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Viewing cable 04HELSINKI1023, FINLAND: RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR THIRD PARTY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04HELSINKI1023 2004-08-06 05:02 2011-04-24 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Helsinki
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HELSINKI 001023 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR PM, EUR/NB 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2014 
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL FI IQ
SUBJECT: FINLAND:  RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR THIRD PARTY 
FINANCING FOR UN PROTECTION FORCE 
 
REF: SECSTATE 166158 
 
Classified By: ACTING POL CHIEF DAVID ALLEN SCHLAEFER FOR REASONS 1.5 ( 
B) and (D) 
 
1.  (C)  This message contains an action request from the 
Government of Finland for additional information.  See para 
6. 
 
2.  (C)  Poloff delivered reftel demarche on August 3 to 
Leena Riitola, the Acting Director of the MFA's Department 
for Africa and Middle-East Affairs.  Riitola agreed that it 
was important for the UN to fully engage in Iraqi 
reconstruction, and that there had to be a robust protection 
force to ensure the safety of returning UN personnel.  She 
said that there was obviously a need for a "buffer" between 
UN civilian personnel and Coalition military operations.  She 
opined that using American and British forces to protect UN 
assets invited attacks by insurgents and was not the ideal 
solution to UN security needs.  However, she stopped short of 
endorsing the concept outlined in reftel and said that the 
Finnish government would have to seriously consider the issue 
before giving any official reaction. 
 
3.  (C)  Riitola told Poloff that Finland's Foreign Minister, 
Tuomioja, was returning from vacation at the end of the week, 
and would be meeting with President Halonen for an "informal 
review" of pressing foreign policy issues that had arisen 
during Finland's unofficial summer break.  Riitola said that 
she would pass the information to the Political Secretariat 
and Foreign Minister's Office, and see that the force 
protection issue was on the agenda for the Halonen/Tuomioja 
meeting. To reinforce our message before that review, 
Ambassador Mack met with Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs Jaakko Laajava and Acting Political DG Anu 
Lammanen Ryter on August 5.  The Ambassador emphasized that 
an early expression of support for the UN protection force by 
Finland could be critical to galvanizing the necessary 
support in the international community.  Keying off comments 
made by President Halonen last week that Muslim troops were 
the best hope for stabilizing Iraq, the Ambassador stressed 
that the force contemplated in reftel would consist primarily 
of Muslim troops and be less likely to be attacked by Muslim 
insurgents and terrorists.  The Ambassador cited Finland's 
long-standing, strong support for the United Nations and 
multilateralism, and also noted recent press remarks by UNSYG 
Annan stating that plans for full UN re-engagement in Iraq 
are in jeopardy because of lack of support on the force 
protection issue. 
 
4.  (C)  Laajava agreed that a solution to the UN force 
protection issue was necessary.  He said that it was often 
easy to "miss the forest for the trees," and that whatever 
policy differences existed with the U.S. as regards Iraq, it 
was in everyone's interest to now assist in helping to build 
a stable and safe country for the Iraqi people.  Laajava 
mentioned that Annan had been in Finland (and was in a 
meeting with President Halonen) when he was informed of the 
tragic attack on UN headquarters earlier this year.  He noted 
that former Finnish President Ahtisaari had led the inquiry 
into the attack, and many of the recommendations in 
Ahtisaari's report seemed to inform the UN force protection 
concept that was now being discussed.  However, Laajava also 
said that since the operation envisioned was not a "blue 
helmet" operation, both politics and logistics could be more 
complicated.  Laajava said that he would be participating in 
the "informal review" of foreign policy later that very day, 
and would fully discuss the issue with Tuomioja and Halonen. 
He also had several questions about the mechanics of the 
operation. 
 
5.  (C)  Comment:  There is currently an ongoing debate in 
the Finnish press about how Finland should reconcile its 
commitment to the UN and multilateralism with the aversion 
both the GoF and Finnish society have as regards the Iraq 
conflict.  While the GoF has publicly emphasized that lack of 
resources makes any consideration of Finnish troop deployment 
impossible, some editorials have questioned whether that 
position is morally sustainable, and whether Finnish lives 
are "worth more" than the lives of would-be peacekeepers from 
the developing world.  Given that, the reaction of the MFA's 
working level to the current demarche suggests they see 
financing a UN protection force as an opportunity for Finland 
to fulfill moral and political obligations to the UN without 
becoming involved in actual ground operations.  Whether 
Tuomioja agrees with this assessment remains to be seen. 
Tuomioja's support alone may not be sufficient to secure a 
positive response from Finland, but his opposition will 
almost certainly make the idea a political non-starter here. 
 
6.  (C)  Action request:  The GoF has requested the following 
information pursuant to its internal debate over third party 
financing on UN force protection in Iraq: 
 
--  What are Iraq's neighbors, especially Saudi Arabia, doing 
in regard to UN force protection? 
 
--  Why is the U.S. making this appeal rather than a direct 
approach from the UNSYG? 
 
--  What criteria were used to determine which countries 
would be approached? 
 
--  Who will command the UN protection force? 
 
--  What will the force's relationship be to the coalition 
and what precisely will its function be? 
 
--  What is the attitude of the IIG to this idea? 
 
--  Why is this not officially a "blue helmet" operation, 
since that would seem to facilitate both financial and troop 
donations? 
 
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED 
MACK