Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 04HELSINKI1137, GYMNICH MEETING: FINLAND SAYS EU "FAIRLY

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #04HELSINKI1137.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04HELSINKI1137 2004-09-02 14:58 2011-04-24 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Helsinki
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HELSINKI 001137 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/NB 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2014 
TAGS: PREL FI IZ CH TU IR SU ZL XF EUN
SUBJECT: GYMNICH MEETING: FINLAND SAYS EU "FAIRLY 
UNANIMOUS" IN SUPPORT OF FINANCING UN PROTECTION FORCE 
 
REF: A. STATE 182534 
 
     B. STATE 180598 
     C. STATE 166158 
     D. HELSINKI 894 
     E. HELSINKI 1124 
 
Classified By: POL Chief John Hall for Reasons 1.4(B) and (D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: In an August 27 meeting with the chief of the 
MFA's EU coordination unit, we reviewed the agenda for the 
September 3-4 Gymnich meeting.  We were told that the EU is 
leaning toward a financial contribution to support a UN 
protection force in Iraq -- and that Finland would consider 
making a national contribution if EU funds did not 
materialize.  (The GoF made that position official on 
September 1; see septel.)  On other issues, we were told the 
Finns: still favor shifting EU focus from the China arms 
embargo to improving the code of conduct; have no problem 
with giving Turkey a date for beginning accession 
negotiations; support sanctions against Sudan -- if those 
sanctions take into account the concurrent need to end 
Sudan's civil war; agree pressure must be kept on Iran; feel 
Ambassador Eide's recommendations on Kosovo make sense but 
may be hard to implement; and support the Sharon plan for 
Gaza withdrawal -- as long as it is not Gaza first and last. 
Our exchange on Burma/ASEM is reported in Ref E; the Finns 
seem still inclined to accept a lower-level Burmese presence 
at the summit.  End Summary 
 
Iraq 
---- 
 
2. (C) On August 27 POL Chief and PolOff met with Kimmo 
Lahdevirta, chief of MFA's EU coordination unit, to review 
issues likely to be raised at the Foreign Ministers' upcoming 
Gymnich meeting.  Lahdevirta said that in addition to the 
topics mentioned in Ref A, the ministers' agenda includes 
Iraq and Middle East peace negotiations. 
 
3. (C) We asked whether the EU had come to any decision on 
the request that the European Union contribute financially to 
cover certain costs for countries that provide troops for a 
UN protection force (Refs B, C).  Lahdevirta said that the 
question had been discussed at that week's meeting of the 
PSC, and his understanding was the participants were "fairly 
unanimous" that the EU should provide some money (he did not 
say how much) from EU common funds to support this 
initiative.  He said that the FMs will take up the matter at 
the Gymnich, but in the meantime, the Commission has been 
tasked with finding the money to do this. 
 
4. (C) Lahdevirta added that Finland prefers the idea of the 
EU contributing as a group, rather than some individual 
members providing national funds.  But if EU funding does not 
materialize, he said, Finland "would be willing to consider" 
making a national contribution.  (Note: On September 1, the 
GoF reported formally to us, and to its fellow EU members, 
that this is Finland's position.  See septel for further 
details.) 
 
China Arms Embargo 
------------------ 
 
5. (C) We argued, as we have in past conversations with the 
GoF, that the government of China would portray lifting of 
the embargo as an endorsement of China's recent human rights 
record, an endorsement China certainly does not deserve. 
Lahdevirta said the Finns understand and agree that the 
Chinese human rights record is "very problematic." 
Nevertheless, the GoF still believes the most productive 
course would be to shift attention to the EU code of conduct, 
tighten it so that it more effectively controls 
high-technology items not covered by the arms embargo, and 
bring it into the EU's body of codified, binding legislation. 
 (Septel reports on a subsequent, more detailed conversation 
with nonproliferation chief and PolDir-designate 
Vierros-Villeneuve.) 
 
Turkey and the EU 
----------------- 
 
6. (C) Lahdevirta said that Finland (during whose 1999 EU 
presidency Turkey became a formal candidate for EU 
membership) has no problem with Turkey being given a date for 
the beginning of accession negotiations.  He added that the 
GoF has been "very disappointed" with the Greek Cypriots' 
reaction to the decision to widen contacts with Northern 
Cyprus. 
 
Sudan/Darfur 
------------ 
 
7. (C) Lahdevirta said Finland is prepared to consider 
sanctions against the Government of Sudan, but reiterated 
that those sanctions must take into account the ongoing and 
separate need to foster peaceful resolution of the 
government/SPLA civil war.  (See Ref D and previous.) 
Iran 
---- 
 
8. (C) The GoF is "waiting eagerly" for the UK/French/German 
report, but certainly agrees that the EU must be part of the 
international pressure on Iran to cooperate fully with the 
IAEA and to suspend all its enrichment-related and 
reprocessing activities. 
 
Kosovo 
------ 
 
9. (C) Lahdevirta described NATO PermRep Eide's recent report 
to the UNSYG as "very critical and his recommendations very 
harsh -- but they may be necessary.  The question is how to 
implement them."  The report, he said, contains ideas that 
make sense, but are more easily said than done.  On the issue 
of Belgrade's interests in Kosovo, Lahdevirta remarked that 
Kosovo Serbs have a legitimate fear of being marginalized or 
cantonized.  They must be able to feel that they have a 
future. 
 
Middle East 
----------- 
 
10. (C) The EU will do what it can to support PM Sharon's 
Gaza withdrawal plan, said Lahdevirta, but with the 
understanding that it cannot be Gaza first and last. 
 
MACK