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Viewing cable 04HANOI2603, GVN: TERRORISTS HERE ARE VIETNAMESE EXILES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04HANOI2603 2004-09-17 07:22 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Hanoi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 002603 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR S/CT, DS, EAP/BCLTV, EAP/RSP, H 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PTER ASEC VM CTERR
SUBJECT:  GVN: TERRORISTS HERE ARE VIETNAMESE EXILES 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: MPS counterterrorism officials are keeping 
a close watch on Vietnamese Muslims.  They do not perceive a 
threat yet, but note that contacts between Vietnamese 
Muslims and international Muslim groups have developed.  The 
GVN highly appreciates U.S. assistance in counterterrorism, 
but would like assistance in combating what they see as a 
threat from U.S.-based Vietnamese exile groups.  End 
Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Visiting Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staffer 
Frank Jannuzi met September 1 with Tran Kim Tuyen, Deputy 
Director General of the Counterterrorism Division of the 
General Department of Security of the Ministry of Public 
Security, and Nguyen Nhu Hung, Division Director for 
Information Analysis in the Counterterorrism Division. 
Deputy Director General Dinh Manh Luat of the International 
Cooperation Department also attended the meeting. 
 
TERRORIST THREAT IN SE ASIA: COULD IT REACH VIETNAM? 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
3. (SBU) Tuyen welcomed Jannuzi to MPS and introduced his 
team.  "I wish we were unemployed," Tuyen joked, "but that 
would be unrealistic."  To date, Tuyen reported, MPS had not 
encountered any terrorist organizations in Vietnam and there 
had been no international terrorist attacks on Vietnamese 
territory.  However, he said, the presence of the United 
States Embassy and other "terrorist targets" in Vietnam 
meant that MPS could not rule out the possibility of an 
attack on Vietnamese soil.  Tuyen noted also that the spread 
of Islamic terrorism in other parts of Southeast Asia, 
including to Thailand and Cambodia, could at some point 
extend to Vietnam.  Using information provided by "sources," 
MPS had identified some "suspect individuals" entering 
Vietnam to seek information and opportunities to plan a 
terrorist attack.  Indonesia had provided information on 
over 400 people suspected of involvement in Jemiya 
Islamiyah/Al Qaeda activities.  Among those 400 names, Tuyen 
said MPS had found seven that had entered Vietnam.  Tuyen 
did not discuss how the GVN used the information or what the 
outcome was of any investigation. 
 
4. (SBU) The small Vietnamese Islamic community of 65,000 
people was another factor in calculating the terrorist 
threat, Tuyen said.  According to MPS intelligence, there 
were no signs of radical Islamic organizations operating in 
Vietnam or influencing Vietnamese Muslims.  However, Tuyen 
noted, there were relationships between Vietnamese Muslims 
and Islamic communities in other countries, and Vietnamese 
Muslims made the Haj pilgrimage.  Vietnamese Muslims had 
been to other countries and "trained" in Islam there, Tuyen 
said.  Some Muslim groups in Vietnam also received financial 
assistance from abroad to set up schools and build mosques, 
he added.  According to "international experience," Tuyen 
said, these were the conditions from which an Islamic threat 
could develop. 
 
5. (SBU) Vietnam did not have madrassas, Tuyen said, but 
Cambodia had some.  Using information provided by the United 
States, MPS had been able to identify a suspect who had 
received more than USD 600,000 provided by a Saudi Islamic 
organization.  MPS was checking carefully to ensure that 
money was used to build a mosque, and an investigation was 
ongoing to determine if the money could have been spent on 
terrorist activities.  Tuyen also said that MPS was taking 
seriously one international expert's (NFI) analysis that 
terrorists want to use Vietnam and China as a "backyard" to 
prepare for terrorist operations elsewhere, for example by 
preparing false identity documents.  On the whole, Tuyen 
characterized intelligence relations with other countries on 
terrorism as "close" but noted that the GVN had yet to 
identify any terrorist organizations operating in Vietnam or 
any other terrorist plots against other countries in Vietnam 
or outside Vietnam's borders. 
 
A REAL TERRORIST THREAT: OVERSEAS VIETNAMESE GROUPS 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
6. (SBU) Tuyen asked Jannuzi to be aware that though the 
threat of Islamic terrorism against Vietnam was low, the 
threat from "radical Vietnamese groups overseas" was high. 
The "National United Front for Vietnamese Liberation" and 
the "Government of Free Vietnam" were both organizations 
that had sent money, people, and weapons into Vietnam for 
the purpose of destabilizing or overthrowing the government, 
Tuyen stated.  The organizations had supported or carried 
out attacks within Vietnam and against Vietnamese missions 
abroad, specifically in Manila and Bangkok.  "Tens" of these 
organizations' agents had been arrested with explosives and 
"other terrorist things," Tuyen said.  The GVN had provided 
"evidence and other information" on these organizations to 
the USG, Tuyen said, but so far the GVN had seen no results. 
The organizations continued to operate in the United States. 
In a particularly flagrant example, Garden Grove, CA radical 
Nguyen Huu Chanh "said on television that he had directed 
his followers to bring weapons and explosives into Vietnam." 
These "terrorists" pose a serious threat to Vietnam, Tuyen 
said, and Vietnam "could not see why they are allowed to 
operate in the United States in the current environment." 
 
THANKS FOR THE HELP 
------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Tuyen said he "appreciated highly" the United 
States cooperation with Vietnam on counterterrorism, 
particularly USG efforts to develop GVN's capacity.  Since 
2001, the United States had invited seven delegations with 
18 members to take part in CT training, Tuyen noted. 
Recently, a group of seven MPS officers had received CT 
training at the International Law Enforcement Academy in 
Bangkok.  "My colleagues highly appreciate the content of 
these courses," Tuyen said.  In addition, Tuyen praised the 
"great deal of information" MPS received from the U.S. 
Embassy and noted the existence of an Embassy-MPS hotline 
for terrorism emergencies.  "We would like to continue to 
learn from the United States and receive any training or 
technology assistance," he added. 
 
8. (SBU) Comment: We have heard most of Tuyen's brief 
before, but there was a change this time: previously, the 
GVN has stated that Muslim groups in Vietnam have "no 
connections" with the Muslim community outside Vietnam.  Now 
MPS is acknowledging contacts and outside sources of funding 
for Vietnamese Muslims.  This is positive because it 
indicates that MPS is staying current with developments 
involving their Muslim community and any potential terrorist 
links, and also because they were willing to share these 
findings with us.  Like our law enforcement relationship, 
our counterterrorism relationship with the GVN is often 
frustratingly unidirectional: we provide training, 
assistance, travel, and information, and they receive it. 
This meeting represented a small, but welcome, improvement. 
MARINE