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Viewing cable 04ISTANBUL1558, CUKUROVA FAILS TO COME THROUGH AGAIN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04ISTANBUL1558 2004-10-15 06:17 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Istanbul
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 001558 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR E, EUR/SE AND EB/IFD 
TREASURY FOR OASIA - MILLS 
NSC FOR MBRYZA AND TMCKIBBEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EINV EFIN TU
SUBJECT: CUKUROVA FAILS TO COME THROUGH AGAIN 
 
Sensitive but Unclassified - not for internet distribution. 
This cable was coordinated with Embassy Ankara. 
 
1. (SBU)  Summary: Turkey's stock market was shaken Tuesday 
as it absorbed news that the Cukurova Group had again missed 
the deadline for completion of the first payment under its 
early payment plan with the Turkish Savings Deposit Fund 
(SDIF).  The ISE-100 dropped 2.15 percent Tuesday as a 
result, with Yapi Kredi Bank, which was slated to receive the 
bulk of the 130 million USD payment, falling 9.5 percent 
before trading in its shares was suspended.  The apparent 
failure of the high profile deal not only complicates the 
future of Yapi Kredi Bank, which is owed 2 billion USD by the 
group, but also that of Turkey's largest GSM operator, 
Turkcell, whose shares are held in trust by the bank as 
collateral for the loan.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Early Repayment: Pursuant to an early repayment 
agreement concluded in July between the Cukurova group, 
Banking Regulatory Board (BRSA), the SDIF, and Yapi Kredi 
Bank,  the group received a "haircut" of nearly 2 billion USD 
in its outstanding debt to the bank and the SDIF (the latter 
debt stems largely from the failure of Pamukbank, which the 
group also owned) by shortening the repayment period from 
2011 to 2006.  From the outset much speculation surrounded 
the identity of the mysterious foreign investors who were 
providing the capital that would enable the Cukurova Group to 
meet its 4 billion USD in outstanding obligations, with press 
speculation earlier this month focusing on Central Asian and 
other unspecified middlemen.  Officially, the source of the 
funds was the Northway Petroleum Corporation, an apparent 
paper entity whose General Manager was added to the Turkcell 
and Yapi Kredi boards earlier this fall. 
 
3. (SBU) Jewel in the Crown: For Cukurova, the key enticement 
to the deal was the ability to hold onto the 13 percent of 
Turkcell shares that the bank holds in trust against the 
group's outstanding debts.  Under its original payment 
protocol, the group can only hold onto the shares by paying 1 
billion USD in cash by the end of January 2005.  The new 
protocol lengthened the deadline and provided for gradual 
release of shares as Cukurova made its debt payments.  The 
company, which once made Mehmet Karamehmet(who controls 
Cukurova) the wealthiest man in Turkey, is the group's 
centerpiece, and with a leading position in Turkey and 
growing interests throughout the region (including its recent 
success in a GSM license tender in Iran, albeit one now 
subject to review by the Iranian parliament), Turkcell 
appears poised to maintain its market dominance and continue 
to grow its overall valuation. 
 
4. (SBU) Missed Deadline: Despite the doubts about the fund 
providers, most brokerages hailed the deal this summer.  One 
typical comment, from HC Istanbul, characterized the outcome 
as "positive for all the parties directly involved."  Given 
Cukurova's previously spotty record in loan repayment, 
however, this endorsement came with the important caveat that 
confidence in the plan would "gradually increase once 
investors see a couple of regular monthly payments by 
Cukurova."  To date, however, no payments have been 
registered.  Instead, the payment deadline was first moved 
from early September to late September, and ultimately to 
October 11.  The Group briefly claimed on October 11 that it 
had made the necessary payment in the United States, but that 
the Columbus Day holiday had prevented transfer of funds to 
Turkey.  That claim swiftly disappeared, however, as the 
group proved unable to produce a deposit receipt and as the 
funds failed to appear again on October 12. 
 
5. (SBU) Next Steps: Still unclear is what the next step in 
the process will be.  The SDIF, which has less at stake, has 
indicated that Cukurova can combine the first and second 
payment, together with interest, and maintain the revised 
protocol.  Both Yapi Kredi Bank and the BRSA, however, have 
said that failure to produce the money on October 12 rendered 
the revised protocol null and void.  Most critically for 
Cukurova, that would enable Yapi Kredi to sell the Turkcell 
shares it holds as early as the end of January.  Already a 
number of companies have expressed interest, including 
Telia-Sonera, the company's minority Finnish partner, which 
could assume majority control of the company by buying the 
pledged shares. 
 
6. (SBU) What Went Wrong: Cukurova Chairman Karamehmet is 
notoriously tightlipped, but already there is speculation 
that the group's unidentified fund providers balked at 
contributing once they realized that the collateral they had 
been promised fell short of the amount they were being asked 
to provide.  As evidence, some note that the fund providers 
had asked that bank shares be provided to them as collateral 
as well, something explicitly prohibited by the early 
repayment agreement, since their eligibility to run a bank in 
Turkey was open to question.  In a statement late Thursday, 
Cukurova claimed that the delay in payment was entirely the 
fault of its lenders, as though this somehow absolved it of 
responsibility. 
 
7. (SBU) Yapi Kredi Still Healthy:  Both the Chief Sworn 
Auditor (bank inspector) of BRSA and Yapi Kredi executives 
told econoffs that, despite the market concerns, Yapi Kredi 
is still a sound institution.  One YKB executive told us the 
Turkcell shares held by YKB have appreciated in value from 
$1.5 billion to $7-8 billion over the past 2.5 years. 
Moreover, he opined that some groups such as Koc, Sabanci or 
Telia Sonera would be very interested in paying a substantial 
premium for these shares.  The Sworn Auditor said YKB is 
adequately capitalized and has a good image.  A second YKB 
executive worried about the effect of the uncertainty could 
have on YKB's image, a concern similar to that voiced by BRSA 
Chairman Bilgin in a meeting this summer. 
 
8. (SBU) How the Cukurova-Yapi Kredi end game plays out is 
important for several reasons.  First and foremost, as BRSA 
Chairman Bilgin has told us privately, Yapi Kredi is one of 
Turkey's major banks, and problems at Yapi Kredi have 
implications for the entire banking sector.  YKB executives 
have told us that BRSA stays in close, solicitous touch with 
YKB management.  This case is also important for the 
credibility of the relatively new leadership of BRSA and 
SDIF.  Cukurova is only one of the owners of failed banks 
that the regulators--backed by the GOT--have been pressuring 
into finalizing deals to honor intervened banks' loans to 
these owners' other companies.  But Cukurova is the most 
important of the remaining cases because of the large amounts 
involved and Yapi Kredi's size and importance.  If SDIF and 
BRSA are perceived as insufficiently tough on Cukurova, this 
could hamper the regulators' ability to enforce other deals 
with failed bank owners.  Finally, the Cukurova arrangement 
raises questions about the source of the funds the group is 
bringing in to make its payments.  Though markets and even 
regulators seem to be mainly focused on whether Cukurova can 
come up with the money, if the source of the funding is not 
clear, it would raise doubts about possible tax evasion or 
money laundering.  End Comment. 
ARNETT