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Viewing cable 04VATICAN3308, POPE RETURNS ICON TO ORTHODOX, HOPING FOR THAW IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04VATICAN3308 2004-08-30 04:33 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Vatican
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS  VATICAN 003308 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT. FOR EUR/WE: LEVIN; DRL/IRF; EUR/RUS 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: PREL SOCI RS VT
SUBJECT: POPE RETURNS ICON TO ORTHODOX, HOPING FOR THAW IN 
RELATIONS 
 
Refs: A) Vatican 2671, B) Vatican 1171 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Pope John Paul II is returning a copy of an 
historic icon of the Virgin Mary to the Russian Orthodox 
Church, a gesture he hopes will help thaw relations between 
Rome and Moscow.  The Pope had wanted to return the icon to 
Moscow in person, but continued coolness from Orthodox 
Patriarch Alexei II to a Papal visit prompted the Pope to 
entrust the return to a high-level Vatican delegation. 
Alexei has downplayed the Pope's conciliatory gesture, 
taking great pains to emphasize that the image of Our Lady 
of Kazan is not the revered historic icon, but "one of many 
copies."  The recent visit to Rome by the Ecumenical 
Patriarch of Constantinople, Bartholomew I (ref a), and a 
few hopeful signs for Catholics in Russia have given the 
Vatican's Orthodox watchers some hope for better times in 
this ecumenical relationship.  However, the predominant 
view in Vatican City is that that this gesture is unlikely 
to be reciprocated as long as Alexei II remains Patriarch. 
End Summary. 
 
---------------------- 
Icon Returns to Russia 
---------------------- 
 
2. (U) Pope John Paul II has decided to return a copy of an 
historic icon of the Virgin Mary to the Russian Orthodox 
Church.  At a farewell event in Vatican City August 25, the 
Pontiff expressed his hope that the gesture would 
contribute to efforts to bring Rome and Moscow a step 
closer to unity.  The icon, a copy of the precious Madonna 
of Kazan, probably dating from the seventeenth or 
eighteenth century, was likely taken out of Russia in the 
early twentieth century.  It changed hands several times in 
ensuing years until it was exhibited at the World's Fair in 
New York in 1964-65.  An American Catholic organization 
later bought the icon, and gave it to the Pope in 1993. 
Although John Paul II would have preferred to return the 
icon personally, the cool response to his wish by Orthodox 
Patriarch Alexei II left the Pope with little choice but to 
entrust the task to a high-level Vatican delegation led by 
the Head of the Pontifical Council for Christian Unity, 
Cardinal Walter Kasper.  Kasper and his team, including 
Washington's Cardinal Theodore McCarrick, will hold talks 
with Orthodox officials on the margins of the hand-over 
ceremony scheduled for August 28 (ref b). 
 
--------------------------- 
Patriarch Downplays Gesture 
--------------------------- 
 
3. (U) Orthodox Patriarch Alexei II has downplayed the 
Pope's conciliatory gesture, taking great pains to 
emphasize that the image of Our Lady of Kazan is not the 
revered historic icon, but "one of many copies."  When the 
Vatican floated the idea that the Pope might personally 
present Alexei with the icon, the Russian prelate told 
journalists that there was no reason for the Pope to be 
involved in the transfer, since the icon is not the 
original.  The Patriarch further called for the Holy See to 
match its gesture with actions in putting an end to what it 
regards as proselytism among Russia's Orthodox communities 
- a charge the Vatican rejects 
 
------------------------------- 
But Other Orthodox See Goodwill 
------------------------------- 
 
4.  (U) Despite the lack of authenticity, public interest 
in the icon has been high, and the gesture has been widely 
seen as a sincere effort to improve relations with the 
Orthodox Church.  A large crowd, including Orthodox clergy, 
took part in the August 25 weekly Papal audience at which 
the Pope bade farewell to the icon, which he has kept in 
his private chapel.  The Pope responded to one of them in a 
voice stronger than we have heard recently, saying that "it 
is with deep emotion that I . . . give thanks to Divine 
Providence which has allowed me today to send to the 
venerable Patriarch of Moscow and all Russians, the gift of 
this holy icon."  At the end of the ceremony Catholic and 
Orthodox clergy processed out of the hall together.  Rome- 
based media have reported enthusiasm for the Pope's gesture 
from Orthodox clergy in Rome, and noted that a group of 
Moscow Catholics has asked Catholic Archbishop Tadeusz 
Kondrusiewicz if it can venerate the icon when it arrives 
in Russia.  However, Kondrusiewicz made it clear that 
ecumenical courtesy would mean Patriarch Alexei would be 
 
 
the first to see the icon. 
 
-------------------------- 
Some Good News from Russia 
-------------------------- 
 
5.  (U) While the Pope has not gotten his long-awaited 
invitation to Russia, the Holy See has been buoyed by 
recent news that the Russian government has given the 
Catholic diocese of Saratov full legal recognition. 
Similar status has already been given to the Catholic 
archdiocese in Moscow, and church officials are hoping to 
have the same courtesy extended to the remaining two 
dioceses in Siberia.  The legal status facilitates the 
churches activities, including new construction and 
education. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Comment: Low Expectations of Alexei 
----------------------------------- 
 
6.(SBU) Alexei's dismissive attitude towards Vatican 
reconciliation efforts has been a constant in Catholic 
Russian Orthodox relations in recent years.  The Patriarch 
has repeatedly condemned alleged Catholic proselytism on 
Orthodox turf and warned against Rome's initiatives to 
shore up its presence in Russia by elevating the status of 
its ecclesiastical jurisdictions.  From the Holy See's 
perspective, it seems that all gestures of rapprochement 
are automatically snubbed and treated with paranoid 
suspicion. 
 
7.  (SBU) Despite Alexei's continued snubs, Pope John Paul 
II and the Vatican can be expected to continue their 
efforts to reach out to the Russian Orthodox.  However, it 
is clear that this relationship will remain more difficult 
than the more promising relations the Holy See enjoys with 
Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, the "first among equals" 
in the Orthodox world.  The Holy See knows that its 
gestures towards the Russian Orthodox are unlikely to be 
reciprocated in any meaningful way while Alexei II is 
Patriarch.  Nevertheless, the Vatican, with its ability to 
take the long view, is willing to wait -- having already 
survived the more than ten centuries of separation between 
the two churches.  In the meantime, the Holy See will 
continue to press for closer cooperation and "communion" to 
combat what it regards as the common threat to the Roman 
Catholic and Orthodox worlds from Europe's aggressive 
secularism.  End comment. 
 
Hardt 
 
 
NNNN 

 2004VATICA03308 - Classification: UNCLASSIFIED