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Viewing cable 04ANKARA5118, TURKS TAKE STEPS TO ADDRESS TRUCKER SECURITY IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04ANKARA5118 2004-09-10 16:01 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005118 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD IZ MOPS PREL PTER TU
SUBJECT: TURKS TAKE STEPS TO ADDRESS TRUCKER SECURITY IN 
IRAQ; WAITING ON U.S. RESPONSE 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 4529 
     B. ANKARA 4600 
     C. ANKARA 4893 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  In addition to their request for U.S. 
assistance (ref a), Turkish officials -- recognizing that USG 
resources for trucker security are limited and that the USG 
cannot solve the problem -- have been exploring a number of 
ideas Turkey could implement on its own to improve the 
security of Turkish truck drivers in Iraq.  An interim U.S. 
reply addressing some of the security suggestions made by the 
Turks would help them manage what they recognize is a 
difficult issue that will only be resolved in the long term. 
End Summary. 
 
Turkish Actions to Reduce Truckers' Risk 
---------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) On September 8, MFA DDG for Bilateral Economic 
Affairs Sakir Fakili asked Econoffs about a U.S. response to 
the list of ideas that were passed in a non-paper to DCM on 
August 11 (ref a).  Fakili was grateful that one of the 
Turkish suggestions had already been accomplished:  Embassy 
Baghdad had designated a point of contact on trucker security 
and had already made contact with the Turkish Embassy in 
Baghdad.  On the other items, Fakili said extending escort 
operations to all Turkish convoys -- not just those supplying 
U.S. forces -- would be the ideal solution from the MFA's 
point of view.  Nevertheless, he recognized that the U.S. 
military might not be in a position to do all that Turkey had 
suggested. 
 
3.  (SBU) Fakili stated that Turkey recognizes that the 
Turkish drivers make an important contribution to the 
stability and reconstruction of Iraq; and Turkey benefits as 
well.  According to Fakili, at any given time there are about 
5-6,000 Turks in Iraq.  Turkish companies have been awarded 
contracts totaling USD 500 million, and Turkish exports to 
Iraq have grown dramatically, more than doubling to USD 1 
billion in the first half of 2004.  On a macro level, this 
trade has not been significantly impacted by the violence 
against Turks that stepped up in August. 
 
4.  (SBU) Fakili said the government is working closely with 
Turkish trucker associations and businesses to identify steps 
Turkey can undertake on its own to improve security for 
Turkish truckers:  some Turkish companies are interested in a 
plan to build secure rest stops for trucks inside Iraq, and 
Turkey is looking into using contractors to enhance security 
for truck convoys.  Because Iraq will allow only Iraqi 
security firms, Turkish officials have been talking with some 
firms in Kirkuk about providing security teams for the 
truckers.  He added that security was also one of the main 
topics discussed when Jalal Talabani and Nechirvan Barzani 
visited Turkey this week. 
 
Border Backlog Lower -- Turkey to Use Syria Route 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
5.  (SBU) Fakili mentioned that the backlog of trucks from 
Iraq to Turkey at the Habur Gate border crossing seems to 
have eased recently.  He said Turkey has already made a 
number of improvements to increase the capacity of the border 
crossing, including increasing the number of personnel and 
installing computers to automate record checks.  However, he 
admitted that Habur will continue to be a problem.  Building 
a second border crossing would solve the problem, he offered, 
but efforts to agree with the Iraqi side failed.  As a 
result, Turkey was looking into using the 55 km-long road and 
rail corridor that runs through the extreme north-east corner 
of Syria.  Currently, 6 trains a week are transiting Syria. 
(Note:  TPIC, the export arm of the state oil company TPAO, 
began making fuel deliveries by train via Syria in January 
2004.  We are not aware if Turkish truckers have been using 
the road through Syria.)  Fakili asked if the U.S. would have 
any concern about Turkish truckers using the route through 
Syria from the Nusaybin border crossing.  (On September 9, 
Transportation Minister Yildirim announced that Turkey and 
Syria had announced an agreement to allow Turkish drivers to 
transit Syria to Iraq.) 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
6.  (SBU) Trucker security remains an important issue for the 
GOT.  As Turkish citizens continue to be attacked and 
sometimes killed, the GOT recognizes that inaction on this 
issue could lead to a political backlash against the 
government's support for U.S. efforts and could lead to 
truckers deciding that the risks they run to provide vital 
supplies to the Iraqi economy and U.S. forces are no longer 
worth it.  Fakili and other MFA officials with whom we have 
recently met recognize that there are no easy answers and 
that Turkey will have to work with the government of Iraq to 
find solutions over the long term.  At the same time, the 
government needs to be able to show its public that it is 
taking action to protect its citizens.  Thus the MFA 
continues to look for a U.S. response to the list of ideas in 
the non-paper to help improve security for Turkish drivers. 
It is also encouraging that the government is taking action 
on its own to reduce some of the risks. 
7.  (SBU) Action Request:  We understand the difficulties 
that implementing the Turkish ideas may entail.  However, we 
urge Washington to prepare an interim response to show that 
we recognize the importance of this issue and to give Turkish 
officials something to point to that the USG takes this issue 
seriously and is working with Turkey to help.  We offer the 
following recommendations for elements of an interim response: 
 
- A response on convoy security will take more time. 
- We are ready to offer logistical and security assistance 
for Turkish teams who want to travel to Iraq to examine 
possible locations for building secure warehouse and rest 
centers for truckers. 
- We are ready to brief Turkish officials on the 
communication options in northern Iraq.  For example, to what 
extent is cell phone service available in the area.  What are 
plans for improvements.  Also, we recommend exploring options 
such as establishing an information center at the border with 
current information on the weather, security conditions, 
etc., or providing regular (monthly) briefings from a U.S. 
official. 
- Embassies Baghdad and Ankara have established POCs for 
Turkish officials on trucker security. 
- We are ready to help identify U.S. contractors to share 
their experiences in Iraq dealing with insurance issues. 
EDELMAN