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Viewing cable 04ANKARA6100, MAJOR TURKISH TRUCKING COMPANY BOSS THREATENS TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04ANKARA6100 2004-10-27 14:19 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

271419Z Oct 04
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006100 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MOPS ETRD PTER IZ TU
SUBJECT: MAJOR TURKISH TRUCKING COMPANY BOSS THREATENS TO 
CLOSE HABUR GATE OVER SECURITY CONCERNS 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 4340 
 
     B. ANKARA 5997 
     C. STATE 195610 
 
(U) Sensitive but unclassified -- please protect accordingly. 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: The head of a large Turkish trucking 
company, Emin Deger, warned emboffs Oct. 22 that U.S. and 
Turkish officials have been too slow to address the security 
concerns of Turkish truckers in Iraq, threatening that he 
could close the Habur Gate if he wished.  Deger said that 
many of those attacking truckers were not 
ideologically-motivated insurgents, but criminal gangs after 
money.  Deger accused the U.S. of being both insensitive and 
ineffective in dealing with the problem.  He proposed 
creating an Iraqi unit of mixed ethnicity to provide convoy 
security.  Deger is well-connected politically.  We do not 
believe he really plans to try to close down the Habur Gate 
and the northern Ground Line of Communication (GLOC), but he 
reflects well Turkish frustration over continuing security 
problems for Turkish drivers and contractors in Iraq.  End 
summary. 
 
2. (SBU) At his request, Emboffs called on Emin Deger, Head 
of Deger International Transport and Trading Company and the 
Turkish-Iraqi Friendship Association, in his Ankara office on 
Oct. 22.  Deger, a Turkish Kurd of Iraqi background, told us 
that until three months ago, his company had been a KBR 
subcontractor carrying 3000 tons/day of humanitarian fuel 
shipments into Iraq as far as Baghdad.  Now that the Iraqi 
State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) has taken over 
humanitarian fuel shipments, his company now carries less 
than a quarter of that amount into Iraq daily. 
 
3. (SBU) Deger complained that despite somewhat beefed-up 
coalition protection for truck convoys in recent weeks, 
security for Turkish truck drivers remains inadequate.  He 
says that so far his company has had one trucker killed and 
two kidnapped in Iraq; one of the kidnap victims is his 
relative.  He also claims to have lost a number of trucks and 
their cargo.  Deger claimed bandits attack trucks both in and 
out of convoy in Iraq going both directions.  He 
characterized those attacking trucks and truckers as bandits, 
not insurgents.  He believes that most of the attacks are 
conducted by a single group of about 90 persons (Arabs, Kurds 
and Turkmen) and that they are motivated by financial gain, 
not insurgents motivated by a political vision. 
 
4. (SBU) Deger claimed that he had information on individual 
leaders of these gangs, and that his employees in Iraq had 
attempted to pass this information on to the Iraqi police. 
However the police, according to Deger, informed his 
employees that while they may work as police by day, they 
work with the criminals/insurgents by night.  He said that a 
Turkmen named "Mustafa" and a restaurant owner named "Farhan" 
in Mosul were the main ringleaders, along with a police 
officer named "Ibrahim," who was since killed (NFI).  The 
dead police officer, Ibrahim, worked at the Jemal police 
station, 70 km south of Mosul on the road to Baji.  His 
cousin (NFI) works at a restaurant 1.5 km south of this 
police station, and served as the connection between the 
police and the criminal gangs/insurgents.  According to 
Deger, the major offload point north of Mosul, Filfil, is the 
main gathering point for both criminal gangs and insurgents. 
He said that it is well-known among the trucking companies 
that Filfil is the place to go to get information on missing 
trucks and their drivers. 
 
5. (SBU) Deger seemed well-informed on GOT efforts to work 
with the USG and the IIG on the trucker security problem, but 
he declared these efforts inadequate.  He said he had 
strongly opposed the call in August by the International 
Transporters Union (UND in Turkish--see ref a) for a ban on 
trucking in support of the coalition, and that he continues 
to counsel truck companies and individual drivers on the 
importance of trade between Turkey and Iraq and of not giving 
into the terrorists and criminals.  But, Deger continued, he 
believes the U.S. and Turkey have been much too slow to act 
and the situation has become worse.  The U.S., he went on, 
has also been "insensitive" in dealing with him on this 
issue.  He claimed that through his contacts he could easily 
close down the Habur Gate, though he was not immediately 
inclined to do so. 
 
6. (SBU) Emboffs assured Deger that both the GOT and the USG 
were quite concerned about trucker security, and that 
trilateral (USG, GOT, IIG) meetings were about to start as a 
further step in grappling with the problem.  We noted that 
sustainment and humanitarian shipping, as well as regular 
commercial traffic, over the GLOC was significant and vital 
to Iraqi stability and future prosperity.  Deger said he 
understood this, and emphasized his feeling of solidarity 
with the Iraqi people. 
 
7. (SBU) We asked Deger what measures he thought would be 
effective, and he recommended a multi-ethnic (Arab, Kurdish, 
Turkmen) convoy protection team of 200-300 Iraqis who could 
be funded by the IIG, the USG, and/or the truckers 
themselves.  The team would include mechanics and ambulances 
to handle stalled trucks and injured drivers and would be 
solely responsible for convoy security and have no other 
duties.  When emboffs asked if 200-300 people would be 
enough, he said that more might be needed, but the smaller 
the better.  "If you have a larger unit," Deger said, "you 
have a larger problem." 
 
8. (SBU) Comment: Deger is well-connected politically (and is 
known in particular to be close to former President Demirel) 
and runs a larger trucking company here.  It is not clear 
whether he has the influence to effectively close down the 
GLOC.  His threat, we believe, reflects overall Turkish 
frustration with the continued attacks against and 
kidnappings of Turkish truckers.  We understand many Turkish 
truck drivers are refusing to drive south of Mosul out of 
security concerns.  While we cannot evaluate Deger's 
recommendation for improving security for the drivers, it is 
all the more important that trilateral trucker security talks 
(refs b and c) begin as soon as possible to demonstrate U.S. 
seriousness.  End comment. 
 
9. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
EDELMAN