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Viewing cable 04BRASILIA1987, MORE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST BRAZIL CENTRAL BANK

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04BRASILIA1987 2004-08-06 19:40 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001987 
 
SIPDIS 
 
TREASURY FOR OASIA - DAS LEE AND SSEGAL 
NSC FOR RENIGAR AND DEMPSEY 
USDOC FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/EOLSON/DDEVITO 
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAAC/WH/OLAC/DMCDOUGALL/ADRISCOLL 
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/JANDERSON/WBASTIAN 
STATE FOR EB/IFD/OMA - KMOSS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2014 
TAGS: EFIN ECON PGOV BR
SUBJECT: MORE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST BRAZIL CENTRAL BANK 
GOVERNOR 
 
REF: A. BRASILIA 1906 
 
     B. 03 BRASILIA 1846 
     C. 03 BRASILIA 2365 
     D. 03 BRASILIA 3292 
 
Classified by Economic Counselor Roman Wasilewski, Reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  A new charge of financial misconduct 
against Central Bank President Meirelles contributed to 
market unease on Thursday August 5, unlike previous 
allegations that he failed to properly disclose his finances 
(ref A).  The new allegation involves a $50,000 payment by 
Meirelles in October 2002, before he became Central Bank 
Chairman, to an account allegedly associated with black 
market currency traders exposed in the Banestado case (refs 
B-D).  As with the previous allegations, Meirelles has fought 
back quickly and publicly, stating in multiple interviews and 
press appearances since yesterday that the payment was an 
innocent one made for the renovation of his New York 
apartment.  Meirelles has stated that he will not contemplate 
stepping down, and President Lula reportedly has said that he 
will not ask Meirelles to do so.  The reassurances appear to 
have calmed financial markets, which by mid-day Friday were 
recovering nicely.  We do not believe that the current 
charges will end in Meirelles' departure.  Even if fresh 
revelations were ultimately to do so, given Lula's personal 
commitment to an orthodox economic policy agenda, we do not 
doubt that he would replace Meirelles with someone 
like-minded.  End Summary. 
 
2. (U) Veja Magazine published on Thursday August 5 charges 
that Meirelles had paid $50,000 into an offshore account 
associated with a well known black market currency trader and 
failed to report the existence of the account from which the 
payment was made on his 2002 tax return.  This followed on 
the heels of allegations each of the last two weeks about 
income-tax improprieties prior to 2003 (ref A).  Unlike the 
previous instances, the latest accusation affected financial 
markets, by traders' accounts, exacerbating worries over 
record high oil prices.  The Sao Paulo stock exchange 
(BOVESPA) fell 3.82% on the day, the Real depreciated 0.5% 
and Brazil's country risk rose 3%, closing at 615. 
 
3. (U) Meirelles once again fought back quickly, granting 
several interviews, issuing a Central Bank press release and 
appearing on the August 6 "Good Morning Brazil" to refute the 
charge.  In denying any wrong-doing, Meirelles claimed that 
he had no personal connection with the currency trader and 
had simply paid a $50,000 bill owed to a third party in 
connection with the renovation of his New York apartment by 
transferring money to the (ultimately suspect) account named 
by that party.  Regarding the second part of the charge, that 
he had failed to declare on his 2002 tax return the account 
from which the payment was made, Meirelles stated there was 
no such obligation because the account was closed before the 
end of 2002. 
 
4. (U) The accusation sparked renewed opposition calls for 
Meirelles to step down, a step that Meirelles reiterated he 
is not contemplating.  While not speaking out publicly, Lula 
is reported widely to have told confidants that he will not 
ask Meirelles to go and as being satisfied with Meirelles' 
explanations of the transactions.  The reassurances appear to 
have calmed local financial markets, which by mid-day Friday 
had recovered almost half of Thursday's lost ground. 
 
5. (C) The opposition PFL and PSDB parties are planning to 
make political hay out of the issue (despite the fact that 
Meirelles himself is a PSDB member who gave up his seat in 
the Federal Chamber of Deputies to take over at the Central 
Bank).  PSDB Senator Antero Paes de Barros, who chairs the 
Senate's long-running inquiry into the Banestado money 
laundering scandal is believed by some to have leaked the 
information on Meirelles' bank accounts from the archives he 
has collected for the Banestado case.  If so, this would not 
be the first time Paes de Barros has been suspected of 
politicized, anonymous leaks, having played a part in the 
emergence of the famous Waldomiro/Charlie Waterfall 
videotapes. 
 
6. (SBU) There is some maneuvering now over whether Meirelles 
will be called before the Senate's Economic Affairs or 
Oversight Committee, but in the end the two committees may 
meet in joint session to question him.  The opposition 
parties could seek to drag out the affair for weeks to avoid 
taking action on legislation that President Lula would like 
to see pass in the abbreviated Congressional sessions before 
the October municipal elections.  Questioning Meirelles about 
alleged corruption would provide a headline-making 
alternative for an opposition that does not want to hand Lula 
any political victories that could help Workers' Party (PT) 
candidates in the elections. 
 
7. (SBU) Comment:  Meirelles' open discussion of the 
allegations with the press stands in marked contrast to Lula 
Chief of Staff Jose Dirceu's closed-mouth reaction to the 
Waldomiro Diniz scandal of early this year.  Barring 
extensive new revelations, we continue to believe that GoB 
damage control efforts in this case and the relatively minor 
nature of the charges make it unlikely that Meirelles will be 
forced to leave.  Moreover, the fact that a replacement would 
require Congressional confirmation gives Lula and the GoB 
even more incentive to defend Meirelles, since obtaining such 
confirmation ahead of the October municipal elections would 
be difficult and give disaffected congressmen a target at 
which to aim their discontent with interest rate policy, the 
GoB's avowed intent to seek Central Bank autonomy in 2005, 
and the broader GoB economic policy agenda.  Even in the 
unlikely event that fresh future revelations do force 
Meirelles out, we have no doubt that Lula will choose a 
replacement from Brazil's ample field of qualified candidates 
who is equally dedicated to the orthodox policies that have 
marked Meirelles' tenure.  The GoB's commitment to orthodox 
economic policy does not hinge on Meirelles, but rather on 
Lula himself. 
 
DANILOVICH