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Viewing cable 04TAIPEI3206, MEDIA REACTION: PRESIDENT CHEN'S NATIONAL DAY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04TAIPEI3206 2004-10-14 08:28 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 003206 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - 
ROBERT PALLADINO 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: PRESIDENT CHEN'S NATIONAL DAY 
SPEECH 
 
 
A) "China's Taiwan Affairs Office Fails to Accommodate 
President Chen Shui-bian's Soft Landing" 
 
The conservative, pro-unification "United Daily News" 
editorialized (10/14): 
 
". Judged from various angles, the statements issued by 
China's Taiwan Affairs Office's Wednesday were already 
tantamount to a political showdown.  Beijing seems to 
say that unless President Chen acknowledges the `one 
China' principle and thus establishes a political 
premise, it would be meaningless to discuss any future 
issues concerning both sides, including the three 
links, direct charter flights and other interactions 
across the Taiwan Strait - meaning that the door would 
be closed for any cross-Strait discussions. 
 
"President Chen's reference to the `1992 Hong Kong 
meeting as the basis' [for re-opening cross-Strait 
talks] shows that he is also clearly aware that the 
`1992 consensus' is the key to resuming cross-Strait 
interaction and that he hopes Beijing could accept his 
`synonym' to improve on the impasse caused by `one 
China.'  But Beijing has refused to accept Chen's 
attempt to use `1992 Hong Kong meeting' to replace the 
`1992 consensus' in exchange for a `soft landing.' 
Beijing even made a tighter definition [of the `1992 
meeting'] and directly called Chen `deceptive.'  For 
Beijing, the three direct links and charter flights are 
no longer its priorities now, and the `one China' has 
become a political premise that allows no [other]. ." 
 
B) "Chen Uses the United States' `Patience 
Recommendation' to Wait for Ice to Melt [Across the 
Taiwan Strait]" 
 
Journalist Lo Chia-wei noted in the conservative, pro- 
independence "United Daily News" (10/14): 
 
". President Chen, in response to China's Taiwan 
Affairs Office's remarks, said `the United States has 
told us to be patient.'  Chen's words have offered a 
good beginning for both sides of the Taiwan Strait to 
`put aside their disputes.'  There may be a chance for 
improvements in the cross-Strait situation next spring 
if Taiwan's goodwill gestures can last beyond the 
legislative elections and Beijing can act in a softer 
manner . ." 
 
C) "To Concentrate Taiwan People's `General Will.'" 
 
DPP Legislator Shen Fu-hsiung said in an op-ed in the 
centrist, pro-status quo "China Times" (10/14): 
 
"It is not unexpected that China's Taiwan Affairs 
Office would harshly criticize President Chen's 
National Day speech.  On the surface, it seems that 
negotiations and reconciliation between the two sides 
of the Taiwan Strait are in the indefinite future.  But 
for Taiwan, now is the best chance for us to work out a 
consensus among ourselves. . 
 
"Even though Chen's speech has failed to win a goodwill 
response from Beijing, it still has indicative 
significance in coordinating the disputes inside Taiwan 
regarding unification and independence.  The president 
has maximized the possible forms for the future 
development of cross-Strait relations - namely, except 
for Taiwan independence, there are other options like 
forming a federation, confederation, commonwealth, or 
even a unified one-China framework.  All of these can 
cover the majority views held by the Taiwan people. 
Chen's move proves that he has broken the blockade of 
the fundamentalists regarding cross-Strait issues and 
has returned to the pragmatic central route." 
 
D) "Taiwan, Mainland on a Collision Course" 
 
The conservative, pro-unification, English-language 
"China Post" said in an editorial (10/14): 
 
". By offering to use the 1992 meeting instead of the 
1992 consensus as the model for resumed talks, 
President Chen was in fact denying there was such a 
consensus. 
 
"The `one China principle,' which implies that both 
Taiwan and the mainland are apart of China, was the 
basis for cross-Strait talks.  The Chen administration 
has been unwilling to acknowledge that there was any 
such consensus because it runs counter to the ruling 
party's pro-independence stance. 
 
"The present predicament makes the prospects for cross- 
strait peace rather dim.  The ruling DPP and its allies 
are determined to bring Taiwan independence to reality. 
Even some political opponents of the `green' camp, 
believing that this can win them more grassroot 
support, tend to support the independence campaign. 
 
"The trend is putting Taiwan and the mainland on a 
collision course.  Beijing will by no means tolerate 
the declaration of statehood by the Taipei government. 
It will do everything possible, including the use of 
military force, to thwart the movement of Taiwan toward 
independence." 
 
"Tension in the Taiwan Strait will in all likelihood 
rise further as the independence advocates aggressively 
push for the accomplishment of their goal and the 
Beijing government make intense efforts to stop them. 
The future of Taiwan has become highly unpredictable, 
with the possibility of the outbreak of war growing 
steadily." 
 
E) "The One China Myth Is the Source of Sadness for the 
Taiwan People" 
 
The pro-independence "Liberty Times" editorialized 
(10/14): 
 
". Today, China has made it very clear that only by 
sticking to the one China principle can both sides 
resume talks.  The one China principle is a synonym for 
`annexing Taiwan.'  Therefore the Pan-Blue politicians 
in Taiwan should cut off their links with the one-China 
principle, identify with Taiwan and accept democracy, 
or they will only bring Taiwan towards the tragic 
ending of war.  Taiwan's elected leader should also 
stop wasting his effort in dealing with China 
meaninglessly.  The only right way is to assert 
Taiwan's identity and seek a way out for the 23 million 
people." 
 
PAAL