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Viewing cable 04KINSHASA1926, USAID visit to Bukavu, Kalehe and Kindu

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04KINSHASA1926 2004-10-16 13:13 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Kinshasa
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 KINSHASA 001926 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
 
STATE FOR AF/C ALLAN EASTHAM, C.PASCHALL 
STATE FOR INR/AA 
STATE FOR PRM TSTOLTZFUS 
AID/W FOR DCHA/OFDA - JBORNS, MMARX, TMCRAE 
AID/W FOR DCHA/FFP - DWELLER, NCARLSON, NCOX 
AID/W FOR DCHA/OTI - GGOTTLIEB, AMARTIN 
AID/W FOR AFR - KO'DONNELL 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/OFDA/ARO - KSMITH 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/FFP - PFESSENDEN, ADEPREZ 
ROME FOR USUN FODAG - TLAVELLE 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
 
E.O. 12958; NA 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM CG
SUBJECT:  USAID visit to Bukavu, Kalehe and Kindu 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (U) OFDA Rep Jay Nash and Acting USAID Mission 
Director Nicholas Jenks were in Bukavu on September 7 
and 8, and in Kindu on September 9.  Interlocutors in 
Bukavu told USAID reps that the population was happy 
to be finally out from under RCD/G and Tutsi control 
after six years, but worried that Rwanda and its 
RCD/G proxies would not long tolerate this situation 
and would try to retake the city militarily. There 
are few ethnic Tutsis in Bukavu at present, and 
though many felt that a return of Banyamulenge 
residents who fled during the Bukavu crisis of May- 
June would be possible, disputes over property rights 
could well ensue, the legitimacy of the previous 
Banyamulenge occupation of many houses in town being 
in question.  Sources of insecurity in South Kivu 
continue to be the forces of Laurent Nkunda in the 
Kalehe-Minova area and the various pockets of 
Interahamwe in rural areas of the province.  Among 
the latter group, the numbers of those volunteering 
for MONUC's DDRRR program have dwindled. 
 
2. The activities of Nkunda's forces have caused the 
displacement of as many as 40,000 people from the 
areas they currently occupy, although reports from 
the field after USAID's visit suggest that 
governmental forces from Bukavu are succeeding in 
pushing Nkunda further north towards Goma. Conditions 
for the IDPs in the sites visited by USAID Reps were 
not good, as not all have received plastic sheeting 
and food, and as the nearest health facilities are 
several hours walk away.  Water and sanitation at the 
sites continue to be problematic, and rape by 
military has been a major problem.  Though 
humanitarian activities outside Bukavu town were shut 
down entirely for several weeks after the crisis of 
late May-early June, most humanitarian agencies have 
restarted or are in the process of doing so now.  The 
Nyabibwe area, still occupied by Nkunda's troops at 
the time of USAID Reps' visit to Kalehe, remains 
inaccessible, however, as do some Interahamwe- 
occupied pockets.  In Maniema Province, security is 
no longer an issue and the main constraint on 
humanitarian access is now entirely logistical. An 
estimated 80% of former IDPs of the province, along 
with many former Mai-Mai, have returned already to 
their original villages.  END SUMMARY. 
 
3. (U) OFDA Rep Jay Nash and Acting USAID Mission 
Director Nicholas Jenks were in Bukavu on September 7 
and 8, and in Kindu on September 9.  The Bukavu 
segment of the trip included a single day road/boat 
excursion to the northern sections of Kalehe 
Peninsula where approximately 10,000 IDPS from the 
Nyabibwe area have taken refuge from killings and 
harassment by forces loyal to ex-RCD/G commander 
Laurent Nkunda. 
 
-------------------- 
Atmosphere in Bukavu 
-------------------- 
 
4. (U) USAID Reps' local interlocutors in Bukavu 
described the population of the city as being 
simultaneously "very happy" and "worried about the 
future."  The happiness comes from the fact that the 
population feels that as a result of the departure of 
the forces of ex-RCD/G commanders Jules Mutebutsi and 
Laurent Nkunda in June, they have now finally been 
largely liberated from the Tutsi politico-military 
domination that they have been experiencing since 
Banyamulenge forces entered the town in 1996 during 
the "first" war (which ousted Mobutu and installed 
Laurent Kabila).  Though there remains an RCD/G 
appointed Tutsi Vice-Governor, real control of the 
city for the moment seems to be in the hands of the 
Kinshasa-appointed governor and regional military 
commander-an impression reinforced by the presence in 
town of many new troops sent from other parts of the 
country, particularly Equateur (ex-MLC). 
 
5. (U) Bukavuans' anxiety about the future is due to 
uncertainty that the present situation can last.  It 
is clear in the speech of virtually everyone in the 
town that they do not consider the war to be by any 
means yet over.  Specifically, they doubt that Rwanda 
will let Bukavu remain largely "independent" of its 
control, and thus expect another Nkunda-like crisis 
at some point in the near future.  In particular they 
are worried that the international community will 
pressure the transitional government in Kinshasa to 
bow to Vice President Ruberwa's demand that 10th 
Regional Commander Mbuza Mabe be replaced.  General 
Mabe is viewed by the population of Bukavu as the 
savior and protector of the city and is thus very 
much a popular local hero.  The population is afraid 
that if he is replaced, the city will again fall into 
RCD/G and Rwanda domination, probably by military 
take over. 
 
6. (U) USAID Reps inquired as to whether there were 
any ethnic Tutsi remaining in Bukavu, now that many 
Banyamulenge had fled to Rwanda during the May crisis 
in Bukavu.  Interlocutors reported that there are a 
handful of government-loyal Banyamulenge soldiers 
from General Masunzu's command in town, and that they 
move around town freely experiencing no problems from 
the local population.  There are also some ex-RCD/G 
Tutsi soldiers (of unknown origin) that arrived in 
town recently from Goma as bodyguards for the Tutsi 
Vice-Governor. 
 
7. (U) Though USAID Reps' interlocutors felt that it 
would now be "safe" for Banyamulenge civilians who 
had fled in May to return to the city, they noted 
that some of their residences had been now occupied 
by others.  As many Banyamulenge illegally occupied 
houses belonging to others when they first came to 
town in 1996 and 1997, it is now unclear, in many 
cases, as to whom property really belongs.  This 
might thus easily prove an obstacle to a full-scale 
return of Banyamulenge refugees and prove a 
troublesome issue in the future. 
 
-------------------- 
Insecurity and DDRRR 
-------------------- 
 
8. (U) There are mainly two sources of insecurity in 
South Kivu at the present time:  the yet-intact 
forces of Laurent Nkunda in the area between Kalehe 
and Goma along the western shore of Lake Kivu, and 
the pockets of Interahamwe in various rural areas 
around the province.  The former group has caused the 
displacement of up to 40,000 civilians since May of 
this year.  As yet unconfirmed reports from the field 
subsequent to USAID Reps' visit to the Kalehe area 
suggest that General Mbuza Mabe's government troops 
from Bukavu may now be attempting to push Nkunda's 
forces north past Minova and have had some early 
successes.  As for the latter group, Interahamwe 
pillaging, rape and other violence recently caused 
the displacement of 3000 civilians in the Walungu 
area, and continues to be a problem in Mwenga 
territory. 
 
9. (U) MONUC DDRRR specialists in Bukavu told USAID 
Reps that voluntary repatriation of Interahamwe and 
ex-FAR always tapers off whenever there is fighting 
between various factions for control of the city or 
of other key towns in the region.  The months 
following the Bukavu crisis of late May and early 
June have been no exception, with repatriation 
volunteers having dwindled to a trickle.  It is 
believed that during periods when the region is 
stable and appearing to make progress toward 
returning to some normalcy, the Interahamwe are less 
tolerated by local Mai-Mai groups, and experience 
greater isolation.  During periods of acute turmoil 
and anxiety, however, when local populations are 
worried that the province may again be overrun by 
forces loyal to Rwanda, Interahamwe elements enjoy 
greater freedom of moment and less pressure. 
 
10. (U) The MONUC DDRRR team also told USAID Reps 
that former 10th Military Region Commander Nabiolwa 
was much more a pro-active collaborator in DDRRR 
efforts than current commander Mbuza Mabe.  They 
attribute Mabe's cooler attitude to an acute 
awareness among FARDC officers since the May-June 
Bukavu crisis that they will not be able to count on 
the MONUC's support should they again have to fight 
renegade insurgents opposing the authority of the 
transitional government in the Bukavu-Goma area. 
 
-------------- 
IDPs in Kalehe 
-------------- 
 
11. (U) USAID Reps accompanied International Rescue 
Committee (IRC) staff to the Chabula and Chigera IDP 
sites on the peninsula extending into Lake Kivu north 
of Kalehe town on September 8.  The sites were 
hosting 1008 and 326 IDP families respectively.  The 
great majority of the IDPs at these locations had 
fled the Nyabibwe area in the hills across the 
channel separating the peninsula from the mainland on 
May 27 when Laurent Nkunda's forces marched through 
their area on the way to Bukavu.  It is at least the 
third time that these same populations have fled 
their home villages in the same manner for the same 
destinations, people having fled first in 1998 when 
the RCD rebellion began, then later fled again in 
2002 in response to Interahamwe raids. 
 
12. (U) When asked why they did not return home now, 
the IDPs replied that it was clear that the war was 
not yet over.   They had heard from newly arriving 
IDPs - described as those who had originally 
attempted to "stick it out" in the home villages - 
many stories of continuing pillaging, rape and murder 
by Nkunda's soldiers.  As recently as five days 
earlier, the IDPs reported hearing sustained heavy 
gunfire - presumably a skirmish between Nkunda's 
forces and Mbuza Mabe's Bukavu-based FARDC soldiers - 
coming from the hills across the bay where they used 
to live.  When asked who made up Nkunda's army, the 
IDPs replied that these were almost entirely 
Rwandaphones, with the rank-and-file being largely 
Hutu and the leadership mostly Tutsi. 
 
13. (U) Living conditions for the IDPs are not good. 
Though some have received plastic sheeting and non- 
food item kits from UNICEF, as well as a single 
ration of food from WFP, others have not yet been 
served, and there are still no mechanisms in place to 
assist newcomers.  Water and sanitation are 
problematic, since the IDPs had no alternative but to 
settle on steep slopes immediately adjacent to the 
lake where there is no water supply.  The 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has 
constructed a handful of latrines and is building 
additional ones, but the proximity of the latrines to 
the lake, necessitated by the steep inclines, 
represents a health hazard.  To provide safe water to 
the IDPs, IRC pumps water from the lake into bladders 
then treats it with chlorine prior to distribution 
through spigots.  IRC plans to increase its 
intervention in the water sector and to begin 
providing health services as well.  At the present 
time, the nearest health facility is several hours 
walk away over mountainous terrain. 
 
14. (U) Although the IDPs have been living in these 
conditions for over three months with only one food 
distribution, they did not appear to be starving.  It 
is clear that they are still depending on food 
supplies coming across the bay from their former 
villages.  Sending representatives back to the 
villages, however, remains highly dangerous, as these 
risk encountering Nkunda's soldiers and having 
everything taken from them as well as physically 
harmed.  Many women who have attempted this have been 
raped. 
15. (U) Rape continues to be a huge problem.  At the 
reference hospital serving the area, USAID Reps 
learned that 20 new cases had come for consultations 
and treatment in the previous week alone.  Hospital 
authorities reported that there were over 100 cases 
documented since May (when Nkunda's forces first came 
through the territory), which, considering that the 
total for all the preceding years of the war was 400, 
represented a huge increase. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Humanitarian access South Kivu and Maniema 
------------------------------------------ 
 
16. (U) Humanitarian activities outside Bukavu town 
itself were shut down entirely for several weeks 
after the Bukavu crisis of late May-early June when 
expatriate humanitarian staff evacuated the city and 
MONUC recommended that local staff no longer travel 
outside city limits.  By mid-July, expatriate staff 
had largely returned, and as of the end of August, 
most agencies had started sending teams to the field. 
OFDA partner International Medical Corps (IMC), which 
runs a health and nutrition program in Bunyakiri 
territory, plans to reopen their support to health 
centers in that area next week. Goal, another OFDA 
partner who, before the events of May-June, was 
running a similar program in Lulingu to the northwest 
of Bukavu but had evacuated the area as a precaution, 
also plans to be fully operational once again in a 
few weeks time.  Humanitarians from Bukavu continue, 
however, to have no access at all to areas north of 
Kalehe in the Nkunda-dominated part of the province. 
 
17. (U) In Maniema Province, the constraint on 
humanitarian access is new entirely logistical, 
according to staff of Catholic Relief Services (CRS) 
and OCHA with whom USAID reps spoke in Kindu.  None 
of those questioned could think of any areas in the 
province where humanitarian agencies would fear to go 
for security reasons.  Unfortunately, however, given 
the extremely poor condition of all roads in the 
region, the improved security situation does not 
immediately translate into increased access.  Many 
areas remain accessible only by motorcycle, and some 
only on foot. 
 
18. (U) It is believed that at least 80% of former 
IDPs in the region have returned to their villages. 
The few who have remained in the forest are believed 
to do so either because they have absolutely nothing 
to go back to in their home villages or because they 
still have crops to harvest in the area where they 
have been living for the past few years.  Most Mai- 
Mai who came to Kindu in the latter part of 2003 and 
first half of 2004 are believed now to have returned 
to their villages, having tired of waiting for 
integration into the FARDC.  The humanitarians report 
them appearing to no longer be a consolidated force 
in Kindu town itself. MEECE.