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Viewing cable 04SANAA3105, YEMEN: 2004 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04SANAA3105 2004-12-18 12:20 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Sanaa
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 003105 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PLEASE PASS TO TTIC WASHINGTON DC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC KCRM EFIN KHLS KPAO YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: YEMEN: 2004 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT 
 
REF: STATE 245841 
 
1. Below is Embassy Sanaa's submission to the 2004 Patterns 
of Global Terrorism Report. 2004 Addendum sent septel.  The 
text and the addendum have also been forwarded to S/CT POC 
via e-mail. 
 
2. Begin text. 
 
Terrorist Attacks and Prosecutions 
---------------------------------- 
 
There were no reported terrorist attacks against Westerners 
in Yemen in 2004.  An economically motivated kidnapping of 
five oil workers, including one western national occurred on 
August 31 in the Ma'rib Governorate.  The incident was 
resolved in a matter of hours without injuries or deaths, 
following intervention by the local authorities.  All 
indications point toward this kidnapping being economically 
motivated and not a terrorist incident.  The hostages were 
employees of the Omani oil drilling company that had 
previously employed members of the tribe responsible for the 
kidnapping. 
 
The Republic of Yemen Government continued to cooperate with 
U.S. law enforcement and took action against al-Qaida and 
local extremists in 2004 by arresting several individuals 
suspected of having al-Qaida ties.  Most notable, however, 
was the government's prosecution of the perpetrators of 
several terrorist acts.  Two terrorism-related prosecutions 
were conducted in 2004. 
 
On August 28 the Sanaa Primary Court convicted 14 al-Qaida 
associates in one trial for various terrorism related 
charges.  Convictions were handed down for the following 
crimes:  the October 2002 attack on the French tanker the V/M 
Limburg; the murder of a Ministry of Interior officer during 
the November 2002 attack on an oil company helicopter, a plot 
to attack the Civil Aviation and Meteorology Authority; a 
plot to attack four foreign embassies in Sanaa and to kill 
the U.S. Ambassador; and, for forging documents for the 
purpose of carrying out terrorism.  Two defendants received 
death sentences, one in absentia.  The other defendants were 
sentenced to prison terms ranging from three to ten years. 
Under Yemeni law, both defendants and the prosecution have 
the right to appeal rulings.  The defendants have all 
appealed their sentences, as has the prosecution.  The latter 
arguing that some of the sentences were too light.  The 
appeals process is expected to conclude in early 2005. 
 
On September 10 the Sanaa Primary Court concluded the trial 
of five defendants for the October 12, 2000 attack on the USS 
COLE in Aden that killed 17 U.S. sailors and injured 35.  On 
September 29, the court issued two death sentences for the 
ringleaders of the bombing.  Three others were convicted and 
sentenced to prison terms ranging from five to ten years for 
their roles in the attack.  This case is also currently under 
appeal. 
 
In both terrorism trials, the USG was able to assist in the 
prosecution by assuming the victims, families, right under 
Yemeni law to participate on behalf of the families.  The 
Yemeni Attorney General,s office cooperated extensively with 
the USG under this provision of the law and ensured that 
adequate evidence was collected against all the defendants. 
 
The Yemeni Supreme Court heard appeals on the death sentences 
of Abed Abdulrazak al-Kamel and Ali Ahmed Mohamed Jarallah 
for the December 30, 2002 shootings of three American 
citizens in Jibla.  No final decision has been issued on 
al-Kamel,s case.  Court officials expect that the conviction 
will be upheld and passed to President Saleh, who they 
believe is likely to sign the order to carry out the 
sentence.  Post representatives attended al-Kamel,s trial 
and appeal proceedings, which were relatively transparent and 
openly reported in the local media. 
 
Security and CT Cooperation 
--------------------------- 
 
Yemen publicly expresses its support for the global war on 
terrorism. In meetings with senior U.S. officials, President 
Saleh underscores Yemen,s determination to be an active 
counterterrorism partner.  Work remains to be done to improve 
Yemen's counterterrorism capabilities and to increase border 
security.  Yemen attended the IISS Gulf Security Dialogue 
Conference in Bahrain in December 2004 during which the 
participants agreed to increase regional counter terrorism 
cooperation. 
 
Over the past year, Yemen has increased its maritime security 
capabilities.  The USG provided extensive training and eight 
boats to the Yemeni Coast Guard, which is now a visible 
patrolling force along the coastline and may well become a 
model for other Horn of Africa nations.  The Coast Guard is a 
long way from having the skill, technology, equipment and 
training to maintain a continuous patrolling presence along 
the entire maritime border, or even to continually cover 
potential hot spots.  Yemen has expressed a willingness to 
fight international terrorists by denying them the use of its 
territorial seas and ports.  It is expanding Coast Guard 
operations to stem the use of Yemen as a &way station8 for 
smuggling of persons, drugs, weapons and explosives.    This 
effort remains constrained by a lack of capacity, capability, 
and financial support. 
 
Land border security along Yemen's extensive frontier with 
Saudi Arabia remains a major concern.  In February, Yemen and 
Saudi Arabia agreed to bolster cooperation in order to combat 
cross border arms and persons smuggling.  The two countries 
also agreed to establish joint patrols and increase 
monitoring.  In November 2004, Yemen and Saudi Arabia began 
looking at joint military exercises and ways to expand border 
checkpoints, but this cooperation is still in the discussion 
stage and much work remains to be done to expand the 
relationship.  The Ministry of Defense is exploring the 
possibility of extending command control and communications 
links to the Saudi border.  In 2003, in keeping with a 
bilateral security agreement, Sanaa and Riyadh exchanged 
prisoners and terror suspects, including the handing over by 
Yemen of an individual on the Saudi's most-wanted list. 
Although there are reports that the two governments are 
arranging another prisoner exchange, this has not occurred as 
of December 2004. 
 
The Yemeni Central Security Force-Counter Terrorism Unit 
(CSF-CTU) has greatly improved its CT capabilities as a 
direct result of US assistance and training.  Yemen also 
continues to cooperate with the USG under its Terrorist 
Interdiction Program, designed to ensure cooperation between 
ministries to strengthen military capabilities and tighten 
border posts and checkpoints in tribal and border areas.  The 
program is currently enjoying limited success as a result of 
U.S. aid. 
 
In 2004, the government's capacity for stemming terrorism 
financing remained limited.  In February, the United Nations 
Sanctions Committee designated prominent Yemeni Sheikh and 
opposition Islah party leader Abdul Majid al-Zindani as a 
person who provides material support to al-Qaida.  Despite 
repeated requests, the Yemeni government has taken no action 
to freeze his assets in compliance with their UN obligations. 
 Zindani continues to appear prominently at public events. 
 
There were no reported arrests by Yemeni authorities of any 
high-profile al-Qaida associates in 2004. 
 
In November 2003 authorities arrested Muhammad Hamdi al-Ahdal 
(a.k.a. Abu Asim al-Makki) who supported mujahedin and 
terrorist operations throughout the Middle East and in 
Chechnya.  He remains in custody. 
 
In 2003 authorities arrested al-Qaida operative Fawaz 
al-Rabi'ea (a.k.a. Furqan) and al-Qaida associate Hadi 
Dulqum.  Al-Rabi'ea was sentenced to ten years in the M/V 
Limburg trial for plotting to attack the Civil Aviation and 
Meteorology Authority.  Hadi Dulqum remains in detention.  In 
2003 the Yemeni government also apprehended suspected 
al-Qaida associate Jabber al-Banna who has an outstanding 
Federal indictment as well as an Interpol warrant for 
providing &material support8 to terrorism related to the 
&Lackawana Six8 terrorist cell in Buffalo, New York.  He 
also remains in custody. 
 
In March 10 Yemeni authorities apprehended USS Cole bombing 
suspects who had escaped from an Aden prison in April 2003. 
Of those that were recaptured, Jamal al-Badawi and Fahad 
al-Quso have both been tried convicted, their cases are 
currently on appeal. 
 
In August 2002 Yemen formed the Islamic Dialogue Committee 
headed by a leading judge.  In 2004 the committee continued 
its dialogue with detainees arrested for connection to 
terrorist groups and extremist elements, including many 
Yemeni returnees from Afghanistan.  According to the Ministry 
of Interior, before detainees are released they are screened 
by Yemen,s Political Security Organization, and make 
commitments to uphold the Yemeni constitution and laws, the 
rights of non-Muslims, and the inviolability of foreign 
interests.  In a 2004 Ramadan Amnesty the government released 
over one hundred security detainees claiming they had been 
rehabilitated. 
 
In June, the Ministry of Vice and Religious Guidance 
sponsored the first "Guidance Conference," bringing together 
more than 270 Muslim clerics from across the Middle East to 
promote moderate and tolerant aspects of Islam.  The 
conference dealt with several issues including the 
differentiation between terrorism and legitimate struggle. 
The conference concluded with five primary recommendations to 
combat extremism in Islam. 
 
Several terrorist organizations continued to maintain a 
presence in Yemen throughout 2004.  HAMAS and Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad (PIJ) are recognized as legal organizations and 
HAMAS maintains offices in Yemen.  Neither organization has 
engaged in any known terrorist activities in Yemen, and PIJ 
does not have any known operational presence.  HAMAS conducts 
extensive fundraising through mosques and other charitable 
organizations throughout the country.  While al-Qaida 
operational structure in Yemen has been weakened and 
dispersed, concerns remain about attempts to reconstitute 
operational cells in Yemen 
 
Other international terrorist groups with a presence in Yemen 
include remnants of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and al-Gama,a 
al-Islamiyya. Despite a major offensive by the Yemen 
government in 2003, the Aden Abyan Islamic Army also 
maintains a presence in the country. 
 
Yemen is a party to eight of the 12 international conventions 
and protocols relating to terrorism. 
KRAJESKI