Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
2011/08/25
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Consulate Kaduna
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Ponta Delgada
Consulate Peshawar
REO Mosul
REO Kirkuk
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
US Delegation FEST TWO
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AF
ADANA
ASEC
AFIN
AMGT
AE
AORC
AID
AR
AO
AU
ASEAN
AGOA
AFGHANISTAN
AFFAIRS
AMED
APER
ASECARP
APEC
AEMR
AS
AA
ANET
AFLU
ABLD
AL
ASUP
AJ
APECO
AMER
ABUD
AODE
AM
AFSN
AESC
AND
AG
ALOW
AROC
AVIANFLU
ATRN
ACOA
AEGR
AMGMT
AADP
AFSI
ACABQ
APRM
AZ
AIDS
ASE
AGAO
ADCO
ABDALLAH
ARF
AIDAC
ACOTA
ASCH
AC
ASEG
AGR
ACS
AMCHAMS
AN
AMIA
ASIG
ADPM
ADB
ANARCHISTS
ALOWAR
ARM
AUC
AINF
AINT
AORG
AY
AVIAN
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARSO
ARABBL
ASO
ANTITERRORISM
ARABL
AOWC
AGRICULTURE
ALJAZEERA
AMTC
AFINM
AOCR
ABER
ARR
AFPK
ASSEMBLY
ASSK
AZE
AORCYM
AINR
AGMT
AEC
ACKM
APRC
AIN
ASCC
AFPREL
ASED
APERTH
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AOMS
AORCO
ANTXON
ARC
AFAF
ADIP
AIAG
AFARI
AEMED
AORL
AX
ASECAF
AOPC
ASECAFIN
AFZAL
APCS
AMB
AGUIRRE
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AIT
ARCH
AMEX
ALI
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
ALEXANDER
ATRD
AEIR
AOIC
ABLDG
ASEX
AFR
ASCE
ATRA
ASEK
AER
ALOUNI
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AMAT
AEMRS
ASPA
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ALL
AECL
ACAO
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORD
AFL
AME
ADM
ASECPHUM
AGIT
ABT
ASECVE
AGUILAR
AT
ABMC
ALZUGUREN
ANGEL
ASR
ANTONIO
BMGT
BEXP
BM
BG
BL
BA
BR
BTA
BO
BY
BBSR
BLUE
BK
BF
BTIO
BELLVIEW
BE
BU
BN
BH
BD
BC
BTC
BILAT
BT
BX
BRUSSELS
BP
BB
BRPA
BUSH
BURMA
BMENA
BESP
BIT
BBG
BGD
BMEAID
BAGHDAD
BEN
BIO
BMOT
BWC
BLUNT
BURNS
BUT
BGMT
BAIO
BCW
BOEHNER
BFIF
BOL
BASHAR
BIMSTEC
BOU
BIDEN
BZ
BFIN
BTRA
BI
BHUM
BOIKO
BERARDUCCI
BOUCHAIB
BORDER
BEXPC
BTIU
BTT
BIOS
BEXB
BGPGOV
BOND
BLR
CE
CG
CH
CVR
CASC
CU
CI
CD
CO
CDG
CB
CJAN
CPAS
COM
CVIS
CMGT
CT
CENTCOM
CNARC
CTERR
COUNTER
CHIEF
CDC
CTR
CBW
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CY
CA
CM
CS
CWC
CN
CITES
CF
CWG
CIVS
CFIS
CASCC
CROATIA
CONS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CASA
COE
CJ
CHR
CODEL
CR
CBC
CACS
CHERTOFF
CAS
CONTROL
CONDITIONS
CONDOLEEZZA
CITEL
CV
CLINTON
CHG
CZ
CON
CTBT
CEN
CRIMES
COMMERCE
CLOK
CRISTINA
CFED
CARC
CND
CTM
CARICOM
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CBTH
CHINA
CSW
CICTE
CJUS
CYPRUS
CW
CAMBODIA
CENSUS
CIDA
CRIME
CBG
CBE
CMGMT
CAIO
CEC
CARSON
CPCTC
CEDAW
COMESA
CVIA
CWCM
CEA
COSI
CAPC
CGEN
COPUOS
CGOPRC
COETRD
CKGR
CFE
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CLO
CAFTA
CVISU
CHRISTOPHER
CACM
CIAT
CDB
CIS
CUL
CHAO
CNC
CL
CSEP
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAN
CAJC
CUIS
CONSULAR
CLMT
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CAC
CROS
CIO
CPUOS
CKOR
CVPR
CONG
CONTROLS
CEPTER
CVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGKIRF
CDCE
DPOL
DEMARCHE
DHS
DR
DA
DISENGAGEMENT
DEMOCRATIC
DEFENSE
DJ
DY
DARFUR
DHRF
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DO
DARFR
DOC
DRL
DK
DOJ
DTRA
DOMESTIC
DAC
DOD
DEAX
DIEZ
DEOC
DELTAVIOLENCE
DCOM
DMINE
DRC
DCG
DPKO
DOMESTICPOLITICS
DE
DB
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DHLAKAMA
DHSX
DS
DKEM
DAO
DCM
DANIEL
DEM
DAVID
DCRM
ETRD
EAGR
ETTC
EAID
ECON
EFIN
ECIN
EINV
ELAB
EAIR
ENRG
EPET
EWWT
ECPS
EIND
EMIN
ELTN
EC
ETMIN
EUC
EZ
ET
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EU
EUN
EG
EINT
ER
ECONOMICS
ES
EMS
ENIV
EEB
EN
ECE
ECOSOC
EK
ENVIRONMENT
EFIS
EI
EWT
ENGRD
ECPSN
EXIM
EIAD
ERIN
ECPC
EDEV
ENGY
ECTRD
EPA
ESTH
ECCT
EINVECON
ENGR
ERTD
EUR
EAP
EWWC
ELTD
EL
EXIMOPIC
EXTERNAL
ETRDEC
ESCAP
ECO
EGAD
ELNT
ECONOMIC
ENV
ETRN
EIAR
EUMEM
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EREL
ECOM
ECONETRDEAGRJA
ETCC
ETRG
ECONOMY
EMED
ETR
ENERG
EITC
EFINOECD
EURM
EENG
ERA
EXPORT
ENRD
ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC
EGEN
EBRD
EVIN
ETRAD
ECOWAS
EFTA
ECONETRDBESPAR
EGOVSY
EPIN
EID
ECONENRG
EDRC
ESENV
ETT
EB
ENER
ELTNSNAR
ECHEVARRIA
ETRC
EPIT
EDUC
ESA
EFI
ENRGY
ESCI
EE
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
ECIP
EIAID
EIVN
EBEXP
ESTN
EING
EGOV
ETRA
EPETEIND
ELAN
ETRDGK
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
EPEC
ENVI
ELN
EAG
EPCS
EPRT
EPTED
ETRB
EUM
EAIDS
EFIC
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EAIDAR
ESF
EIDN
ELAM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
ECN
EDA
EXBS
EINTECPS
ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ
EPREL
EAC
EINVEFIN
ETA
EAGER
EINDIR
ECA
ECLAC
ELAP
EITI
EUCOM
ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID
EARG
ELDIN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EFINTS
ECCP
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
EAIDNI
EFQ
ECOQKPKO
EGPHUM
EBUD
ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ
ENERGY
ELB
EINDETRD
EMI
ECONEFIN
EIB
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EIN
EFIM
ETIO
ELAINE
EMN
EATO
EWTR
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
EPPD
ENRGIZ
EISL
ESPINOSA
ELEC
EAIG
ESLCO
EUREM
ENTG
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ECINECONCS
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
EFND
EPECO
EAIRECONRP
ERGR
ETRDPGOV
ECPN
ENRGMO
EPWR
EET
EAIS
EAGRE
EDUARDO
EAGRRP
EAIDPHUMPRELUG
EICN
ECONQH
EVN
EGHG
ELBR
EINF
EAIDHO
EENV
ETEX
ERNG
ED
FR
FREEDOM
FINREF
FJ
FI
FRELIMO
FOREIGN
FAA
FETHI
FAS
FTAA
FRB
FAO
FCS
FINANCE
FWS
FTA
FEMA
FDA
FLU
FRANCISCO
FBI
FORCE
FO
FARC
FK
FT
FCSC
FAC
FM
FMGT
FINV
FCSCEG
FARM
FERNANDO
FINR
FIN
FINE
FIR
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FCUL
FKLU
FMLN
FISO
FIXED
GM
GMUS
GG
GR
GE
GAZA
GT
GH
GZ
GJ
GLOBAL
GV
GABY
GOI
GA
GCC
GB
GY
GATT
GC
GUAM
GEORGE
GTIP
GOV
GOMEZ
GUTIERREZ
GL
GKGIC
GF
GU
GWI
GARCIA
GTMO
GN
GANGS
GIPNC
GAERC
GREGG
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
GERARD
GI
HK
HR
HUMANR
HUMAN
HO
HA
HUMANRIGHTS
HU
HHS
HIV
HUM
HRKAWC
HILLEN
HILLARY
HDP
HUMRIT
HSTC
HUMANITARIAN
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HURI
HL
HRETRD
HOURANI
HG
HARRIET
HESHAM
HI
HNCHR
HARRY
HRECON
HRC
HOSTAGES
HEBRON
HUMOR
HSWG
HYMPSK
HECTOR
HN
HYDE
HUD
HRPGOV
HIGHLIGHTS
ID
ILC
IS
IZ
ICAO
IMO
ITU
IR
IAEA
ICRC
IPROP
IT
IBRD
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ISSUES
ITRA
IV
IO
IGAD
IRAQ
IN
IMF
ICTR
ISCON
IADB
IDB
IEA
INR
IWC
ICCAT
ILO
INMARSAT
IOM
ICJ
IQ
ISPA
ITRD
IPR
INTELSAT
ISN
IAHRC
INTERNAL
IFAD
IICA
IHO
IRAN
IL
IRCE
IC
INTELLECTUAL
IRM
IE
ICTY
IDLI
IFO
ISCA
INF
INL
ISRAEL
INV
IBB
INFLUENZA
ISPL
ITER
ITIA
INRA
ISAF
IACHR
INTERPOL
IFR
IRS
INRB
IEF
ISAAC
ICC
INDO
IIP
IATTC
INAUGURATION
IND
INS
IZPREL
IACI
IEFIN
INNP
ILAB
IA
IMTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
IFIN
IRAJ
IX
ICG
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IACW
IK
IUCN
IZEAID
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
ISO
ICES
IRMO
ITPGOV
IQNV
IMSO
IRDB
IMET
INCB
IFRC
JA
JO
JP
JM
JCIC
JOHN
JE
JEFFERY
JS
JUS
JN
JOHNNIE
JAMES
JKUS
JOSEPH
JML
JAWAD
JSRP
JIMENEZ
JOSE
JKJUS
JK
JAPAN
KMDR
KPAO
KPKO
KJUS
KCRM
KGHG
KFRD
KWMN
KDEM
KTFN
KHIV
KGIC
KIDE
KSCA
KNNP
KHUM
KIPR
KSUM
KISL
KIRF
KCOR
KRCM
KPAL
KWBG
KN
KS
KOMC
KSEP
KFLU
KPWR
KTIA
KSEO
KMPI
KHLS
KICC
KSTH
KMCA
KVPR
KPRM
KE
KU
KZ
KFLO
KSAF
KTIP
KTEX
KBCT
KOCI
KOLY
KOR
KAWC
KACT
KUNR
KTDB
KSTC
KLIG
KSKN
KNN
KCFE
KCIP
KGHA
KHDP
KPOW
KUNC
KDRL
KV
KPREL
KCRS
KPOL
KRVC
KRIM
KGIT
KWIR
KT
KIRC
KOMO
KRFD
KUWAIT
KG
KFIN
KSCI
KTFIN
KFTN
KGOV
KPRV
KSAC
KGIV
KCRIM
KPIR
KSOC
KBIO
KW
KGLB
KMWN
KPO
KFSC
KSEAO
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KREC
KFPC
KUNH
KCSA
KMRS
KNDP
KR
KICCPUR
KPPAO
KCSY
KTBT
KCIS
KNEP
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KNNB
KGCC
KINR
KPOP
KMFO
KENV
KNAR
KVIR
KDRG
KDMR
KFCE
KNAO
KDEN
KGCN
KICA
KIMMITT
KMCC
KLFU
KMSG
KSEC
KUM
KCUL
KMNP
KSMT
KCOM
KOMCSG
KSPR
KPMI
KRAD
KIND
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KTER
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KITA
KTSC
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KJUST
KMIG
KLAB
KTFR
KSEI
KSTT
KAPO
KSTS
KLSO
KWNN
KPOA
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KBTS
KWWW
KY
KJRE
KPAOKMDRKE
KCRCM
KSCS
KWMNCI
KESO
KWUN
KPLS
KIIP
KEDEM
KPAOY
KRIF
KGICKS
KREF
KTRD
KFRDSOCIRO
KTAO
KJU
KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW
KEN
KO
KNEI
KEMR
KKIV
KEAI
KWAC
KRCIM
KWCI
KFIU
KWIC
KCORR
KOMS
KNNO
KPAI
KBWG
KTTB
KTBD
KTIALG
KILS
KFEM
KTDM
KESS
KNUC
KPA
KOMCCO
KCEM
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KWN
KERG
KLTN
KALM
KCCP
KSUMPHUM
KREL
KGH
KLIP
KTLA
KAWK
KWMM
KVRP
KVRC
KAID
KSLG
KDEMK
KX
KIF
KNPR
KCFC
KFTFN
KTFM
KPDD
KCERS
KMOC
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KDRM
KEPREL
KBTR
KEDU
KNP
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KISLPINR
KTPN
KA
KJUSTH
KPIN
KDEV
KTDD
KAKA
KFRP
KWNM
KTSD
KINL
KJUSKUNR
KWWMN
KECF
KWBC
KPRO
KVBL
KOM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KEDM
KFLD
KLPM
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KM
KWMNCS
KAWS
KLAP
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KPFO
KDP
KCMR
KRMS
KNPT
KNNNP
KTIAPARM
KDTB
KNUP
KPGOV
KNAP
KNNC
KUK
KSRE
KREISLER
KIVP
KQ
KTIAEUN
KPALAOIS
KRM
KISLAO
KWM
KFLOA
LE
LU
LH
LA
LG
LO
LY
LANTERN
LI
LABOR
LORAN
LTTE
LT
LAS
LAB
LAW
LVPR
LARREA
LEBIK
LAURA
LS
LOTT
LOVE
LR
LEON
LAVIN
LGAT
LV
LAOS
LOG
LN
LB
MOPS
MO
MARR
ML
MASS
MZ
MR
MNUC
MX
MV
MCC
MY
MEDIA
MTCRE
MG
MCAP
MOPPS
MP
MI
MK
MC
MD
MA
MU
MASC
MW
MT
MEPP
MN
MTCR
MH
MEPI
MIL
MNUCPTEREZ
MMAR
MICHAEL
MUNC
MDC
MPOS
MONUC
MAR
MGMT
MAS
MEPN
MENDIETA
MARIA
MONTENEGRO
MOOPS
MSG
MARITIME
MURRAY
MUKASEY
MOTO
MCA
MFO
MEX
MRSEC
MMED
MACP
MAAR
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MAPP
MGT
MARQUEZ
MANUEL
MNUR
MCCAIN
MF
MOHAMMAD
MOHAMED
MNU
MFA
MILITANTS
MINORITIES
MTS
MLS
MILI
MIAH
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MARAD
MNVC
MINURSO
MNUCUN
MIK
MARK
MBM
MPP
MILITARY
MAPS
MNUK
MILA
MTRRE
MACEDONIA
MICHEL
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
MARRGH
MRCRE
MTRE
MORALES
MAP
MCTRE
MHUC
MOPSGRPARM
MOROCCO
MCAPS
NL
NU
NS
NI
NPT
NATO
NO
NG
NATEU
NSF
NZ
NAS
NP
NDP
NLD
NGO
NEPAD
NAFTA
NASA
NEA
NGUYEN
NIH
NK
NIPP
NONE
NR
NANCY
NEGROPONTE
NRR
NERG
NSSP
NSG
NSFO
NE
NATSIOS
NFSO
NATIONAL
NTDB
NT
NCD
NTSB
NRC
NELSON
NAM
NH
NPG
NEC
NSC
NFATC
NMFS
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NARC
NCCC
NA
NC
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NEY
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NW
NARCOTICS
NORAD
NOAA
NON
NTTC
NKNNP
NMNUC
NUMBERING
ODIP
OIIP
OPRC
OSCE
OREP
OTRA
OPET
OSCI
OVIP
OECD
OCII
OUALI
OPDC
OEXC
OFPD
OPIC
OFDP
OPCW
OECV
OAS
OM
OMIG
ODAG
OPREP
ORA
OIC
OEXCSCULKPAO
OIG
OASS
OFFICIALS
ORTA
OSAC
OIL
OIE
OEXP
OPEC
OPDAT
OMS
OES
OHI
OMAR
OCRA
OFSO
OCBD
OSTA
OAO
ONA
OTP
ORC
OAU
OXEC
OA
ODPC
OPDP
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OASC
OSHA
OPCD
OTR
OPPI
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OSTRA
OASCC
OBSP
OFDA
OPICEAGR
OIM
OGAC
OTA
OTRAORP
OPPC
OESC
OCEA
OVP
ON
OPAD
OTAR
OCS
ODC
OTRD
OCED
OSD
ORUE
OREG
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PGOV
PREL
PREF
PL
PM
PHSA
PE
PARM
PINS
PK
PUNE
PO
PALESTINIAN
PU
PBTS
PROP
PTBS
POL
POLI
PA
PGOVZI
POLMIL
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLM
PD
POLITICS
POLICY
PAS
PMIL
PINT
PNAT
PV
PKO
PPOL
PERSONS
PING
PBIO
PH
PETR
PARMS
PRES
PCON
PETERS
PRELBR
PT
PLAB
PP
PAK
PDEM
PKPA
PSOCI
PF
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PSOE
PELOSI
PROPERTY
PGOVPREL
PARP
PRL
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PBOV
PAO
PKK
PROV
PHSAK
PHUMPREL
PROTECTION
PGOVBL
PSI
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PUM
PRELKPKO
PATTY
PSOC
PRIVATIZATION
PRELSP
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PREC
PAIGH
PROG
PSHA
PARK
PETER
POG
PHUS
PPREL
PS
PTERPREL
PRELPGOV
POV
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN
PWBG
PMAR
PREM
PAR
PNR
PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO
PARMIR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PARTM
PN
PRE
PTE
PY
POLUN
PPEL
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PIRF
PGOVPM
PBST
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PRM
PRELKPAOIZ
PGVO
PERL
PGOC
PAGR
PMIN
PHUMR
PVIP
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PINL
PKPAL
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PHAS
PODC
PRHUM
PHUMA
PREO
PPA
PEPFAR
PGO
PRGOV
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PKFK
PEPR
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PGOVPHUMKPAO
PRELECON
PINOCHET
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PRELC
PREK
PHUME
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVPZ
PGOVKCRM
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PRELSW
PAHO
PEDRO
PRELA
PASS
PPAO
PGPV
PNUM
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PRFE
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PHUMPGOV
PVOV
PHSAPREL
PROLIFERATION
PENA
PRELTBIOBA
PIN
PRELL
PGOVPTER
PHAM
PHYTRP
PTEL
PTERPGOV
PHARM
PROTESTS
PRELAF
PKBL
PRELKPAO
PKNP
PARMP
PHUML
PFOV
PERM
PUOS
PRELGOV
PHUMPTER
PARAGRAPH
PERURENA
PBTSEWWT
PCI
PETROL
PINSO
PINSCE
PQL
PEREZ
PBS
RS
REFUGEES
RW
RP
RELFREE
RO
REGIONAL
RIGHTS
REACTION
REPORT
RU
RENAMO
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RM
REFUGEE
REL
RELATIONS
ROW
RREL
REGION
RATIFICATION
RBI
RICE
ROOD
RODENAS
RUIZ
RODHAM
ROBERT
RGY
ROY
REUBEN
RELIGIOUS
RUEHZO
RODRIGUEZ
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
RSO
RCMP
REO
ROSS
RPTS
RENE
REID
RUPREL
RMA
RI
REMON
RPEL
RFE
RFIN
RA
RAFAEL
RAY
RUS
RPREL
ROBERTG
RECIN
RAMONTEIJELO
SNAR
SP
SN
SMIG
SL
SOCI
SU
SG
SF
SENV
SZ
SOE
SCUL
SY
SO
SR
SYR
SE
SA
SW
SIPDIS
SCIENCE
SADC
SI
SCI
SOCIETY
SC
SAARC
STR
SECRETARY
SANC
SSH
ST
SNA
SGWI
SEP
SOCIS
SETTLEMENTS
SPECIALIST
SK
SHUM
START
STET
SCVL
SREF
SCHUL
SCUIL
SYRIA
SECURITY
SPCE
SYAI
SMIL
SOWGC
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SNAP
SPP
SCUD
SOM
SPECI
SMIGBG
SENC
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SENVSXE
SASIAIN
SACU
SENVSPL
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCOI
SCRS
SILVASANDE
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SM
SNARKTFN
SAAD
SD
SAN
SIPRNET
STATE
SENS
SUBJECT
SFNV
SECSTATE
SSA
SPCVIS
SOI
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SPTER
SKSAF
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SANR
SPSTATE
SMITH
SCOM
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
SNARM
SIPDI
SCPR
SNIG
SELAB
SULLIVAN
SENVENV
SECDEF
SOLIC
SOIC
SPAS
SASC
SOSI
SEC
SEN
SENVCASCEAIDID
TU
TH
TW
TSPA
TRGY
TPHY
TBIO
TIFA
TS
TZ
TX
TSPL
TT
TK
TC
TINT
TERFIN
TERRORISM
TIP
TURKEY
TI
TECHNOLOGY
TNGD
TRSY
TRAFFICKING
TOPEC
TPSL
TP
TD
TR
TA
TIO
TREATY
TO
THPY
TECH
TRADE
TPSA
TG
TAGS
TF
TRAD
THKSJA
TVBIO
TNDG
TN
TBIOZK
TWI
TV
TWL
TRT
TWRO
TSRY
TTPGOV
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TRBIO
TL
TPKO
TIA
TGRY
TSPAM
TREL
TNAR
TBI
TFIN
TPHYPA
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
TPP
TE
THANH
TJ
TBKIO
UNGA
USUN
UN
UG
UNSC
UK
UP
US
UNCTAD
UNVIE
UNHRC
USTR
UNAMA
UNCRIME
UNESCO
UV
UNDP
UNHCR
UNCSD
UNCHR
UZ
USAID
UNEP
UNO
UNPUOS
UY
UNDC
UNCITRAL
UNAUS
UNCND
UA
UNMIK
USTDA
USEU
USDA
UNICEF
UR
UNFICYP
USNC
USTRRP
UNODC
UNRWA
UNOMIG
USTRPS
USAU
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
UNFPA
UNSCE
USSC
UGA
UEU
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNION
UNCLASSIFIED
USPS
UNA
UMIK
USOAS
UNMOVIC
UNFA
UNAIDS
UNCHC
USGS
UNSE
UNRCR
UNTERR
USG
UE
UAE
UNWRA
UNCSW
UNSCR
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNPAR
UNC
UB
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNREST
UNHR
USPTO
UNFCYP
USCG
UNIDROIT
UNSCD
UPU
UNBRO
UNECE
USTRUWR
UNCC
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
VM
VE
VT
VETTING
VN
VZ
VIS
VC
VTPREL
VIP
VTEAID
VTEG
VOA
VA
VTIZ
VANG
VISIT
VO
VENZ
VAT
VI
VEPREL
VEN
WFP
WTO
WHO
WTRO
WBG
WMO
WIPO
WA
WI
WSIS
WHA
WCL
WE
WMN
WEBZ
WS
WAR
WZ
WMD
WW
WILLIAM
WEET
WAEMU
WM
WWBG
WWT
WWARD
WITH
WMDT
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WALTER
WRTO
WB
WHTI
WBEG
WCI
WEF
WAKI
WHOA
WGC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 04BANGKOK8485, U.S.-THAILAND FTA: STATUS AND PROSPECTS
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #04BANGKOK8485.
| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 04BANGKOK8485 | 2004-12-16 09:55 | 2011-08-25 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Bangkok |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 BANGKOK 008485
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
STATE PASS TO USTR FOR A/USTR BWEISEL
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETRD ECON PREL TH US FTA
SUBJECT: U.S.-THAILAND FTA: STATUS AND PROSPECTS
SUMMARY
¶1. (SBU) The November 22 announcement by the Thai lead
negotiator that the RTG was seeking a postponement of the
December 2004 FTA round was the culmination of several
complex crosscurrents within the RTG and Thai society. The
ostensible reason for the postponement, the upcoming
(February 6) elections, is genuinely believed by some senior
officials, as is the need for additional time for
preparation, but is probably the least important element of
the whole story. Key elements within the RTG are
dissatisfied with the comprehensiveness of the U.S.
negotiating framework, particularly its inclusion of labor,
environment, and financial services, as well as the emphasis
on negative lists in services and investment. Key private
sector organizations, notably the Thai Bankers Association,
also have voiced their objections to U.S. requests. The
prospective U.S. offer has disappointed some here, especially
in areas such as temporary entry. The RTG currently is split
into two camps on how to proceed: the first, led by Finance
Minister Somkid and Chief Economic Adviser Pansak, argues for
a go-slow, narrowly focused market access agenda; the second,
led by lead FTA negotiator Nitya (who is allied with Foreign
Minister Surakiart), favors a faster, more comprehensive
approach, arguing that such an FTA would transform and
modernize the Thai economy. They also stress the high costs
of non-participation as other countries pursue FTAs with the
U.S.
¶2. (SBU) Resolution of this debate awaits the February
elections. Our opportunity for input is limited, although we
may be able to make our negotiating framework more attractive
here by emphasizing benefits to small and medium sized
enterprises, a politically favored sector of the Thai
economy. In spite of the delay and internal RTG
soul-searching, we remain basically optimistic about the
FTA's prospects because we don't see how either side's
fundamental interests in having an FTA have changed. For the
U.S., it is our best chance to maintain a favored trading and
investment position with Thailand that is jeopardized by
several imminent developments. Equally important, an FTA
will be transformational for Thailand, effecting a shift in
many of its governmental institutions towards a more
rules-based economy. That will be good for Thailand, good
for the U.S., and will serve as a positive precedent for the
many other developing economies which are weighing economic
development and trade policy options. In asking for a
comprehensive, transformational FTA with the U.S., we are
asking Thailand to do something unprecedented, something that
it will find very hard. Negotiations are likely to take some
time. Progress could prove non-linear, with periods of rapid
movement forward, followed by some regression, a hiatus, and
repetitions of this cycle. It will require patience,
determination, and judgment, with no guarantee of success.
But we believe it is worth the considerable effort likely to
be required. End Summary.
FTA TALKS PUT ON HOLD
¶3. (SBU) On November 22, the RTG's chief negotiator announced
that his government was proposing to the USG that the FTA
negotiating round scheduled for the week of December 13 be
postponed. The reasons he cited for the request were the
upcoming Thai national elections (currently scheduled for
February 6, 2005), and the need for additional time to
prepare for further talks with the U.S. This announcement
was pursuant to a decision made the previous day by the RTG's
newly created FTA Oversight Committee. In addition to the
postponement request, the Committee ordered the relevant
agencies to further study the major issues in the FTA and
provide recommendations on a future course of action.
¶4. (SBU) While the explanations publicly provided by the lead
RTG negotiator are undoubtedly genuine, no one here believes
they represent the complete story -- or even the primary
story -- behind the postponement request. Rather, the
postponement was the culmination of several complex
crosscurrents within the RTG and Thai society.
THE ELECTIONS
¶5. (SBU) Prime Minister Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai Party and its
allies have gone into full campaign mode for the February 6
national elections, and all other issues are being viewed
through the election prism. It is an unfortunate fact that
public sentiment concerning Thailand's several free trade
initiatives is almost entirely negative. Perhaps the most
talked about trade deal is Thailand's "early harvest" tranche
of the ongoing FTA talks with China. While the early harvest
provisions contain significant benefits for prospective Thai
exporters to China, press coverage has centered almost
entirely on increased imports of Chinese onions and garlic,
and resulting depressed prices for Thai farmers in this
sector. (We have yet to see a mass media article that
mentions any increase in consumer welfare due to lower food
prices.)
¶6. (SBU) Against this backdrop, the U.S.-Thai FTA talks are
regarded by the RTG as a potential political liability best
avoided in an election campaign. From the perspective of the
RTG, the only way the FTA talks with the U.S. could have been
a useful campaign tool would have been an early harvest
component which contained some attractive market access
improvements for Thai exporters. The U.S. preference for a
single undertaking that addresses substantially all trade and
investment barriers meant that there would be no pre-election
"presents" for Thailand (and the Thai Rak Thai party). Once
that fact was recognized by PM Thaksin and the relevant RTG
ministries, support for a pre-election negotiating round
largely evaporated.
¶7. (SBU) But we don't accept the claim that the postponement
request is all about -- or even primarily about -- an
exogenous factor like the elections. For one thing, trade
policy, while recently controversial and a political
negative, is not a big vote-mover here. Many issues
overshadow it. For another, Thailand's FTA talks with Japan
are about as controversial here as those with the U.S., and
yet the previously scheduled FTA talks with that country,
scheduled for the week of December 6 in Bangkok, have gone
ahead (and with very little media scrutiny). We doubt the
December 13 FTA talks with the U.S. in remote Hawaii would
have generated much in the way of media attention here.
NEED FOR ADDITIONAL PREPARATION TIME
¶8. (SBU) There is no question that the RTG has found itself
ill prepared for negotiations with the U.S. The belated
formation (in early November, five months after the start of
negotiations) of the RTG's FTA Oversight Committee (chaired
by Finance Minister Somkid) is, in part, a belated
recognition that more work on positions has to be done,
especially in (but not limited to) labor, environment, and
financial services (the Committee's creation is also partly
motivated by internal power struggles within the RTG -- para
15). One of our working level contacts in the Ministry of
Commerce said, "If you look at the guys on our (the RTG's)
labor and environment teams, you can see right away that they
are not prepared to negotiate anything." A Labor Ministry
source said that as of late November, his ministry had yet to
complete translating into Thai the text presented by the U.S.
in the October FTA round.
¶9. (SBU) But like the elections, we don't accept that the
need for greater preparation time is the major reason for the
postponement. Only a minority of the negotiating groups were
faced with serious preparation related obstacles that would,
arguably, delay further meetings. Preparation for 90 percent
of the negotiating groups would have been advanced by the
December talks, since the talks would have provided
opportunities for information exchange, clarification of
positions, and so forth. It is evident that factors other
than the need for additional time for preparation played a
role in the postponement.
"REQUEST SHOCK"
¶10. (SBU) While the RTG thought that it had done its
homework in preparation for the FTA talks with the U.S., it
has found out that much more remains to be done. The RTG --
or at least many of its key officials -- were seemingly
caught off guard by the scope and depth of U.S. requests in
many areas. These areas include labor; environment;
financial services. When we express our astonishment to RTG
officials at their surprise at the U.S. agenda (after all,
the U.S. must rank as the most transparent country in the
world in terms of negotiating goals in our trade relations --
our complete negotiating agenda has been available on the
Internet for several months prior to the start of
negotiations), they respond that 1) the full impact and
ramifications of the U.S. requests had not been fully
appreciated; and 2) not all RTG officials had been fully
briefed in advance on the U.S. negotiating position. A
prominent official that probably falls into this category is
the Prime Minister; while he is a supporter of an FTA with
the U.S. -- indeed, he claims authorship of the idea -- he is
probably unaware of what its contents are likely to be. All
indications are that he has been caught off guard by the
overall U.S. request list, and is disappointed that the U.S.
is unwilling to negotiate a quick and politically attractive
"early harvest" package. (Note: We believe the RTG's "early
harvest" plan for the FTA with the U.S. largely involved
formally renewing key provisions (Articles 4 and 10) of the
U.S.-Thailand Treat of Amity and Economic Relations.)
"LITTLE DEALS WITH BIG COUNTRIES"
¶11. (SBU) Seen through Thai eyes, the U.S. requests suffer
from comparison with the other recent trade deals Thailand
has concluded. Many of these deals lack (at least for now)
comprehensive market opening substance, opting instead for
relatively easy "early harvests." This is the case for both
China and India. Even the FTA with Australia is fairly
slow-pitch: aside from reductions in goods tariffs, very
little was accomplished. By comparison, the breadth of the
FTA with the U.S. is wildly ambitious -- maybe too ambitious
for some. One knowledgeable local observer said, "Thaksin
wants little deals with big countries; they make good
headlines without causing too much trouble."
"OFFER SHOCK"
¶12. (SBU) The RTG has also had to review its strong desire
for a temporary entry chapter (or at least strong temporary
entry provisions as part of a services chapter) in the FTA.
The desire for a U.S. visa is strong in Thailand (the U.S.
has long been the country of choice for education, for
example); one of the strongest appeals of the U.S.-Thailand
Treaty of Amity and Economic relations are the reciprocal
preferential visa provisions. We believe the RTG has been
counting on reaffirming and perhaps upgrading this provision
as a big part of its public sales campaign for the FTA.
Adding insult to injury is the inclusion of temporary entry
chapters in the Chile and -- most importantly -- Singapore
FTAs. Thailand's rivalry with the latter country is an
important reason behind the RTG's persistence in asking for
temporary entry provisions. Lead Thai negotiator Nitya
recently cited the temporary entry provisions negotiated in
the U.S. FTA with Singapore in wondering aloud to the
Ambassador whether an FTA without temporary entry provisions
would be acceptable to the RTG. He said, "Of course, it
isn't my call, but you know what the Old Colonel (PM Thaksin)
thinks about Singapore." We believe the RTG's basic position
on somehow addressing temporary entry is inflexible, and as
such is probably one of a handful of issues that falls
outside the normal give and take of the negotiating process.
In the absence of some treatment of temporary entry in some
context (not necessarily within the FTA), we question whether
the RTG will agree to an FTA.
¶13. (SBU) The RTG hopes that the post-U.S. election climate
will be more amenable to the discussion of temporary entry.
In noting that the President's party has strengthened its
majority in Congress, some officials here are hopeful that
the U.S. may re-think its position on temporary entry and
trade agreements. In arguing for a delay in further FTA
talks, the Prime Minister's chief economic adviser, Dr.
Pansak Vanyaratyn, asked the Embassy's Economic Counselor,
"Why don't we wait until both of our governments have a
mandate?" The "mandate" Pansak probably was referring to in
the case of the U.S. was a reconsideration of our position on
excluding temporary entry from trade agreements.
PRIVATE SECTOR OPPOSITION
¶14. (SBU) The corporate elites of Thai society are viewed by
many here as highly insecure. "They don't see any
opportunities in liberalization, only the loss of privilege,"
one source told us. While there is considerable truth in
this statement, we think it is somewhat exaggerated; in
reality, private views are mixed. In general, the Federation
of Thai Industry (which accounts for much of the
manufacturing sector here) generally is supportive of the
FTA. Opposition to the FTA is centered in the Thai Bankers
Association and large swathes of the Thai Chamber of
Commerce. These are powerful organizations, and they no
doubt have made their voices heard.
INTER-MINISTERIAL CONFLICT
¶15. (SBU) Long simmering differences over policy and
jurisdiction boiled over in the November 21 FTA Oversight
Committee meeting that called for the December round's
postponement. Far from being resolved, these differences
could become sharper in the coming months. Normally (and by
law), trade negotiations are led by the Ministry of Commerce.
For the U.S. FTA, the Foreign Ministry has the lead. Lead
Thai FTA negotiator Nitya has the title of Adviser to the
Foreign Minister. This is not a very powerful position. The
Chair of the FTA Oversight Committee is Finance Minister
Somkid. Somkid is a politically powerful Cabinet minister (a
coterie of MPs owe him allegiance); he is thought to be a
leading proponent of the skeptical, "go-slow" school
regarding the FTA with the U.S., favoring a narrow agenda
that focuses on traditional market access issues. His major
ally on the FTA Oversight Committee is Dr. Pansak. This pair
have found common cause in blocking Nitya's plans for the
FTA, which included the December negotiating round. Nitya
(allied with FM Surakiart) favors a full speed ahead,
comprehensive FTA agenda. In terms of both institutional and
personal political power, this pair easily outguns Nitya.
This intra-governmental conflict could continue -- and even
worsen -- beyond the February elections.
¶16. (SBU) At the inaugural November 22 meeting of the RTG's
newly created FTA Oversight Committee, the various themes of
the several dissenting factions -- those concerned over the
elections, inadequate preparations, "request shock", or
"offer shock," -- came together, finding common cause in a
call to stop forward progress on the FTA pending a
reassessment of the entire FTA exercise. Most observers here
think the FTA talks will be re-started after the elections,
but such an eventuality awaits a formal decision to that
effect by the FTA Oversight Committee.
POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
¶17. (SBU) Frustrated by the proliferation of ill-informed
FTA oversight committees (we currently count four that play
some role in the FTA) and his inability to chart the course
of the FTA talks, Nitya is lobbying to be given the title of
Thai Trade Representative. This can be designated a Cabinet
level position, and would give him a fighting chance of
regaining control over the FTA agenda. We understand a
decision regarding this is not likely until after the
elections. Everyone here thinks that Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai
party and its allies will win handily, probably increasing
their majority in the lower house of parliament. If the
post-election Minister of Commerce is a politically powerful
figure, it is possible that Commerce may seek to assert its
leadership in the U.S.-Thai FTA talks. In that case,
Commerce probably would resist increasing Nitya's power, and
the latter could find his position untenable. But, while a
Commerce takeover of the talks could spell trouble for Nitya,
it might not be all bad for the FTA; what is needed to drive
negotiations forward is 1) strong commitment 2) from a
powerful figure. A new Commerce Minister might prove just
the ticket. In this regard, we find it significant that the
Commerce-led FTA talks with both India and China continue to
move forward, while the MFA-led FTA talks with the U.S. and
Japan have been delayed.
¶18. (SBU) Somkid and Pansak are thought to be dissatisfied
with both the U.S. negotiating framework and (derivatively)
proposed pace of the FTA negotiations. Somkid (seconded by
Pansak) has described the negotiating mandate set forth in
U.S. Trade Promotion Authority legislation as negotiating
"pre-conditions," (they count 17 such TPA pre-conditions in
total) and as such undermine the RTG's desire for both sides
to negotiate from a clean slate. They also object (in
varying degrees) to various U.S. positions (as cited in paras
10-12). Their initial response has been to halt the talks,
albeit temporarily. Somkid and Pansak surely have the
support of PM Thaksin, at least for now. Said one long time
Thai observer, "This is a classic Thai response to being
pushed faster or farther than they want to go; they step
back."
¶19. (SBU) But the temporary delay is only a tactical move; we
think major strategic decisions have been deferred until
after the February elections. Foreign Minister Surakiart
recently told the Ambassador, "We have a mandate to pursue
these talks after the elections," and vowed to resume talks
once "the necessary parliamentary and legal processes are
complete." Surakiart added that he had made these points to
U.S. Trade Representative Zoellick during the recent APEC
meeting in Santiago, Chile. The full speed ahead school,
which includes FM Surakiart, have been arguing that with the
proliferation of FTAs, the costs of non-participation are
likely to be very high.
¶20. (SBU) In a separate meeting with the Ambassador, Finance
Minister Somkid was somewhat less encouraging, telling the
Ambassador, "We will not do anything we cannot explain to the
Thai people. After the elections, we will meet with our
entire FTA team and look at every position; I think we can
handle everything." He then made an indirect pitch for an
"early harvest" approach: he described a meeting he had with
the lead Japanese FTA negotiator, where he had urged the
Japanese to consider immediate FTA concessions, leaving other
areas for later. He concluded by saying, "We need to be
careful. Many in Thai society are ready to be opposed to an
FTA with the U.S. We don't want to let that happen." While
he didn't spell out exactly how he proposed to avoid such an
eventuality, the overall message seemed to be, "Go slow, be
moderate in your requests."
¶21. (SBU) We find it significant that no RTG official has
told us they are opposed to the FTA per se. The opposition
for now seems mostly short term and tactical. We think there
is a good chance that even hard core opponents of Nitya, such
as Pansak, may change their tune after the elections; in
Pansak's economic writings, he touts the modernizing effect
of FTAs. Whatever its short term political advantages may
be, a narrow market access type of FTA will not yield much in
the way of economic modernization.
WHAT WE SHOULD DO
¶22. (SBU) While it is easy to be discouraged by some of the
attitudes toward the FTA that are prevalent here, we see the
current hiatus as a temporary setback that in no way alters
the overall situation. A Free Trade Agreement with Thailand
clearly remains in our interest. Usually, an FTA is designed
to take bilateral relations to a new level. In the case of
Thailand, however, much of our motivation is the preservation
of our current position. The U.S. currently is Thailand's
largest trading partner. In investment, U.S. firms have
privileged access to the Thai market under the Treaty of
Amity and Economic Relations (AER). But our status is
imminently threatened by current trends. In view of GATS MFN
issues, we doubt the AER has much of a future as a
stand-alone document. The relentless rise of China's
economic profile in this region represents a challenge to the
U.S.'s trade and investment leadership. Additionally,
Thailand is negotiating a number or other FTAs, which
probably will create some trade diversion that disadvantages
U.S. exporters. Given these developments, without a new
framework for our commercial relationship we will find it a
challenge to maintain our current position.
¶23. (SBU) We also think pursuing an FTA is the right thing
to do for reasons that go beyond maintaining our position
here. A close precedent to what we are trying to accomplish
with our FTA with Thailand is the Mexico component of NAFTA.
Like Mexico, Thailand is a medium-sized developing economy.
Like Mexico, Thailand is essentially not a rules-based
economy, relying, instead, to a great extent on personal,
informal arrangements. As envisioned by the U.S., our FTA
with Thailand will effect a transformation within the Thai
economy, by moving it towards a more rules-based, transparent
way of conducting commerce. Such a transformation will be
hard to achieve; it will be much harder than anything
Thailand is likely to ask the U.S. to do. It is also a safe
bet that, similar to the case with Mexico, that a
comprehensive FTA will see Thailand make the vast majority of
the concessions, since the vast majority of the existing
trade and investment barriers are on the Thai side. Leading
RTG policy makers are aware of the transformational,
modernizing potential of the FTA and, in their more visionary
moments, cite that potential as the FTA's chief attraction.
But, it is an open question whether the Thai Government or
people are willing and capable of effecting such a
transformation. The chief architect of PM Thaksin's economic
plan ("Thaksinomics"), Pansak Vanyaratyn, wrote, "I am not
sure we have the iron will to stay the course. I am not
certain that we, meaning, the Thai State or the Thai private
sector, have the will or the stamina to complete the change
that we have set in motion." We share Dr. Pansak's
uncertainty.
¶24. (SBU) While posing great challenges, the
transformational potential of an FTA with Thailand is what
makes it worthy of great effort on our part. By helping
Thailand move toward more rules-based, transparent, and
efficient governance, an FTA with the U.S. will be the
catalyst for much higher output and living standards in
Thailand. It will be a world showcase, serving as a positive
precedent for the many other developing economies which are
weighing economic development and trade policy options.
¶25. (SBU) Deciding on the future course of the FTA is
largely a Thai question which eventually will be resolved by
a debate within the Thai Government and society. Our
opportunity for input is limited. As far as the U.S.
management of the FTA negotiations goes, we don't have a lot
of fine tuning to recommend since there are few, if any,
complaints in this area. On the contrary, Amb. Nitya has on
several occasions publicly expressed his appreciation for the
professionalism of the lead USTR negotiator.
EMPHASIS ON SMEs COULD HELP
¶26. (SBU) The Thaksin Government has placed a heavy emphasis
on small and medium sized businesses. Following the 1997
economic crisis, the RTG believed that the potential in SMEs
and the traditional sector, given its great flexibility,
diversity, and low import content, would provide a new source
of economic growth and income. The RTG has introduced a host
of economic programs aimed at boosting this sector of the
Thai economy, which already accounts for almost 40 percent of
Thailand's GDP. This sector also represents a core
constituency of Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai party.
¶26. (SBU) Our FTA framework could be more attractive to the
RTG if there was a greater emphasis on SMEs across the
various negotiating groups. This would mainly involve
changes in formatting and emphasis, not new concessions. RTG
officials point out that an FTA that could be marketed in
Thailand as an "SME FTA" would be a much easier sell to Thai
public opinion (and would be much more attractive to PM
Thaksin, whose exact position on the RTG's internal FTA
debate remains uncertain). Our nascent "Group on Small and
Medium Enterprises and Other Cooperation" represents a good
start; it is possible that other opportunities to emphasize
SMEs could be identified and exploited in other negotiating
areas. For example, in the government procurement chapter it
might be possible to highlight the small business set-aside
provisions, and gear our efforts in trade capacity building
toward this area. It might be possible to enlist the aid of
the U.S. Small Business Administration on this project.
¶27. (SBU) In spite of the delay and internal RTG
soul-searching, we remain basically optimistic about the
FTA's prospects because we don't see how anyone's fundamental
interests in having an FTA have changed. It is
overwhelmingly in Thailand's interest to have an FTA with the
U.S., whether one argues on the grounds of its
transformational, modernizing effect; the high costs of
non-participation; market access; strategic alliances; or
some combination of these. An FTA with Thailand remains
overwhelmingly in our interest, whether one argues on the
grounds of maintaining our strong position here; the hugely
beneficial transformational effects in the Thai economy
likely to accrue from the FTA; or the demonstration effect on
other developing economies. In asking for a comprehensive,
transformational FTA with the U.S., we are asking Thailand to
do something unprecedented, something that it will find very
hard. Negotiations are likely to take some time. Progress
might be non-linear, with periods of rapid movement forward,
followed by some regression, a hiatus, and a repetition of
this cycle. It will require patience, determination, and
judgment, with no guarantee of success. But we believe it is
worth the considerable effort likely to be required.
JOHNSON