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Viewing cable 04KINSHASA2083, OFDA VISIT TO KALEHE AND MINOVA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04KINSHASA2083 2004-11-12 12:50 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Kinshasa
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 002083 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
AID/W FOR DCHA/OFDA - JBORNS, MMARX, TMCRAE 
AID/W FOR DCHA/FFP - DWELLER, NCARLSON, NCOX 
AID/W FOR DCHA/OTI - GGOTTLIEB, AMARTIN 
AID/W FOR AFR - KO'DONNELL 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/OFDA/ARO - KSMITH 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/FFP - PFESSENDEN, ADEPREZ 
ROME FOR USUN FODAG - TLAVELLE 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
 
E.O. 12958; NA 
 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM CG
SUBJECT: OFDA VISIT TO KALEHE AND MINOVA 
 
 
1.   (U) On October 26, OFDA Rep Victor Bushamuka evaluated 
the humanitarian and security situation in Kalehe and Minova 
territories.  Security and humanitarian access has improved 
along the entire axis Kalehe-Minova-Goma, following the 
reestablishment of FARDC control of Minova in September. 
Most of Kalehe and Minova residents living along the road 
have already returned to their villages. However, there is 
still a general fear among the population of possible 
attacks from the hills of Kalehe by Interahamwe elements and 
the remnants of Nkunda forces. In addition, a cholera 
epidemic has emerged in all villages from Kalehe to Minova, 
with 109 cases registered in Bushushu in three weeks and 159 
cases registered in Minova in two weeks. IRC has been 
assisting cholera victims in Kalehe and the DRC government 
has promised assistance to Minova victims. Although the 
epidemic appears to be under control in areas receiving 
assistance, the situation could reach uncontrollable 
proportions in Minova and isolated areas if not quickly and 
appropriately addressed.   END SUMMARY 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
2.   (U) OFDA Rep Victor Bushamuka visited the territories 
of Kalehe and Minova on the axis Bukavu-Goma in South-Kivu 
Province on October 26. The object of this visit was to 
assess the security and humanitarian situation in the areas 
after their liberation from forces loyal to ex-RCD/Goma 
commander Laurent Nkunda. During the visit, OFDA Rep stopped 
in Kalehe, Bushushu, Lushebere, Nyabibwe, Kirotse and 
Minova, and met with health care providers and 
administrative authorities to discuss the prevailing health 
and security situation in the areas. 
 
3.   (U) The territories of Kalehe and Minova are located 
between Bukavu (capital of South Kivu) and Goma (capital of 
North Kivu). Kalehe is about 65 km and Minova about 150 km 
north of Bukavu. Nkunda forces passed through these 
territories in late May on their way to briefly capture 
Bukavu and in June-August on their retreat from Bukavu. 
These dissident forces established temporary bases in 
Kalehe, Nyabibwe, and Minova.  The presence of Nkunda's 
forces was characterized by killings, harassment, pillaging, 
rapes and other violence that caused massive displacement of 
an estimated 40,000 civilians. Some Kalehe and Bushushu 
residents fled westward to the hills while others took 
refuge eastward on small islands in Lake Kivu. The 
displacement of the population of Lushebere, Nyabibwe, and 
Minova was along ethnic lines, with the Tutsi Rwandophone 
population moving north toward Goma, an area controlled by 
forces loyal to the RCD-G, and non-Rwandophones fleeing to 
small islands including Cigera and Tshime. 
 
4.   (U) 10th Military Region troops initiated an offensive 
against Nkunda's forces in July, pushing them north and 
reestablishing government control of Kalehe and Bushushu in 
August, and Nyabibwe and Minova in September. 
 
 
------------------------------ 
Security and Population Return 
------------------------------ 
 
5.   (U) OFDA Rep found, throughout the visit, that the axis 
from Kalehe to Minova was controlled by forces under the 
command of the 10th Military Region. Although these soldiers 
established several military check points along the road, 
vehicles were only checked for weapons at the entry of the 
territory of Kalehe and at the border between South and 
North Kivu. The other checkpoints only provided an 
opportunity for soldiers to ask for cigarettes.  FARDC 
positions could also be seen on hillsides along the road 
from Kalehe to Minova. 
 
6.   (U) According to Kalehe and Minova residents, security 
has improved for villages located along the main roadside. 
Interahamwe living in the National Parc of Kahuzi Biega, as 
well as the remnants of General Nkunda's soldiers, often 
attack villages in the hills, raping, pillaging, and killing 
civilians. This has led to the displacement of the 
population from the hills to Kalehe, Nyabibwe and Minova, 
which are currently under FARDC control. Despite the heavy 
presence of FARDC soldiers along the road, there is still a 
general fear among the population of possible attacks in 
villages by Interahamwe or the remnants of Nkunda forces. 
 
7.   (U) The Administrator of the territory of Kalehe 
indicated to OFDA Rep that almost the entire population from 
villages along the road who fled the fighting have already 
returned. The IDP camps that were established in Kalehe, no 
longer exist, as most of the occupants have returned to 
their villages. However, IDPs from the hills of Kalehe, 
whose areas are still considered insecure, remain in Kalehe 
itself, although most have been placed in host families. 
Although many Minova residents have also returned, the 
return of Rwandophones, especially Tutsi, has apparently 
been cautiously slow. In addition, recent confrontations 
between two newly-integrated FARDC battalions, ex-ANC and ex- 
Mai-Mai forces, in the hills near the border of North and 
South Kivu around the village of Bweremana are reported to 
have displaced an estimated 2,000 new IDPs to Minova. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Cholera Outbreak among Returnees 
-------------------------------- 
 
8.   (U) Upon arrival in Bukavu, the OFDA Rep was briefed by 
the medical staff of the International Rescue Committee (IRC- 
USA) regarding the outbreak of cholera in villages along the 
axis Kalehe-Minova. During the visit, OFDA Rep observed that 
the areas most affected by the epidemic were Minova and 
Bushushu. At the time of the visit, Minova had registered 
about 159 cases and three deaths in two weeks, and Bushushu 
registered 109 cases in three weeks. Other areas affected 
included Kalehe center with 6 cases, and Lushebere and 
Nyabibwe with 2 cases each in the week prior to the visit. 
 
9.   (U) According to health officials, these statistics 
represent only a fraction of cases. Only people living 
closer to health centers or those who can travel are able to 
seek assistance from health centers, and therefore, the only 
ones counted. People living in isolated areas often try 
traditional medicine before visiting health centers. The 
case of Mulolo peninsula, a village of pygmies believed to 
be the most heavily hit by the epidemic, was pointed out to 
the OFDA Rep. Because of Mulolo's isolation (15 km from 
Nyabibwe) only two people from Mulolo have been so far able 
to reach the health center since the outbreak was first 
announced three weeks ago in the area. 
 
10.  (U) Cholera bacteria proliferate in areas with 
inadequate sanitation facilities. The majority of initial 
victims were IDPs on the island of Cigera, which had no 
clean water nor proper sanitation facilities. In addition, 
strong seismic activity in July 2003 in the aftermath of the 
2002 volcanic eruption in Goma damaged a number of wells in 
Bushushu, Kalehe, and Minova that required constant 
maintenance.  Due to lack of maintenance during the period 
of insecurity, most wells were found to require major 
rehabilitation when people returned to their villages. As a 
result, returnees in these areas relied on the lake and 
river as main sources of water, which is believed to have 
contributed to the spread of a number of diarrheic diseases, 
including cholera. 
 
----------------------- 
Humanitarian Assistance 
----------------------- 
 
11.  (U) IRC has been assisting cholera victims with all 
necessary medication in the territory of Kalehe, including 
Kalehe center, Bushushu, and Nyabibwe. Isolation structures 
have also been established and the damaged water systems in 
Kalehe have been rehabilitated by IRC. New wells were also 
contracted in areas where the population has increased due 
to a high influx of IDPs.  Unlike in Kalehe and Nyabibwe, 
Minova cholera victims do not yet have similar level of 
assistance. MSF (Medecin Sans Frontiere) Holland started to 
provide perfusion drugs to the Minova health center. 
However, according to Minova health providers, the 
assistance does not yet meet their needs in medication. In 
addition, at the time of the OFDA Rep's visit, no structure 
existed for the isolation of cholera patients in Minova. The 
DRC government, through the Central Health Bureau and the 
Societe Nationale de Hydraulic Rural, promised antibiotics 
to the health center and pledged to rehabilitate the damaged 
wells in the area. Until the DRC government fulfills its 
promise, the cholera epidemic probably will continue to 
claim victims in Minova. 
 
---------- 
Conclusion 
---------- 
12. (U) Security improvement and people's desire to quickly 
re-establish their economic activities has expedited the 
movement of people among villages along the axis Kalehe- 
Minova. Heavy movements of people not only facilitates 
exchange of goods, but also the transmission of diseases. 
Although the epidemic appears to be under control in areas 
that receive assistance, it might reach uncontrollable 
proportions if the situation in Minova and its surrounding 
isolated villages is not carefully monitored and quickly 
addressed. 
 
13. (U)  Bujumbura minimize considered. 
MEECE