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Viewing cable 04HANOI1869, LOCAL ELECTION RESULTS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04HANOI1869 2004-07-02 07:28 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Hanoi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 001869 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV SOCI VM DPOL
SUBJECT:  LOCAL ELECTION RESULTS 
 
Ref: Hanoi 01209 
 
1. (U) Summary. Ninety nine point five per cent or about 
fifty million voters allegedly cast the polls on April 25 to 
elect deputies to local legislatures -- known as People's 
Councils -- at the provincial, district, and commune levels. 
Percentages of women, "young," and Communist Party (CPV) 
members who were elected did not meet official targets.  In 
addition, many serving local officials failed to win 
(re)election.  Fraud was a recognized problem, and "proxy 
voting" was prevalent.  While more an exercise in public 
relations than true grassroots democracy, the elections 
reflected a more assertive role by voters, potentially 
posing a long-term challenge to the continued CPV monopoly 
of power, if not its actual political domination.   End 
Summary. 
 
Not quite meeting goals 
----------------------- 
 
2. (U) The GVN recently released statistics about the 
results of the April 25 elections for People's Councils at 
the provincial, district, and commune levels (reftel). 
According to official sources, 99.5 per cent of Vietnam's 
eligible voters cast their votes for a total of 306,123 
deputies at the three levels.  According to the official 
report, the number of CPV and GVN officials elected to the 
new People's Councils -- especially at the provincial and 
district levels -- remained high.  Female delegates 
respectively accounted for 23.8 pct, 23.22 pct, and 20.1 pct 
of the total number of elected delegates at the provincial, 
district, and commune levels.  For new "young" delegates 
(under 35 years old), the numbers were, respectively, 10.7 
pct, 14.61 pct, and 21.5 pct.  Ethnic minority legislators 
elected at the provincial level represented 18.90 pct, with 
17.6 pct at the district level and 21.2 pct  at the commune 
level.  Non-CPV members won 13.60 pct of the seats at the 
provincial level, 14.61 pct at the district level, and 30.80 
pct at the commune level.  Slightly over thirty-one pct of 
the provincial-level delegates will serve at least their 
second term in the People's Council.  Three hundred and 
twelve self-nominated candidates won this year's elections, 
compared to two hundred and eighty seven for the last 
People's Councils, while still representing only about 1 pct 
of all new delegates. 
 
3. (U) According to Tran Ngoc Nhan, Director of the central 
Vietnam Fatherland Front's Department for Democracy and 
Legal Affairs, the initial goals had been for female 
delegates to account for twenty five per cent of the total 
number of delegates at all three levels, while young 
delegates would respectively account for 15, 20, and 25 per 
cent, and non-CPV members somewhere between 25 and 30 pct. 
No goal was set with respect to the ethnic minorities 
delegates, he claimed.  Nhan attributed such lower results 
to "voters' choice," asserting that the VFF committees at 
all levels had focused on seeking the "best" candidates for 
the elections.  (Before the election, he had confidently 
predicted to Embassy that a more diverse spectrum of 
delegates to People's Councils would improve public 
representation.) 
 
4. (U) Observers noted that the failure of many senior CPV 
and State officials nominated by CPV committees at all the 
three levels to win election was perhaps the most noteworthy 
aspect of the elections.  Even the official media reported 
public complaints that delegates who are simultaneously 
employees of local CPV and State's offices normally do not 
spend adequate time and efforts for local legislatures. 
According to an official report from the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, eleven candidates who were standing members of 
provincial CPV committees and thirty-two department-level 
directors and deputy directors failed to win election.  One 
hundred and two candidates who were standing members of CPV 
committees at district level, including a number of chairmen 
and vice chairmen of People's Councils and People's 
Committees, also did not win.  Similarly, more than two 
thousand candidates who were standing members of CPV 
committees at the commune level, including numerous chairmen 
and vice chairmen of communal People's Councils and People's 
Committees, failed to win election. 
 
5.  (U)  In Quang Binh province, candidate Dinh Huu Cuong, 
Chairman of the provincial CPV committee and incumbent 
Chairman of the provincial People's Council (1999-2004 
tenure) was not elected to the new provincial People's 
Council.   Officials from Quang Binh People's Committee 
confirmed to a local newspaper that the provincial CPV 
committee had intended for Cuong to serve another term as 
Chairman of the provincial People's Council. 
 
6. (U)  CPV Politburo member Tran Dinh Hoan, also chairman 
of the CPV Commission for Organization and Personnel 
Affairs, nonetheless reiterated publicly that current CPV 
officials should still hold major People's Councils 
positions.  Hoan claimed that CPV and People's Council 
portfolios have "much in common," because both deal with 
"orientations and guidelines."  Hoan indicated that the 
CPV's responsibility for personnel evaluation and selection 
must be an integral part of local elections, so that the 
current system -- the "Party names the leaders, the people 
vote for them" -- could gradually develop into a more 
democratic process, while still guaranteeing the CPV's 
fundamental leadership role.  A GVN report explicitly warned 
that the failure of "Party-designated" candidates to win the 
elections should be considered a "serious lesson" for local 
CPV committees.  Failure of CPV-designated candidates to win 
elections for People's Councils signaled increased public 
distrust in the professional capabilities of quite senior 
local officials, opined a senior staffer of the Office of 
the National Assembly (ONA) privately. 
 
Fraud and proxy voting 
---------------------- 
 
7.  (U)  Voting fraud was formally reported in numerous 
localities.  In early May, the National Assembly Standing 
Committee (NASC) asked for new elections in twenty five 
communal polling stations and in eleven provinces and 
municipalities:  Danang, Haiphong, Nam Dinh, Hai Duong, Vinh 
Phuc, Ha Nam, Ha Tinh, Thanh Hoa, Dac Nong, Nghe An, and Bac 
Can.  ONA officials asserted that the new elections (which 
took place simultaneously on May 9) reflected an effort to 
rectify "serious violations to laws."  In a number of 
localities, the number of votes at the April elections had 
noticeably outnumbered the number of eligible voters, 
confirmed one ONA official. 
 
8. (U)  Apart from more egregious fraud, the tradition of 
"proxy voting," as noted in reftel and in the May 2002 
National Assembly elections, has become prevalent.  Often, 
one member of a family will cast the ballots for all 
eligible family members, even though this is not technically 
allowed. (Duc, can you describe this a little more, 
please??) Local officials privately admitted that they were 
"tolerant" of proxy voting, under pressure for high and 
quick voting turnout. 
 
 
9. (U) Comment:  No one expected local elections in Vietnam 
to be a genuine example of grassroots democracy in action, 
given the elaborate stage-managed process overseen by the 
CPV and the VFF.  The elections are mostly a public 
relations exercise to convince the citizens that they have a 
role in the legislative process, and to bolster GVN and CPV 
claims to be building "grassroots democracy."  Nonetheless, 
the growing willingness of voters to cast their ballots with 
greater independence -- rejecting candidates from among the 
State and CPV ranks in favor of potentially more 
representative legislators, or those personally known to 
them -- is yet another indication that the CPV grip over the 
lives of citizens is loosening.  As the local councils 
receive additional authority over local budgets and other 
issues of direct concern to voters, this trend is likely to 
continue, posing new challenges for the CPV monopoly of 
power in the future, while not fundamentally undermining its 
political domination. 
BURGHARDT