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Viewing cable 04ANKARA4893, TURKISH BUSINESSMEN DESCRIBE THREAT TO WORK IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04ANKARA4893 2004-08-28 06:58 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 004893 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SE, AND NEA/I 
NSC FOR MBRYZA 
ALSO FOR MNF-I AND MNF-NORTH 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ETRD ECON IZ TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH BUSINESSMEN DESCRIBE THREAT TO WORK IN 
IRAQ, REQUEST US HELP 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 4529 
     B. ANKARA 4600 
     C. ANKARA 4713 
 
1.  (Sbu) Summary: In recent days the head of the Turkish 
Chamber of Commerce, as well as executives of 
two leading Turkish USG contractors in Iraq (Tepe and Yuksel) 
have all met with the Ambassador to press for 
US consideration of additional security measures to enhance 
security for Turkish truckers and contractors in 
Iraq.  The businessmen,s proposals dovetail with those in 
the GOT non-paper (ref b) but are significant in that 
these are credible contacts, struggling to continue to do 
business in Iraq, including significant work for the 
USG.  Post reiterates its request for guidance in Ref  B. 
End Summary. 
 
Meeting with Chamber of Commerce and Truckers, Association: 
------------------------------------ 
 
2.(Sbu) The President of the Turkish Chamber of Commerce 
(TOBB) Rifat Hisarciklioglu and the President 
of the International Transporters Association of Turkey 
(UND) Cetin Nuhoglu met with the Ambassador 
August 23 to discuss security of Turkish truckers in Iraq. 
Hisarciklioglu claimed that 41 Turkish drivers have 
been killed, are missing or have been kidnapped.  (Of the 41, 
two kidnapped drivers have since been released 
and 8 of the missing drivers have been found.)  He cautioned 
that some Turkish businesses are "re-thinking" 
working in Iraq.  Hisarciklioglu said TOBB still hoped the 
U.S. would help implement recommendations it 
made in a February 2004 report.  In particular, 
Hisarciklioglu emphasized the need for insurance.  He said 
TOBB recently updated its proposals to improve security for 
Turkish truckers and other workers and urged 
that Turkish and U.S. officials work together to report on 
these issues to Washington and Baghdad. 
 
3. (Sbu) TOBB,s new proposals include 1) designating secure 
routes from the border to the major destination 
points (Mosul, Kirkuk, Baghdad); 2) enhancing security at the 
transshipment depots; 3) providing security for 
all convoys (not just those supplying U.S. programs; 4) 
enhancing communication among drivers (most of whom 
carry cell phones) by establishing a GSM network in northern 
Iraq; 5) establishing secure accommodation 
facilities on the route, where drivers can safely rest; and 
6) providing investment incentives for construction 
of logistical warehouses in Iraq. 
 
4. (Sbu)  The Ambassador thanked Hisarciklioglu for the 
proposals and TOBB,s support, adding that the U.S. 
has a strong interest in finding solutions.  He noted that 
the Turkish truckers are essential in providing supplies 
to U.S. forces and Turkish companies are playing an important 
role in reconstruction.  However, since the 
transfer of sovereignty, the U.S. has less ability to 
implement the proposals ) most decisions must be made by 
the IIG in Baghdad.  The Ambassador undertook to pass the 
proposals to Baghdad and Washington. 
 
5. (Sbu) Hisarciklioglu said that TOBB is close to concluding 
a contract with the GOT,s Customs Undersecretariat 
to begin the long-delayed modernization of the current border 
infrastructure at Habur Gate.    However, he warned 
that the issue of the second border crossing &will play a 
role.8   The Ambassador reminded Hisarciklioglu that the 
U.S. supports a second crossing and even offered a TDA 
financed feasibility study on the best possible route, but 
political problems on both sides have stalled any progress. 
 
TEPE: 
------- 
 
6. (Sbu) On August 19, CEO Ali Kantur and Deputy General 
Manager Suleyman Son, of Tepe Group, a 
large Turkish  construction company with substantial USG 
subcontracts in Iraq, met the Ambassador. 
Kantur said that Tepe has completed fifteen projects in Iraq 
(mostly prefab buildings for camps for the 
U.S. military) and continues to work on three others. Kantur 
described how security problems are 
impairing its ability to peform under the contracts.  As 
reported in ref A, terrorists kidnapped two 
employees of Tepe,s subsidiary, Bilintur.  The terrorists 
murdered one hostage, Murat Yuce, on the 
Internet, and have threatened to kill the other unless Tepe 
pulls out of Iraq. 
 
7. (Sbu) Kantur and Son, explained that one of their biggest 
problems now is how to transport prefabricated 
housing to the Falluja area under a subcontract with KBR. 
Though they used to transport through Syria and 
switch to Iraqi drivers on the Iraq side of the border, that 
route has now become too insecure to use. After 
four months at the border, Tepe has brought the goods back up 
through Turkey to the Habur Gate and 
actually buried them on the Iraqi side, near Zahko, but still 
lacks a secure way to get them to Falluja. 
 
8. (Sbu) More broadly, Kantur said Tepe has lost 15 trucks 
worth of goods, worth millions of dollars. Nearly 
all of these losses have occurred since the beginning of 
2004, when*according to Kantur*the security situation 
in Iraq became much worse.  Sometimes KBR has been able to 
arrange US military escort, but usually not. 
When escort has been provided, sometimes it requires trucks 
to wait for weeks.  Now Tepe is simply unable 
to deliver the goods. Because of the kidnappings near 
Falluja, Tepe has had to pull out of the area and even 
in Baghdad it is moving its people to the Green Zone or 
evacuating them.  Son said that now even Iraqi 
drivers will not go to Falluja. 
 
Yuksel: 
--------- 
 
9. (Sbu) Also on August 19, Emin Sazak, and Hakan Ferhatoglu, 
senior executives from the Turkish construction 
company Yuksel, came in to see the Ambassador.  Yuksel, like 
Tepe, is a significant USG contractor in Iraq and 
in Afghanistan, where it is building the new U.S. Embassy. 
Yuksel has subcontracts with both KBR and Fluor in 
Iraq.  Sazak and Ferhatoglu described problems in Iraq 
similar to Tepe,s. 
 
10. (Sbu) Sazak said Yuksel brings all its goods to Zakho, 
where it changes to Iraqi drivers.  Now it has trouble 
finding Iraqi drivers willing to take the goods south.  Sazak 
went into some detail about the convoy escort 
provided by MNF-I.  He said there is usually one US military 
vehicle in front and one in the rear, going about 
60-70 km/hr. Sazak echoed a concern raised by the GOT MFA: 
If a truck has a problem and needs to stop, 
the military escort will only stop briefly, often leaving the 
truck behind.  Sazak said Yuksel has had at least 
one case of its people killed in an escorted convoy, and in 
one case had to leave a truck behind. 
 
11. (Sbu) Sazak  said that in addition to the loss of life, 
insurance is a big problem since Yuksel cannot document 
losses.  It would be very helpful, he added, if the US 
military escort would be willing to provide a report of an 
attack, or a truck lost to attackers.  Sazak also wondered 
whether the US military could not consider some sort of 
air patrol, since the truck route in Northern Iraq is a flat 
area and surveillance from the air might have a deterrent 
effect.   Near Fellujah, where the camp Yuksel employees were 
working in came under mortar attack, Sazak 
wondered whether the insurgents weren,t getting inside 
information since they seemed to be finding their range 
as though someone was spotting the efficacy of the rounds. 
 
12. (Sbu) Sazak also passed on a problem specific to Camp 
Anaconda.  Whereas in every other camp in Iraq*and 
previously in Anaconda itself*Yuksel employees had been able 
to circulate in the camp with a green badge, a new 
US commander in Anaconda has taken away these badges, 
inhibiting the Yuksel people,s movements.  Sazak 
claimed that the commander,s reasoning is that Turkey is not 
part of the coalition. 
 
13. (Sbu) Sazak said that Yuksel is the largest Turkish 
contractor in Iraq, with eight hundred employees and is 
struggling not to pull out.  He pointed out that a Yuksel 
pullout would be a &big deal8 but did not imply that they 
were close to any such decision. 
 
 Comment and Action Request: 
----------------------------- 
 
14. (Sbu)  While post has no independent means to verify the 
Turkish businessmen,s reports, in many ways their 
accounts*particularly Kantur and Sazak,s*are more credible 
than those of the MFA.  Kantur and Sazak are well 
known to the Embassy and both have extensive ties to*and 
business with*the U.S.  They genuinely seem to be 
struggling to stay engaged in Iraq.  Post reiterates its 
request in ref A for Washington guidance on how to respond 
to Turkish proposals on transport security into Northern 
Iraq. 
 
15. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
EDELMAN