Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 04ABUJA1573, DARFUR PEACE TALKS: WRAPPING UP ROUND ONE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #04ABUJA1573.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04ABUJA1573 2004-09-13 11:13 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Abuja
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001573 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PHUM EAID MARR NI SU DARFUR
SUBJECT: DARFUR PEACE TALKS: WRAPPING UP ROUND ONE 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: The first round of African Union (AU)- 
mediated discussions on Darfur in Abuja ended September 10 
with the parties remaining far apart on fundamental issues 
and approach to the negotiations.  The AU mediators plan to 
officially adjourn the talks after meeting with President 
Obasanjo on September 14, and will set another round of 
negotiations in four to six weeks.  Repeated attempts to 
forge consensus during this round on a security protocol 
were frustrated by the lack of seriousness on the part of 
the GOS, and by the inexperience and intransigence of the 
rebels.  Hamid Al Ghabid, AU mediation team Chairman, will 
likely prepare a "Chairman's Communique" highlighting areas 
of agreement and issues over which agreement could not be 
reached.  Both sides agreed on the need for an expanded AU 
force and for a strengthened cease-fire, but could not agree 
on mechanisms to accomplish them.  The parties appear 
willing to continue negotiations after the adjournment.  End 
Summary. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN'S POSITIONS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2.  (SBU) The GOS delegation's body language gave the 
rebels/mediators an impression the GOS was not serious or 
willing to discuss key issues.  Throughout the proceedings, 
the GOS refused to admit any responsibility for the ongoing 
humanitarian disaster in Darfur.  They repeatedly branded 
the jinjaweit a band of outlaws, and called other Arab 
militias or tribal groups "defense forces," in an attempt to 
sideline the jinjaweit issue.  This also appeared designed 
to anger rebel "movement" representatives, further fueling 
their distrust of GOS intentions.  After Secretary Powell's 
testimony on September 9, however, the GOS delegation 
approached the mediators and observers offering to make 
concessions, such as allowing an expanded AU-monitoring 
mission and protection force, acknowledging their 
responsibility to disarm the jinjaweit and other militias, 
and removing references to DDR in the protocol. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - 
REBEL INTRANSIGENCE 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
3.  (U)  Rebels remained focused throughout on four key 
objectives: withdrawal of government forces, including 
police, to pre-conflict garrisons; international or AU 
forces to disarm the jinjaweit and to protect civilians; 
creation of an independent commission of inquiry to 
investigate human rights abuses, genocide, and atrocities; 
and a no-fly zone over Darfur for military aircraft and 
civilian aircraft being used for intimidation.  At the same 
time, the rebel movements refused to consider steps common 
to cease-fire arrangements, such as providing information on 
their locations and order of battle to the Cease-Fire 
Commission (CFC) and assembly.  The mediation team and 
international observers have been unable to convince the 
rebel movements to drop insistence on actions that can be 
taken by the international community, i.e. AU and UN, 
outside the peace talks.  In addition, AU and USDEL have 
advised them that their position could sideline them from 
future peace implementation efforts as in the Pronk Plan. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
FRUSTRATED MEDIATION ATTEMPTS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
4.  (U)  The last AU mediation drafts represented minimum 
requirements the CFC sought, to advance monitoring efforts 
and elicit an invitation for an expanded AU force.  Both 
sides categorically rejected the AU initial draft until they 
were intensely lobbied in foreign capitals.  The GOS 
conceded measures for a workable response after considerable 
pressure.  The rebel movements rejected the initial draft 
and subsequent draft, particularly a provision in the 
preamble that recognizes the sovereignty of Sudan.  The 
rebels also clung to their position that security provisions 
be discussed under political issues. 
 
5.  (SBU)  On September 8, Al Ghabid recognized that he 
would not get a draft that would move the peace process 
forward due to opposition from the rebels, who seemed to 
want to keep international pressure on the GOS.  On the 
security agenda, both sides have agreed on the need for an 
expanded AU force and a strengthening of the cease-fire, the 
return of prisoners, and the non-use of child soldiers. 
However, discussions repeatedly went back to the rebel 
movements' rejecting the so-called "handwritten addition" in 
paragraph six of the N'djamena Humanitarian Cease-Fire 
Agreement.  The rebels consistently refer to the N'djamena 
document as a "forgery", insisting that they had rejected 
the requirement for assembly.  They also maintain that the 
GOS committed to "neutralize the militias" while the GOS 
says that the N'djamena agreement does not mention the 
jinjaweit.  The GOS insistence that the movements be 
cantoned and disarmed along with the militias (as opposed to 
the jinjaweit) was a continuing problem.  Over the weekend, 
however, GOS Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs 
Mohammed Yousef Abdulla and other members of the Sudanese 
delegation said in meetings that they understand the rebels 
are not required to disarm, while the GOS needed to "satisfy 
their constituencies" that they will be protected from 
attacks by the rebel movements. 
 
- - - - - - 
NEXT STEPS 
- - - - - - 
 
6.  (U) The formal negotiations ended September 10 even 
though informal meetings occurred throughout the weekend to 
see if compromise language could be reached.  Nigerian FM 
Adeniji will meet with the AU mediation team September 13, 
and Obasanjo is likely to meet with representatives of the 
rebel movements, GOS, and mediation and observer teams on 
September 14.  The AU then plans to officially adjourn the 
negotiations for four to six weeks. 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
7.  (SBU)  The AU team did not believe a security protocol 
could be reached at this point, and for that reason 
recommended adjourning the proceedings formally to allow 
both sides time to reflect.  The AU will highlight the 
achievement of a humanitarian protocol and the beginning of 
discussions on security issues.  The fact that both parties 
are talking is a big step forward, and the next round -- 
which should cover political issues-- will give a better 
indication of whether the GOS and parties can negotiate a 
workable outcome.  The AU could not work out the security 
protocol in 10-14 days this time, and we expect the 
political agenda will be even more contentious. 
 
8. (U) Minimize considered. 
 
CAMPBELL