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Viewing cable 04ABUJA1514, DARFUR PEACE TALKS: CONSIDERING SECURITY ISSUES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04ABUJA1514 2004-09-03 09:54 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Abuja
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001514 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR D, P, AF; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PREF EAID MARR NI CD SU DARFUR
SUBJECT: DARFUR PEACE TALKS: CONSIDERING SECURITY ISSUES 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  After reaching agreement on a 
humanitarian protocol on September 1, the African Union-led 
negotiations on Dafur are addressing security issues, with 
the primary goal of strengthening the mechanisms for the 
implementation of the N'Djamena Humanitarian Cease-fire 
Agreement.  A draft proposal on security issues is being 
compiled and will be considered on September 4.  It is clear 
that the Government of Sudan wants a deal, from its 
delegation making concessions on key issues, such as the 
size and mandate of the AU-monitoring force.  The rebel 
movements' negotiating tactic is to continue to frontload 
extreme demands, a sign of inexperience.  The AU hopes to 
have agreement on a security protocol by early next week. 
End Summary. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
HUMANITARIAN PROTOCOL ACHIEVED 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2. (U)  On September 1, the African-Union (AU) mediation 
team, the Government of Sudan, and the Sudanese Liberation 
Movement/Army (SLM/A) and Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM) agreed to a humanitarian protocol that includes 
uninhibited access for humanitarian organizations and 
protection measures for civilians.  (Note: The humanitarian 
protocol was scanned to AF/SPG on September 2.  End Note.) 
The rebel movements were able to get dropped references to 
agreements to which they are not a party.  They then agreed 
to compromise language proposed by Nigerian Foreign Minister 
Adeniji to remove the final obstacle to the agreement which 
was the rebel's concern about the mention of cantonment in 
previous AU decisions.  The agreement boosted the confidence 
of the rebel movements in the AU mediation team and in their 
own ability to achieve their demands.  The GOS was anxious 
to get results and compromised on most points.  Still wary, 
the rebel movements refused to initial the humanitarian 
protocol.  They argue that humanitarian issues are 
interlinked with security.  They have assured the AU that 
they will sign both protocols after agreement is reached on 
security issues.  Nonetheless, the AU and international 
observers, including the U.S. delegation, continue to press 
rebel leaders to initial the humanitarian protocol. 
 
- - - - - - - - 
SECURITY ISSUES 
- - - - - - - - 
 
3.  (U)  Capitalizing on the momentum gained with 
achievement of a humanitarian protocol the previous evening, 
the AU mediation team and parties began discussing security 
issues on September 2.  The AU allowed both sides to present 
their positions, which at times was a session to vent anger 
and trade accusations.  The agenda items included: the 
report of the Joint-Cease Fire Commission, disarmament of 
the jandjaweed, cantonment of the rebel forces, and prisoner 
exchanges.  The GOS, while denying any ties to the 
jandjaweed, did give ground in its opening remarks on the 
expansion of the AU monitoring mission in Sudan and agreed 
to the suggestion of the Chairman Hamid Al-Ghabid that the 
ICRC become involved in prisoner exchanges. 
 
4.  (U)  The rebel movements complained about the 
"different" versions of the N'Djamena accord and then 
refused to discuss the cantonment of their troops.  They 
asked the GOS to explain what measures it had taken to 
disarm the jandjaweed, and pressed for the GOS to live up to 
its commitments at N'Djamena.  They demanded captured SLM/A 
and JEM members be released.  JEM's spokesman Ahmed Lissan 
called for a no-fly zone in Darfur for military aircraft or 
civilian aircraft being used for intimidation, a weeding out 
of jandjaweed and other militia members from the security 
forces, and an investigative mechanism for crimes against 
humanity.  SLM/A and JEM want more AU monitors and an 
expanded protection force with a mandate to protect 
civilians. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - 
POTENTIAL PITFALLS 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
5.  (U) Two issues may complicate reaching accord on 
security issues.  First, the rebels' insistence on the 
removal of GOS security forces from the IDP camps and other 
areas.  The AU, however, believes this can be overcome with 
an acceptable security mechanism that includes the 
deployment of AU monitors alongside security forces. 
Second, the rebel movements refuse to discuss cantonment, an 
issue pushed by the GOS delegation throughout the 
discussion.  However, it is likely that the AU will be able 
to get this issue moved to the political discussion. 
 
6.  (SBU)  The AU hopes to obtain a security agreement early 
next week.  They are planning a break of about three weeks 
before reconvening in Abuja.  The Libyan delegation has not 
given up its efforts to move the venue to Libya.  However, 
the Nigerian Government is against this idea and the rebel 
movements are cool to it.  SLM/A and JEM leaders have told 
us that they are comfortable with the Nigerian venue, 
particularly the efforts of President Obasanjo and Foreign 
Minister Adeniji. 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
7.  (SBU)  The AU's stated goal on security issues is to put 
"flesh and bones" on the N'Djamena Humanitarian Cease-Fire 
and to create specific mechanisms to ensure compliance.  We 
do not yet have a complete picture of what these mechanisms 
will look like, but expect the finalized draft by the end of 
September 3.  The GOS wants to get a deal and we believe 
there is considerable maneuvering room if the rebel 
movements concede on moving the difficult issues of 
cantonment and investigation of human rights abuses to the 
political discussions. 
 
8.  (U) Minimize considered. 
CAMPBELL