Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 04MADRID2909, SPAIN: DEFMIN AND HIS DEPUTY ON S-80 SUBS WEAPONS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #04MADRID2909.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04MADRID2909 2004-07-30 11:57 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Madrid
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002909 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SECDEF FOR OSD A.J. TORRES 
JOINT STAFF FOR MAJOR STACY YIKE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MASS MARR SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN:  DEFMIN AND HIS DEPUTY ON S-80 SUBS WEAPONS 
PACKAGE COMPETITION 
 
1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY Ambassador Argyros phoned Spanish Defense 
Minister Jose Bono July 16 to reinforce USG concern that the 
bidding process for the Spanish S-80 submarine weapons 
package, in which two U.S. companies are involved, remained 
open and transparent.  Ambassador noted to Bono that the 
bidding deadline had closed during the previous Spanish 
government, but that it now appeared that the process was 
changing to allow French and German firms to compete.  Bono 
claimed the process remained open and transparent and 
expressed his confidence in the U.S. companies involved, but 
noted he had also received calls from the French and German 
Foreign Ministers.  Bono suggested DCM meet with Deputy 
Defense Minister Pardo to further discuss the bidding 
process; Charge met with Pardo July 27 and received a message 
similar to Bono's to the Ambassador.  Pardo said no final 
decision would be made until at least the fall of 2004.  END 
SUMMARY 
 
Ambassador's call to Defense Minister 
 
2.  (SBU)  Ambassador phoned Defense Minister Bono Friday 
July 16 regarding the S-80 warfare system for the Spanish 
S-80 Submarine project.  Ambassador urged Bono and the GOS to 
strongly consider the American companies as potential vendors 
(both Lockheed Martin and Raytheon are bidding for the 
contract). The Ambassador noted that he understood that the 
Minister was reviewing all contracts that were left without 
being executed by the previous administration.  The 
Ambassador noted that it was understandable the new 
government would wish to understand any contracts it would 
have to sign.  However, the Ambassador stressed he hoped the 
review process would be open and transparent and that there 
would be a level playing field.  The Ambassador raised the 
issue of allowing French or other companies to re-enter the 
bidding process as a concern because as he understood it the 
bidding process had already been closed and allowing new 
entries did not seem to be in the spirit of an open and 
transparent process. 
 
3.  (SBU)  Bono responded that he understood the Ambassador's 
concern about the U.S. companies and wanted the Ambassador to 
know that he felt the two that were bidding were good 
companies and that they were highly regarded by the GOS and 
the Spanish Navy.  Bono however added that he had had a 
similar conversation with the French and German Foreign 
Ministers.  Bono told the Ambassador that while the GOS may 
review the previous proposals submitted by the French neither 
the French nor the Germans will have favorable treatment at 
the review. 
 
4.  (SBU)  Bono volunteered that he would instruct his Deputy 
Defense Minister (MOD State Secretary) to call the Embassy 
and provide the details of how the review process will be 
conducted and when it will be decided.   Bono re-emphasized 
he understood why the Ambassador made the call. 
 
Charge's discussion with Deputy Defense Minister 
 
5.  (SBU)  As follow-up, Charge met with MOD State Secretary 
Pardo July 26 to review the issue, as Bono had promised. 
Pardo claimed the U.S. should be "absolutely unworried" by 
the process.  There is absolutely no anti-American bias in 
the effort, nor is there a tendency to favor European 
companies, Pardo claimed.  The GOS would decide on the basis 
of two criteria:  which system the armed forces considered 
the best technologically and which decision would best 
advance Spain's defense industry and its cooperative efforts. 
  In all of this, Pardo repeated, there is "nothing hidden" 
nothing "occult."  Charge emphasized the benefits for 
U.S.-Spain relations and for U.S.-Spanish defense ties if the 
Spanish defense firm Izar was able to do business with a U.S. 
firm on S-80 project.  Pardo responded that defense 
cooperation issues would be "fundamental" to the 
decision-making process on this contract. 
 
6.  (SBU)  Pardo noted that he himself had decided not to 
meet with any of the companies involved (he had turned down a 
meeting with Lockheed Martin reps last week), in order to 
maintain the integrity of the process.  He said that given 
the highly-charged atmosphere with companies vying for a 
lucrative contract, it was natural that "rumors" would arise 
about the process. Charge noted the U.S. concern that the 
technological specifications of the bid had changed in order 
to allow French and German companies to participate.  Pardo 
said there was no formal change in the technological 
specifications, but that the MOD had been or might be in 
touch with some of the companies involved to clarify 
questions or issues. 
 
7.  (SBU)  Pardo stressed the importance to the MOD of 
maintaining strong ties with the U.S., both on a personal and 
political level.  He said Spain wanted to maintain a 
cooperative and friendly relationship with the U.S., and 
noted the two companies involved in the S-80 contract were 
well-regarded. 
 
8.  (SBU)  Pardo told Charge that no decision would be made 
until after Spain's traditional August summer break (e.g. at 
the earliest in the fall). 
MANZANARES