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Viewing cable 04ANKARA6673, TURK TELECOM FINALLY TO BE PRIVATIZED?

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04ANKARA6673 2004-12-01 15:42 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

011542Z Dec 04
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006673 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
USDOC FOR 4212/ITA/MAC/OEURA/CPD/DDEFALCO 
TREASURY FOR RADKINS AND MMILLS 
NSC FOR BRYZA AND MCKIBBEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EINV ECPS PGOV TU
SUBJECT: TURK TELECOM FINALLY TO BE PRIVATIZED? 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 6491 
 
     B. ANKARA 6480 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  The long-awaited opening of the tender 
process for the privatization of Turkey's fixed line telecom 
monopoly, Turk Telecom (TT), was announced on November 25, 
with the Privatization Administration (PA) seeking bids 
through the end of next May for a 55 percent block sale to a 
"strategic investor."  The road toward privatizing TT has 
since the 1990's been fraught not only with repeated delays, 
but also with legal obstacles, political sensitivities, 
internal wrangling over tender specifications, and outright 
cancellations of sales.  The GOT's dubious track record on 
efforts to privatize TT as well as its other major 
state-economic-enterprises (SEEs) (ref A) casts doubt on the 
likelihood of a successful outcome. 
 
----------------------------- 
GOT Opens the Tender Process 
----------------------------- 
 
2. (U) According to the PA's November 25 tender announcement, 
the GOT will accept bids for a 55 percent block sale of TT 
until May 31, 2005.  Interested parties must submit 
preliminary bids by January 11, 2005 with due diligence 
beginning on February 1.  The GOT plans to hold a closed 
bidding process and will require bidders to sign 
confidentiality contracts.  Pre-qualification criteria for 
 
SIPDIS 
applicants require that the aggregate of the total assets of 
an applicant should be no less than $500 million with an 
aggregate shareholder's equity of at least $250 million.  An 
applicant or a joint-venture (JV) member having not less than 
a 5 percent interest in the JV should have at least three 
years experience in managing or operating a fixed line or 
mobile telecommunications company with at least two million 
lines or have controlled, for a minimum of three years, a 
fixed line or a mobile telecom company with at least two 
million lines.  A $30 million bid bond is also required.  The 
two largest holding groups in Turkey, Sabanci group and Koc 
group, have reportedly purchased a tender document and are 
expected to make a joint bid for TT. 
 
3. (U) TT's cable TV unit, "Kablonet," will remain outside 
the scope of the tender.  TT's Internet service provider 
(ISP) unit, however, will remain within the scope of the 
tender.  There had been disagreement between the Competition 
Authority (CA)--the independent competition regulator--and 
the PA, and between the Telecom Authority (TA) and the CA 
during the drafting stage of the tender specification process 
over whether or not these units should be sold separately. 
Whereas the CA recommended that TT be broken up and its cable 
and ISP units be sold separately, the PA wanted to put a 
divestment requirement in the bidding document and require 
the purchasing company to sell the cable unit after one year. 
 For its part, the Telecom Authority advised against separate 
sales of the cable and ISP units.  Before the launch of the 
tender, the Transport Minister, who is also responsible for 
telecoms, sought to mitigate the potential worry the internal 
conflict could cause investors by announcing that the 
differences between the CA and TA had been resolved. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Turk Telecom: The Road to Privatization 
--------------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) The long process for the privatization of TT, has 
been the prime example of Turkey's underperforming 
privatization program (reftel).  Following two failed 
attempts to sell 20 percent of TT in September 2000 and 33.5 
percent in May 2001, the GOT first targeted a new tender for 
May 2004.  Though the tender process was finally opened in 
November, it was preceded by a long period of inaction and 
then numerous delays.  In September, the GOT had announced 
its plans to open tenders for the privatization of TT in the 
first week of October.  By mid-October, the GOT retracted its 
plans and said that they would invite tenders for a 
fifty-five percent block sale of TT by the beginning of 
November. 
 
5. (SBU) After the failed attempts to sell shares of TT, the 
GOT made some improvements to help make the framework for 
privatization more favorable.  For example, the GOT passed a 
law in July 2004 which made it possible for foreign investors 
to purchase 100 percent of a state-owned company, which is 
significant since many foreign companies have shown an 
interest in TT and because the TT privatization is 
widely-considered among the most politically-sensitive.  The 
scope of the GOT-retained "golden share" was also narrowed so 
as to only be active in cases where majority shareholders 
sought to change the articles and ownership of the company. 
PA experts admit that the cash flow generated by TT--reported 
to be well in excess of $1 billion per year--is an important 
contributor to the GOT's treasury, however, the GOT has 
reportedly remained very enthusiastic and supportive of 
privatizing TT. 
 
6. (SBU) In a meeting with EconOff, Avea General Manager, 
Cahit Paksay, was bullish on a Turk telecom privatization. 
Paksay noted that the GOT is serious about privatizing TT and 
that they had not created unrealistic expectations for the 
sale this time around.  Paksay said the potential buyer would 
enjoy the extensive, brand-new copper line infrastructure and 
monopoly position of TT and claimed that for the latter 
reason in particular, company's like Telekom Italia were very 
interested in TT.  Noting that his bullishness depended on TT 
retaining its fixed lined monopoly, he saw Turkey following 
the European model where the entrenched monopoly would 
maintain a dominant position. 
 
-------- 
Comment 
-------- 
 
6. (SBU) The GOT's announcement of the opening of the TT 
tender process is only the first step in a long road ahead. 
Sales of SEE's have historically been stalled in the courts 
because of labor grievances and TT privatization has been no 
exception.  The PA must undertake an aggressive public 
relations campaign to allay the concerns of the 61,000 TT 
employees who would be affected by the company's 
privatization.  In addition, some analysts believe that the 
price for TT could end up being as low as $2 billion given 
the current state of the global telecom industry.  Though the 
PA says the GOT remains enthusiastic about the sale, a 
perceived low price for one of the state's "crown jewels" may 
still pose as an obstacle to TT's privatization, as it did in 
the GOT's decision last year to cancel the tender of Tekel's 
tobacco operations.  Even if the price is right, the GOT may 
also encounter resistance from elements in the Turkish 
establishment who consider Turk telecom to be of strategic 
importance.  Another privatization challenge is the lack of 
clarity on the GOT's plans for liberalizing Turkey's telecom 
sector (ref B), creating potential uncertainty for how 
investors can value TT.  These concerns and a long history of 
unsuccessful attempts to privatize TT dating back to the 
early 90's do not inspire confidence this time around.  If, 
on the other hand, the GOT succeeds, it will be a watershed 
event, giving credibility to the privatization program and 
opening the way for badly-needed modernization of the Turkish 
telecommunications sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
EDELMAN