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Viewing cable 04TAIPEI3730, MEDIA REACTION: BUSH-HU MEETING AT APEC, RICE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04TAIPEI3730 2004-11-22 23:16 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 003730 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - 
ROBERT PALLADINO 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: BUSH-HU MEETING AT APEC, RICE 
NOMINATION 
 
 
1. Bush-Hu Meeting at APEC 
 
A) "The United States Casts a Curse on the Futures of 
Both Sides of the Taiwan Strait" 
 
The centrist, pro-status quo "China Times" 
editorialized (11/22): 
 
". It seems inevitable for Washington to describe [its 
`consistent'] position regarding the cross-Strait 
situation as a `curse' because, after all, either side 
of the Taiwan Strait is constantly testing the bottom 
line of the other side intentionally or 
unintentionally.  On the surface, it seems that 
Beijing's logic is that `China will use force if Taiwan 
declares independence'; whereas Taipei's logic is 
`Taiwan will declare independence if China uses force.' 
But in reality, China has never slowed down its steps 
in expanding its military buildup, and Taiwan has never 
slowed down its pace in probing for the institution of 
a new constitution or referendum under the slogan of 
`no independence.'  The gaps between words and 
behaviors have provided an excuse for the hawkish 
faction within both sides to escalate their 
confrontations.  A consequence of this spurring each 
other on has also forced the United States to state 
[its position] more and more explicitly. 
 
"As a matter of fact, the curse that the United States 
has cast on both sides of the Taiwan Strait with regard 
to the "consistency" of its one-China framework has 
produced a certain chemical reaction in the subtle 
triangular relationship between Washington, Beijing and 
Taipei.  The chemical reaction is that both sides of 
the Strait seem rather uninterested in improving their 
mutual relationship but are trying every means they can 
to work on their relationship with the United States. 
The formal talks on cross-Strait issues by President 
Chen have begun to focus more and more on `stabilizing 
Washington,' while statements made during election 
campaigns seem to be "irritating Beijing" whether 
intentional or not.  The consequence [of Chen's 
approach] resembles the summit between President George 
W. Bush and Chinese President Hu Jintao in the way that 
Bush used Chen's formal speeches aimed at alleviating 
cross-Strait tensions to persuade Beijing, and Hu, in 
return, uses Chen's campaign rhetoric to lodge 
complaints with Washington. Such a model has recurred 
several times this year.  If judged from the 
consequence, chances are high that the results are 
unfavorable for Taipei.  Was Taipei not the victim 
[following][Chinese Premier] Wen Jiabao's visit to the 
United States at the end of last year and Secretary of 
State Colin Powell's visit to China last month?  No 
wonder whenever there are high level contacts between 
U.S. and Chinese officials, the only focus of Taipei's 
administration falls on whether there will be any 
`unexpected remarks' by the United States. 
 
"It is expected that after the year-end legislative 
elections, no matter what the final results are, the 
newly elected legislators will simultaneously explode 
the issues of `instituting a new constitution' and 
`referendum' by `amending the referendum law and by 
`starting the process of amending the constitution.' 
The expected situation will be that the Pan-Green 
Alliance will be the initiators of the two issues while 
the Pan-Blue Alliance would probably not hold it back 
any longer.  Will such a development break the curse 
set by the United States?  We are all eyes." 
 
B) "Bush, Hu Each Express Their Own Views under the one 
China Curse" 
 
Washington correspondent Vincent Chang said in the 
conservative, pro-unification "United Daily News" 
(11/22): 
 
"The White House official's move to interpret 
[Washington's] cross-Strait policy using the statement 
that `consistency is the key' was a repetition of 
Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly's comments at 
the House International Relations Committee hearing 
April 20, in which he indicated that the `status quo' 
across the Taiwan Strait should be defined by the 
United States.  The White House official's remark also 
demonstrated that the Bush administration's 
determination is to handle the cross-Strait situation 
from its own perspective. 
 
"In other words, during its second term, the Bush 
administration may likely demand more strongly that 
Beijing and Taipei act according to the rules set by 
the United States.  Such a move by the White House may 
be pro-active, but its purpose is to passively defend 
the U.S.-defined status quo in the Taiwan Strait; this 
is why Washington chose to use the `consistent' 
principle to stop both sides of the Taiwan Strait in 
order to ensure that neither side would transgress 
outside the United States' consistent policy and thus 
put the region in danger. 
 
"Judged from this perspective, the Bush administration 
has evidently learned from its previous experiences 
over the past four years in dealing with both sides of 
the Taiwan Strait and it will demonstrate greater 
confidence during its second term to maintain a dynamic 
balance of the cross-Strait situation.  The Taiwan 
government, as a result, will have less room to move 
around like it did over the past four years if it wants 
to go beyond Washington's `consistent' principle." 
 
2. Rice Nomination 
 
The conservative, pro-unification, English-language 
"China Post" editorialized (11/20): 
 
". With Rice's ascent to the top foreign policy post, 
what's in store for Washington's China policy?  Will it 
bode well for Taiwan and cross-strait relations? 
 
"Nobody knows.  But one thing is certain: Washington's 
one China policy will not change.  Washington will 
continue to sell arms to Taiwan, to be sure.  But it 
would be wrong for Taiwan to assume that the neo- 
conservatives in the Bush administration will tolerate 
President Chen to keep taking dangerous moves toward 
independence, which would spell trouble for Washington. 
. 
 
"Is Rice capable of doing the same as Henry Kissinger 
did for Nixon three decades ago?  We hope not, but 
nobody can rule out the possibility.  In realpolitik, 
all that counts is national interests, not moral 
principles." 
 
PAAL