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Viewing cable 04TAIPEI3668, MEDIA REACTION: SECRETARY POWELL'S RESIGNATION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04TAIPEI3668 2004-11-17 23:37 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 003668 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - 
ROBERT PALLADINO 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: SECRETARY POWELL'S RESIGNATION 
AND U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
 
A) "Since [Chen] Has Extended an Olive Branch [to 
Beijing], Why Does He Still Want to Add Fuel to the 
Fire [across the Taiwan Strait]?" 
 
The centrist, pro-status quo "China Times" 
editorialized (11/17): 
 
"U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell has tendered his 
resignation, and according to a White House official, 
President George W. Bush has already invited National 
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice to head the State 
Department.  The personnel shake-up in Washington's 
diplomatic circles in the wake of the U.S. general 
election is quickly taking shape.  Taiwan, of course, 
must monitor and pay special attention to the United 
States' new diplomatic team and its implications for 
Washington's Asia-Pacific policy.  But more 
importantly, Taiwan needs to try hard to rebuild its 
image, in the eyes of the U.S. decision makers, as a 
responsible and rational player whose interests are 
consistent with those of the United States. . 
 
"Among everything, the most important thing is to 
rebuild the United States' trust in Taiwan because 
during the past period, unexpected rifts have occurred 
in the mutual trust between Taiwan and the United 
States due to Taiwan's referendum and its plans to 
institute a new constitution and to rectify the 
nation's name.  [Secretary] Powell's recent comment in 
Beijing that Taiwan is not a sovereign state indicated 
that President Bush's decision-making circle is 
determined to strengthen its suppression of Taiwan's 
press for independence in an attempt to avoid a war 
across the Taiwan Strait.  Different from Powell's 
moderate style, Rice is a tough hard-liner.  After 
learning the lesson from her predecessor, the Rice team 
may act more cautiously and seek to squeeze the room 
allowed for Taiwan.  When such an attitude is 
transformed and applied to a cross-Strait 
confrontation, it might pose a more unfavorable 
challenge for Taiwan. . 
 
"The responsibility of a state leader is to protect the 
nation's dignity, security and prosperity.  For Taiwan, 
the cross-Strait relationship is what is most closely 
related to its national dignity, security and 
prosperity, and what the United States expects from 
Taiwan is exactly its responsible and prudent attitude 
in handling cross-Strait issues.  When the United 
States believes that Taiwan's moves hit the red line 
and threaten U.S. national interests, it would 
certainly attempt to destroy the threat.  In any 
situation such as participation in the international 
community, cross-Strait security and confrontation 
across the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan needs support from the 
United States.  Hence, it is already more than 
important for Taiwan to enlarge its mutual interests 
with the United States.  How can this island allow 
itself to become a threat in the eyes of the Untied 
States? . 
 
"To be frank, if [Chen] has to add fuel to the fire 
[across the Taiwan Strait] every time after he extends 
an olive branch, any beautiful olive branch will become 
the firewood that keeps cross-Strait confrontation 
burning.  Bystanders like the United States and 
international society would not feel the sincerity of 
Taiwan's [desire] for reconciliation.  It is a good 
idea to seek accession into the United Nations under 
the name of Taiwan, but let us open our eyes and look 
at reality.  Taiwan has failed each year in its efforts 
to join the United Nations and still we have not seen 
any progress on this matter.  The key actually lies in 
the current international political situation and the 
relatively disadvantageous position Taiwan is in when 
compared with China.  It actually has nothing much to 
do with Taiwan's name. 
 
"Some scholars and politicians in the United States are 
worried that Chen Shui-bian will push for incremental 
independence for Taiwan in a `salami slicing' way.  But 
now it seems that Taiwan is actually trying to `scoop a 
salami.'  It is not using a knife on the surface; 
however, it is using a spoon to scoop out the salami 
once in a while.  [Chen] claims one day that the 
Republic of China is Taiwan, and that Taiwan is the 
Republic of China. Then another day [he] says Taiwan 
wants to push for its constitutional reform by carrying 
out the true spirit of instituting a new constitution. 
Later, [he] says that Taiwan wants to join the United 
Nations using the name Taiwan, and then he claims that 
the 1992 consensus is a consensus to surrender.  Given 
all such remarks, even though the salami has not been 
cut through, it has actually been scooped empty inside 
with only the skin left on the outside. . 
"Perhaps many of the remarks that President Chen has 
made over the past few years were for campaign 
purposes, but many previous examples have shown that 
the Chen Shui-bian administration seems to believe that 
a strained cross-Strait relationship could greatly 
benefit the Pan-Green camp.  This may work well as a 
campaign strategy, but in the eyes of the United States 
and the international community, it merely proves that 
the Taiwan authorities are unable to transcend 
political party disputes and work out a policy that is 
in the national interest of the island.  As a result, 
both Washington and the international community may 
find it hard to truly trust Taiwan, [and the distrust] 
will further alienate Taiwan from the United States and 
allow Beijing to have a greater influence and 
capability to effectively suppress Taiwan.  When it 
comes to the responsibilities of a state leader to 
safeguard a nation's dignity, security and prosperity, 
shouldn't President Chen have higher expectations for 
himself other than winning an election?" 
 
B) "The Key of the United States' Cross-Strait Policy 
Lies in Taiwan's Behavior" 
 
Journalist Sean Liu observed in the centrist, pro- 
status quo "China Times" (11/17): 
 
". [National Security Advisor Condoleezza] Rice is no 
stranger to the cross-Strait issue, and she is expected 
to handle the Taiwan policy on the United States' 
existing basis, which includes Washington's long- 
standing displeasure with the Chen Shui-bian 
administration, its firm opposition to Taiwan 
independence and the push for Taiwan to buy weapons. 
President George W. Bush, during his second term, will 
certainly urge China to demonstrate flexibility and to 
resume talks with Taiwan.  But if the Taiwan leaders 
continue with their actions or words that often 
challenge the United States' `one China policy,' it is 
evident that Beijing will not be the target of U.S. 
pressure." 
 
C) "Condoleezza Rice May Adjust U.S. Policy toward 
Taiwan" 
 
The conservative, pro-unification, English-language 
"China Post" noted in an editorial (11/17): 
 
"For Taipei, newly re-elected President George W. 
Bush's appointment yesterday of his National Security 
Advisor Condoleezza Rice to replace Colin Powell as 
U.S. secretary of state may provide a new opportunity 
to improve Washington relations strained in the last 
two years over the way President Chen Shui-bian pushed 
his political agenda and addressed his differences with 
Beijing. 
 
"Rice is unlikely to change Washington's basic `one 
China' policy, a position which has been followed by 
all past administrations since the U.S. shifted 
diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing more than 
two decades ago.  However, she could adopt a clearer 
stance against Taiwan's passionate campaign to pursue 
formal independence and its escalating anti-Beijing 
rhetoric. 
 
"A State Department under Rice could move more actively 
to encourage the resumption of long-stalled contacts 
and talks between Taipei and Beijing.  The above policy 
trends have already become apparent during the latter 
part of the current Beijing term.  Such policy 
adjustments have been considered necessary to prevent 
the simmering tension between the two sides from 
escalating into hot war, a conflict that the U.S. could 
be drawn into. ." 
 
PAAL