Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 04FRANKFURT10386, Muslim Political Observers On Risk of Extremist

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #04FRANKFURT10386.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04FRANKFURT10386 2004-12-10 10:15 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Consulate Frankfurt
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 FRANKFURT 010386 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PGOV SMIG SOCI PHUM GM NL EUN
SUBJECT: Muslim Political Observers On Risk of Extremist 
Violence in Germany 
 
REF:  A) The Hague 2864 B) Frankfurt 6156 (NOTAL) C) Hamburg 
 
60 D) 02 Frankfurt 10187, E) Frankfurt 1390 F) Frankfurt 
9141 G) Frankfurt 0567 
 
Sensitive but unclassified  not for internet distribution 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY.  Muslim political contacts in Frankfurt's 
district see the predominantly secular character of 
Germany's largely Turkish Muslim community as a bulwark 
against Islamic extremism but cite the area's growing North 
African population and the presence of far-right German 
groups as potentially destabilizing factors.  While 
fragmented religiously and politically, ethnic Turks in 
Germany are united across party and religious lines by their 
support for Turkey's entry into the European Union.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Turkish Secularism Makes Extremism in Germany Less Likely 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
2. (SBU) Consulate representatives met with Muslim 
representatives of Germany's major political parties to 
assess the danger of Islamist attacks along the lines of 
that against the Dutch filmmaker Van Gogh and potential 
reactionary violence against Germany's 3.1 million Muslims. 
Former European Parliament member Ozan Ceyhun (Social 
Democrats/SPD) underscored the largely Turkish and secular 
composition of Germany's Muslim population as a safeguard 
against religious extremism.  Ceyhun warned, however, that 
Germany's growing North African community (while still 
relatively small) harbors significant religious 
fundamentalist and anti-American elements. 
 
3.  (SBU) Hesse Green Party caucus chief Tarek Al Wazir (of 
Yemeni descent) noted that fundamentalist Muslims -- while a 
minority -- are less inclined to integrate into local 
communities and often retain ties with like-minded groups 
outside Germany, opening the door for extremist influences 
from other parts of Europe and the Middle East.  (NOTE: 
Alleged Al Qaeda Hamburg cell member and September 11 
plotter Mounir el-Motassadeq came from Morocco, while a 
Frankfurt terror cell convicted of plotting to attack the 
Strasbourg Christmas Market in 2000 was of Algerian origin. 
A Frankfurt mosque raided by police in June on suspicions of 
extremist activity received partial funding from the 
Moroccan consulate (refs B-D) END NOTE). 
 
--------------------------- 
Fear of Right-Wing Violence 
--------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Ceyhun expressed fear that right-wing political 
groups could carry out "reprisal" attacks against Muslims in 
the wake of the Van Gogh controversy in the Netherlands. 
Local Muslims reacted with alarm to the November 18 
firebombing of a Turkish mosque in Sinsheim near Heidelberg 
(no one was hurt in the attack).  Following the December 3 
arrest of a 17-year old ethnic German of Tajik origin in 
connection with the bombing, however, Baden-Wuerttemberg 
police described the attack as an isolated incident. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Muslim Political Participation On The Rise 
------------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) Muslim political participation in the region has 
increased significantly in recent years, fueled in part by 
expanded naturalization under the federal citizenship law of 
2000.  Over 700,000 Muslims in Germany now carry a German 
passport, and another 800,000 were born in Germany.  Turkish 
Germans are predominantly Sunni with a significant Alevi 
minority. Although socially conservative, the vast majority 
of Turkish voters (80% in 2002 national elections) back the 
SPD because of its support for Turkey's EU membership bid. 
Germany's Green Party has also seen a rise in Turkish 
membership because of a platform that is seen as friendly 
towards immigrants and opposes recent anti-headscarf laws 
(refs E-F). 
 
6.  (SBU) Mr. Sina Afra of the Liberal Turkish-German Union 
(a Free Democrat/FDP-affiliated group) estimated that 10-15% 
of Germany's Turkish community are non-practicing, while an 
equivalent are deeply religious.  The majority are somewhat 
observant but increasingly participate in German society: 
Afra cited as an example the increasing number of Turkish 
high school graduates in Germany (from only 2,000 in 1989 to 
around 45,000 today).  Ceyhun affirmed the positive trends 
but noted that Muslims integrate into German society at 
varying speeds;  even many with German citizenship live in 
Muslim sub-communities.  Several city governments in SW 
Germany have pioneered successful initiatives to integrate 
their large immigrant populations, particularly Frankfurt's 
"Mama learns German  and Papa too", a program providing 
German-language instruction to immigrant mothers and fathers 
(ref G). 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Support for Turkey's EU Entry Trumps Party Affiliation 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
7.  (SBU) Our Muslim interlocutors noted broad and vocal 
support among Turkish Germans for Turkey's entry into the 
EU.  Not surprisingly, contacts made the case for Turkey to 
be judged fairly under the Copenhagen agreement, with Al 
Wazir remarking that Germany "cannot renege on promises made 
to Turkey decades ago."  Mr. Meze Zafer of the German- 
Turkish Forum (a Christian Democrat/CDU affiliated political 
group) opined that support for Turkey's EU membership tends 
to isolate Turkish CDU members from fellow conservatives and 
hinders progress on other political and religious issues. 
Ceyhun struck a rare discordant note by saying that he 
believed Turkey would end up only with the "privileged 
partnership" envisioned by the CDU, painting instead a role 
for Turkey as leader of a group of pro-western states in the 
Middle East (including Egypt, Israel, and Iraq) that could 
partner with the EU on important issues.  Ceyhun voiced his 
disappointment over Turkey's tepid participation in the 
coalition supporting a democratic Iraq. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
8.  (SBU) Right-wing German politicians in this largely 
conservative region have used the Van Gogh incident and 
fears of Islamic extremism to score points in Germany's 
debate on integration, including Baden-Wuerttemberg 
Education Minister Annette Schavan, who declared that 
Germany should compel Muslim religious leaders to preach in 
German.  Germany's Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution (which monitors extremism) estimates that only 
0.1% of Germany's Muslims belong to radical Islamic 
movements and believe that the secular and moderate leanings 
of most Muslims in Germany mean that fundamentalist appeals 
are unlikely to gain traction within the community at large; 
although such groups pose an obvious danger. 
 
9.  (SBU) The economic contributions of Germany's Muslim 
immigrants (particularly given the country's aging workforce 
and dwindling birth rate) are significant; however, recent 
anti-headscarf laws show the country's struggle to integrate 
a culture seen by many as incompatible with "German" values 
(such as gender equality).  Fear sparked by the Van Gogh 
murder has added a new subtext to Germany's continuing 
debate on how to accommodate diversity.  END COMMENT.