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Viewing cable 04TAIPEI3389, MEDIA REACTION: SECRETARY POWELL'S BEIJING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04TAIPEI3389 2004-10-29 07:19 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 003389 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - 
ROBERT PALLADINO 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: SECRETARY POWELL'S BEIJING 
TRIP AND U.S. POLICY 
 
 
A) "The Supporter [Who Was] Behind [Us] Unexpectedly Is 
the First to Hit [Us]" 
 
Journalist Liu Pao-chieh said in the conservative, pro- 
unification "United Daily News:" (10/29): 
 
"U.S. Secretary Powell said Thursday a `peaceful 
resolution' is [the basis of] Washington's cross-Strait 
policy, but so far he has not yet changed his denial of 
Taiwan's sovereign status, and this is what deserves 
more attention.  This development should prompt the DPP 
government to reconsider its cross-Strait policy that 
emphasizes relying wholly on the United States [to 
counter China]. . 
 
"When considering Taiwan's relations with the United 
States and Japan, the DPP always assumes that the two 
countries would not want to see Taiwan fall into the 
hands of China.  The reason that Washington wants both 
sides of the Taiwan Strait to resume a dialogue, 
according to the DPP, lies in the hope of stabilizing 
cross-Strait relations, and the DPP believes that 
Washington will not be happy to see both sides move 
toward unification.  In the DPP's eyes, what the United 
States has been doing is just the manipulation of a two- 
handed strategy. . 
 
"Thus, even while a superpower like the United States 
is seeking rapprochement with China, Taiwan continues 
to go the opposite way.  Many political figures [in 
Taiwan] have expressed strong hostility toward China 
and thought they had U.S. support behind them.  They 
have failed to realize that, in fact, the United States 
has changed its position [over the past four years]. 
 
"[Senior Presidential Advisor] K.M. Koo placed 
advertisements in U.S. newspapers but got slashed by 
the United States.  Those pro-independence people 
originally planned to rely on the United States as a 
strong backing for fighting against China, but they did 
not expect that the first one to hit [against Taiwan] 
is the United States.  This is political reality." 
 
B) "[Should Taiwan] Apply to Become One of the States 
of the United States?" 
 
The "News Watch" column of the pro-independence "Taiwan 
Daily" said (10/29): 
 
"When [Secretary] Powell said Taiwan is not an 
independent sovereign state, some politicians in Taiwan 
got very angry and they protested.  Of course, some 
other politicians were as happy inside their hearts as 
if they had seen the `end of Taiwan independence.'  But 
are things really that bad? 
 
"Have the Americans ever looked at Taiwan as an 
independent sovereign state?  If we reflect on the 
annual talks between Taiwan and the United States over 
intellectual property rights, we see that Taiwan was 
forced to give up its administrative, legislative, even 
judicial rights.  When did the Americans ever treat 
Taiwan as an independent sovereign state? . 
 
". In some Americans' eyes, Taiwan is of course not an 
`independent sovereign' state, otherwise how could the 
Taiwan Relations Act be a domestic law of the United 
States?  See, the U.S. military needs to protect 
Taiwan!  Some people in Taiwan launched a movement 
intending to apply to become one of the states of the 
United States.  It seemed more like an act of kissing 
the ass of the Americans.  But just look at the United 
States' influence on Taiwan: even if Taiwan is not a 
state of the United States, it should at least be a 
special administrative region of the United States, 
like the status of Puerto Rico. ." 
 
C) "Powell's Storm and Taiwan's Situation" 
 
The Sun Ching-yu column said in the pro-independence 
"Taiwan Daily" (10/29): 
 
"Secretary Powell remarks could be viewed as a warning 
signal for the Chen Shui-bian administration.  Despite 
the fact that Chen managed to stick to his bottom line 
in his May 20 inaugural speech and National Day speech, 
his administration still had to pay the price for 
Chen's challenge of Washington's `one China' policy. 
The pro-independence camp believes that Taiwan should 
push all the more for the rectification of Taiwan's 
name because the international community does not 
recognize the Republic of China (ROC).  But they have 
never really paid attention to the fact that Powell was 
not denying the sovereignty of the ROC but the 
`independence' and `sovereignty' of Taiwan.  Before 
last year, the Bush administration had many times 
addressed Taiwan as the `Republic of China.' 
 
"Whether this new change in the United States' Taiwan 
policy will turn from `words' into `action' is the 
touchstone to see if Taiwan will really split from the 
United States. ." 
 
D) "Don't Read Too Much into Powell Statements" 
 
Liu Kuan-teh, a political commentator based in Taipei, 
said in an op-ed of the pro-independence, English- 
language "Taipei Times" (10/29): 
 
". It is true that there have been ups and owns in 
relations between Washington and Taipei in the past 10 
months.  As Taiwan's leaders keep emphasizing Taiwan's 
independence sovereignty, Beijing has doubled its 
pressure on Washington. 
 
"It is natural for the Bush administration to make an 
extra effort to maintain a friendly atmosphere with its 
Chinese counterpart before the general election. 
Nevertheless, appeasing China should not be conducted 
at the expense of Taipei's pursuit of dialogue and 
normalization with Beijing. 
 
"Perhaps this was an unfortunate break in the momentum 
to press Beijing to be flexible on the resumption of 
cross-Strait dialogue." 
 
PAAL