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Viewing cable 04HANOI2795, BURMA ADDRESSED IN LOW-SUBSTANCE ASEM SUMMIT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04HANOI2795 2004-10-13 09:51 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Hanoi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 002795 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EUR, EAP/BCLTV, EAP/RSP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL EU PHUM BM VM ARF
SUBJECT: BURMA ADDRESSED IN LOW-SUBSTANCE ASEM SUMMIT 
 
REFTEL: Hanoi 2638 
 
1. (SBU) Summary and Comment: Predictions that ASEM-5 would 
be a talk shop lacking in substance proved for the most part 
accurate, but the Europeans successfully insisted on raising 
the Burma issue and including a reference to the political 
situation there in the Chairman's Statement.  The event 
itself went smoothly, with no serious problems or incidents, 
and offered an excellent opportunity for the assembled 
leaders to pursue bilateral meetings on the summit's 
margins.  The Vietnamese spent lavishly during the 
concurrent bilateral visits of the French President and 
German Chancellor, signing contracts for ten Airbus jets, 16 
German locomotives, a light rail project for Hanoi, a cement 
factory and a limestone processing plant for a total 
expenditure of more than USD one billion.  Vietnam and the 
EU were also able to use the occasion to conclude their 
bilateral WTO talks.  Ultimately, ASEM-5 underscored that 
the Asian preference for formal diplomatic frameworks 
focusing on uncontroversial issues such as economic and 
cultural relations remains strong, as does the European 
preference for more substantial and "productive" events. 
End Summary and Comment. 
 
CONSENSUS EMOTION: RELIEF 
------------------------- 
 
2. (U) The dominant reaction of our Asian and European 
interlocutors alike to the successful conclusion of the 
Fifth Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM-5) held October 7-9 in Hanoi 
was relief.  The Europeans were relieved that the summit 
unfolded without any major problems or incidents, and the 
Asians were relieved that the Europeans did not let the 
Burma issue derail the entire event -- although there was 
some reported dissatisfaction on the part of the GVN and 
other Asian representatives that European participation was 
at a relatively lower level.  On Burma, the delegates were 
ultimately able to agree to a paragraph (4.7) in the 
Chairman's Statement under the heading of "Recent Regional 
Developments" as follows: 
 
Begin text: 
 
The Leaders took note of the briefing on the recent 
political developments in Myanmar given by the Head of the 
Myanmar delegation.  In this connection, they encouraged all 
stakeholders in the country to work together to ensure a 
successful outcome of the ongoing national reconciliation 
process.  The National Convention should be an important 
element in the national reconciliation and democratization 
process and a forum for a genuine open debate with the 
participation of all political groups in the country. They 
looked forward to the early lifting of restrictions placed 
on political parties in accordance with the assurances given 
by Myanmar.  They also reaffirmed their support for the 
efforts of the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General. 
 
End text. 
 
REACTION TO BURMA COMPROMISE 
---------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) The reaction to the final Burma compromise was 
lukewarm but positive.  Even though its effort to include a 
call for Aung San Suu Kyi's release failed, the UK 
delegation viewed the Burma language in the Chairman's 
Statement as "decent enough."  The Singaporeans were happy 
that the issue had not derailed the summit.  The Spanish 
Ambassador told the Ambassador that he thought that human 
rights and political issues had been somewhat neglected, but 
that the summit had on the whole been worthwhile.  The 
French (who, according the Czech Ambassador, had joined the 
Germans in opposition to raising the issue at all) 
considered the statement an "acceptable outcome" but 
complained that the conflict over Burma's participation had 
overshadowed this ASEM summit to the point where real 
progress on other issues was not possible. 
 
MORE STYLE THAN SUBSTANCE 
------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) The French complaint that ASEM-5 contained more 
form than substance was echoed by all of our other European 
interlocutors, and may be shared by the GVN.  According to 
French First Secretary Alexis Andres, Foreign Minister 
Nguyen Dy Nien told French Ambassador Antoine Pouilleute 
that he "agreed" that ASEM should strive for "more 
operational outcomes."  The British have a different view of 
the Vietnamese attitude, however:  they blame the GVN for 
spiking at the SOM level an Indonesian proposal to create an 
Asian-Europe cultural dialogue on religion, despite strong 
support from the European countries and from the 
Philippines.  In general, however, our European 
interlocutors agreed that the Asians were concerned with 
maintaining the protocol level of the meetings and 
restricting them to the cultural and economic areas while 
the Europeans wanted to see ASEM address the issues of the 
day, such as Burma or human rights.  One thing on which all 
of the participants agreed was that ASEM-5 offered an 
excellent opportunity for leaders to meet each other 
informally.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' ASEM 
Secretariat estimated that there were more than 150 leader- 
 
SIPDIS 
level bilateral meetings on the margins of ASEM-5. 
 
SOME MINOR LOGISTICS AND SECURITY ISSUES ARISE 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
5. (SBU) Many of our interlocutors were pleasantly surprised 
that there were no major security, logistical or 
organizational problems during the confab.  A common refrain 
from European diplomats, journalists and even some of 
Vietnam's ASEAN colleagues was that the event proceeded 
"surprisingly smoothly."  The Japanese noted that there were 
serious problems with parking for non-delegation vehicles in 
the vicinity of the events, and the French ran into trouble 
when some members of their delegation were refused entry 
into certain events due to a credentialing mix-up.  However, 
the consensus was that these were relatively minor problems 
considering the scale of the event.  One worrisome 
observation involved security:  the UK Embassy noted that, 
although the approaches to the event were strictly guarded 
and the GVN dedicated a massive amount of manpower to 
security, well-dressed and well-groomed individuals (both 
Asian and European) were often allowed to pass security 
checkpoints freely without having to show credentials.  On 
the positive side, the German Deputy Chief of Mission said 
that GVN cooperation with German security personnel 
protecting Chancellor Schroeder was "excellent," a sentiment 
echoed by the French in describing the arrangements for 
President Chirac. 
 
6. (SBU) Unfortunately, there were few logistical or 
security lessons from ASEM-5 that will be applicable to the 
2006 APEC summit in Hanoi.  That event will be held at the 
new International Convention Center on the outskirts of the 
city, far from the ASEM-5 venue in the center of Hanoi. 
 
7. (SBU) There were no tangible, substantive outcomes to the 
ASEM-5 summit.  The documents generated by the event -- 
including the Chairman's Statement; Recommendations for 
Organizational and Management Strategy and Long Term 
Financial Sustainability of ASEF (Asia-Europe Foundation); 
Recommendations for ASEM Working Methods; the ASEM Work 
Program 2004-2006; the List of New Initiatives; and ASEM 
Activities since ASEM-4 -- are available online at 
www.asem5.gov.vn. 
 
THE GVN GOES SHOPPING 
--------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) Vietnam had a productive series of bilateral visits 
and high-level meetings that occurred concurrently with the 
summit, including with Japan, the ROK and China (septel). 
Vietnam was also able to conclude its bilateral WTO talks 
with the EU (also septel).  The GVN went on a spending spree 
during the visits of the French President and the German 
Chancellor:  it signed an MOU with France to buy ten Airbus 
aircraft with a contract value of USD 750 million (details 
to be negotiated later) and agreed that the French would 
build an above-ground tramway through Hanoi at a cost of 
approximately USD 200 million, of which USD 140 million 
would be a loan and USD 60 million would be a grant. 
Germany obtained agreement on the GVN purchase of 16 diesel 
locomotives for 45 million Euros (USD 55.5 million) and 
concluded a deal worth 110 million Euros (USD 136 million) 
for ThyssenKrupp AG to provide a cement factory and 
limestone processing plant.  The Germans had been 
negotiating the locomotive deal for nine years prior to the 
Chancellor's visit, according to the German DCM.  Vietnam 
also signed agreements with Japan, China, South Korea, the 
EU, Sweden and Belgium, although none of those was as 
substantial as the deals with the French and the Germans. 
 
9. (SBU) Comment:  ASEM-5 was a tribute to the utility of 
low expectations.  The heated debate over Burma's 
participation and the subsequent attendance by a limited 
number of high-profile European leaders made the very 
existence of the ASEM-5 summit appear to be an 
accomplishment.  The fact that it concluded without any 
negative incidents and with a consensus position on Burma 
then seemed like a triumph.  EU concerns (reftel) that ASEM- 
5 would end up a substance-free talk shop turned out to be 
well-founded, but the opportunities for productive bilateral 
meetings on the sidelines made the event worthwhile for all 
who attended.  The Asian preference for formal diplomatic 
frameworks focusing on uncontroversial issues such as 
economic and cultural relations remains, as does the 
European preference for more substantial and "productive" 
events.  Conflict over the ultimate character of ASEM will 
likely carry over to ASEM-6 in Helsinki in 2006, but the 
opportunity to arrange a rich schedule of high-level 
bilateral meetings will prove a powerful draw nonetheless. 
MARINE