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Viewing cable 04OTTAWA2991, CANADIAN PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY: BACKGROUND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04OTTAWA2991 2004-11-08 20:16 2011-04-28 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Ottawa
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

082016Z Nov 04
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 002991 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EB/EWH, WHA/CAN, WHA/EPSC - J.YOUNG 
 
STATE ALSO FOR L/LEI - PROPP 
 
DEPT PASS USTR FOR CHANDLER 
 
USDOC FOR ITA - WORD, FOX, HERNANDEZ 
 
USDOC PASS ITC - SCHLITT AND JENNINGS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD EINV CA
SUBJECT:  CANADIAN PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY:  BACKGROUND 
 
REF:  VANCOUVER 1450 
 
SUMMARY/ INTRODUCTION 
--------------------- 
 
1. On October 29, the Information and Privacy Commissioner 
for the Canadian Province of British Columbia released a 
report titled "Privacy and the US Patriot Act."  The report 
(reftel) finds a "general consensus" that, under the Patriot 
Act, U.S. authorities could order a U.S.-based corporation 
to produce records held in Canada.  The example in question 
is personal health data on Canadian citizens which the 
corporation might hold as part of a data services 
arrangement with a Canadian province's health ministry.  On 
November 4, in an annual report, the Privacy Commissioner of 
Canada proposed (among other things) an audit of the cross- 
border flow of Canadians' personal information and the 
impact this may have on their rights to privacy. 
 
2.   These reports have intensified discussion in Canada of 
privacy issues, particularly those raised by the interplay 
of the world's largest cross-border commercial relationship 
with U.S. law enforcement and counterterrorist activity.  As 
background to inevitable USG participation, this message 
outlines the Canadian context of such issues.  END 
SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION 
 
CANADIAN LEGAL CONTEXT 
---------------------- 
 
3.There are two key Canadian laws governing privacy: 
 
-- The 1983 Privacy Act required some limits on the GOC's 
collection, use and disclosure of personal information, and 
gave Canadians the right to access and correct it. 
 
-- The 2001 Personal Information Protection and Electronic 
Documents Act (PIPEDA), which extended privacy protections 
beyond the federal government to personal information 
collected in any commercial activity. 
 
4.Key guidelines of PIPEDA are that (a) the individual's 
knowledge and consent are required; (b) purposes must be 
identified at or before the time of collection, and the 
information cannot be used or disclosed for other purposes; 
and (c) individuals generally must be given access to the 
information about themselves, and be able to challenge it. 
 
5.The key difference between the Canadian and U.S. legal 
approaches to privacy is that independent offices, called 
Privacy Commissioners, exist to enforce these laws at both 
the federal and provincial levels in Canada.  While these 
officials' direct power is constrained by their very limited 
staff resources, they comment regularly on privacy issues 
(including on government policy and legislation) through 
publications, media, and Parliamentary channels, and their 
views are widely reported.  The federal Privacy 
Commissioner's website is privcom.gc.ca. 
 
 
HISTORY OF ISSUES 
----------------- 
 
6.EU DIRECTIVE:  Beginning in 1995, the European Union's 
Policy Directive on Personal Data accented differences 
between EU and US practices, and threatened to bar the 
commercial transmission of personal data across the 
Atlantic.  Canada's privacy regime, with its (albeit modest) 
enforcement capacity, was significantly closer to the EU 
model than the United States'.  While the EU and the United 
States spent several years negotiating USDOC's "safe harbor" 
compromise, the GOC responded by developing the legislation 
which eventually resulted in PIPEDA. 
 
7.CUSTOMER DATA:  Throughout Canadian society in the late 
1990's, as in the United States, there was heightened 
concern about telephone and Internet privacy: 
telemarketing, customer "loyalty" or "reward" programs, the 
sale of mailing lists and other customer data, and the 
collection and distribution of personal information through 
the Internet.  These mainly focussed on practices in the 
private sector, rather than in government.  Privacy 
Commissioners commented extensively on these issues, which 
PIPEDA was also intended to address. 
 
8. OPENING MAIL:  In 2001, the federal Privacy Commissioner 
successfully rolled back Canadian customs officials' right 
to open international mail.  Until then, customs inspectors 
could not open letters under 30 grams without consent or a 
warrant, but they could legally open any correspondence 
contained in a larger package, such as a courier envelope. 
The GOC admitted that this was done regularly to assist in 
the enforcement of immigration law.  Immigration lawyers 
appealed to the Privacy Commissioner, who persuaded the GOC 
to exclude the weight of courier envelopes from the 30-gram 
rule. 
 
9/11 REACTION 
------------- 
 
9.   In the rush to enact anti-terrorist measures in both 
Canada and the United States in the wake of September 11, 
2001, advocates viewed privacy rights as being threatened by 
over-hasty government action.  In addition, Canada's federal 
Privacy Commissioner repeatedly cautioned the GOC against 
relying too heavily on pressure from the USG as a 
justification for its measures.  In his view, national 
security could well provide reasonable grounds for 
diminishing Canadians' privacy rights, but the GOC had to do 
so in a Canadian legal context.  In his words, "The 
Americans made us do it" could not be a sufficient excuse. 
 
PUBLIC SAFETY ACT 
----------------- 
 
10. The GOC unveiled an extensive Public Safety Act which 
worked its way through Parliament during 2003, to close 
scrutiny from the media and the Privacy Commissioners.  Much 
of the Act dealt with transportation security questions, 
such as the provision of airline passenger data to the 
federal police and intelligence services (RCMP and CSIS).  A 
key issue in this context was the extent to which this data 
might be used not just for counter-terrorist purposes, but 
for broader law enforcement and surveillance.  Again, the 
Privacy Commissioner stressed that if this were to occur, it 
should be done transparently and not hidden behind a "mask" 
of counter-terrorism.  The Act also touched on other privacy 
issues, such as federal authorities' access to financial 
records of non-governmental organizations. 
 
STATUS AND NEXT STEPS 
--------------------- 
 
11.   At the beginning of 2004, PIPEDA became applicable 
across the private sector, i.e. to all personal data 
gathered in the course of commercial activity.  Enforcement 
of PIPEDA (and its provincial equivalents) is complaints- 
driven and is expected to be constrained by the size of 
Privacy Commissioners' staffs.  The Public Safety Act became 
law on May 6, 2004.  The appropriate use of airline 
passenger data continues to be discussed both within Canada 
and between U.S. and Canadian authorities. 
 
12.  GOC privacy concerns and constitutional constraints 
present significant barriers to information sharing with the 
U.S. law enforcement community.  In 2002, as part of our 
efforts to facilitate the Border Action Plan, Embassy 
recommended a joint USG-GOC review of privacy regimes in 
order to provide for effective law enforcement, national 
security, the rule of law, and protection of constitutional 
liberties. 
 
13.  While the Public Safety Act was before Parliament in 
2002-2004, Embassy made efforts to raise the level and 
frequency of our contacts with the federal Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner (OPC).  These efforts - and the work of 
the Office - were disrupted by an administrative and 
financial scandal at OPC in 2003, and we intend to renew 
them in coming months. 
 
CELLUCCI