United States' Interests to Strike 
Taiwan in Order to Pacify China" 
 
A commentary by Tsou Jiin-wen in the pro-independence 
"Liberty Times" said (12/1): 
 
"The U.S. Department of State is speaking again.  The 
tone being heard this time by the people of Taiwan is 
entirely different from the feeling they had before the 
U.S. general elections.  Before the elections, the 
Taiwan people were more understanding toward the 
offending but honest comments made by the superpower 
ally.  But after President Bush's re-election, many 
Taiwan people would like to say: please, my old friend, 
don't treat Taiwan's dignity as if it were nothing. 
 
"Taiwan is already a completely democratic nation.  Its 
people are absolutely entitled to decide what is a 
modern constitution that meets the demands of the time. 
They also have the wisdom to calculate and bear the 
consequences of their choices.  There is no need for a 
foreign spokesperson to openly call on Taiwan's head of 
state by name and ask him to provide `an explanation.' 
 
"There is no room for dictatorship in Taiwan anymore. 
Even if a president has promised something by himself, 
the promise does not mean anything unless the people of 
Taiwan approve it. 
 
". [If the United States treats Taiwan] using selective 
democratic standards and conditional justice, it is not 
impossible that the advocacy for a peaceful takeover by 
China will win the upper hand when Taiwan is pushed 
into a corner.  By that time where will the U.S. 
interest lie? ." 
 
D) "Chen Is Required by U.S. to Clarify Referendum 
Talk" 
 
The conservative, pro-unification, English-language 
"China Post" editorialized (12/1): 
 
"President Chen Shui-bian's credibility was questioned 
once again yesterday by Washington when a State 
Department spokesman demanded that the Taipei leader 
clarified (sic) his recent remarks about his intention 
to hold a referendum on a new Constitution for Taiwan 
in 2006. . 
 
"Here in Taipei, Chen was quick to deny that his latest 
take about holding a referendum to decide a new 
Constitution in 2006 has violated his past promises. 
But the fact is that Chen indeed contradicted the 
remarks he had made in May this year when he assumed 
office to begin his second term. 
 
"In that inaugural speech, Chen explicitly pledged that 
his constitutional 're-engineering' project would be 
achieved in accordance with the 'existing 
constitutional procedures.'  That is, the reform 
project would be first passed by the Legislature and 
then ratified by an ad hoc National Assembly.  Beyond 
that, he didn't say anything about conducting a popular 
vote in 2006 to adopt a new Constitution. . 
 
"Chen must have anticipated that his remarks could 
provoke Washington and Beijing, earning him charges of 
breaking his important political promises.  But 
obviously he must also have calculated that at this 
point in time nothing counts more than the need for him 
to win a stable majority in the Legislature in next 
week's elections. 
 
"It's really unfortunate that we should have a leader 
who would not hesitate to do anything for the good of 
his and his party's political interests even if this 
would mean jeopardizing the security of Taiwan and its 
people." 
 
PAAL