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Viewing cable 04ANKARA4179, TURKEY: MUSLIM WORLD OUTREACH -- PCC REQUEST FOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04ANKARA4179 2004-07-28 12:06 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

281206Z Jul 04
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 004179 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
FOR EUR/SE, EUR/PPD, EUR/PGI; R FOR ACTING UNDER SECRETARY 
PATRICIA HARRISON FROM CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ROBERT S. DEUTSCH 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID KDEM KPAO OEXC OIIP OPRC PGOV PHUM PREL
SUBJECT: TURKEY: MUSLIM WORLD OUTREACH -- PCC REQUEST FOR 
STRATEGIES 
 
REF: A. STATE 155954 
 
     B. ANKARA 1007 
     C. STATE 13711 
 
1.  (SBU)  Ref (B) details the context in which the Mission 
pursues outreach to Muslim audiences in Turkey.  That 
information is excerpted, with minor updates, in para 2 and 
3, while the rest of this message examines audiences and 
strategies for outreach. 
 
2.  (SBU)  While Turkey's 20th century history is largely 
different from that of other countries in the Broader Middle 
East, the issues we are dealing with in this 99 percent 
Muslim country are at their root only different in degrees. 
Like the rest of the region, Turkey has been governed by an 
elite intent on pursuing self-serving policies while only 
grudgingly allowing the majority of the population to express 
its political will.  With technology, the common citizen has 
increasing knowledge of global developments and a growing 
ability to make his voice of disaffection heard.  In Turkey, 
as in the Broader Middle East, the U.S. has been associated 
with the rule of often-corrupted elites, and has come to be 
seen through a common prism with them.  Strongly negative 
perceptions of our pro-Israel policies and, more recently, 
our actions in Iraq are another pillar of anti-Americanism in 
Turkey, as elsewhere in the region. 
 
3.  (SBU)  In Turkey, the democratic institutions that have 
been created since the 1950s have, despite their 
imperfections, allowed the bulk of the population to 
gradually find a political voice.  Turkey's current drive for 
EU membership has provided impetus to improve those 
institutions and advance the process of creating an open 
society.  The ruling AK Party derives support from this base. 
 For the U.S. to connect with the majority of the Turkish 
population and reduce its skepticism of our motives, we must 
be palpably supportive of democratization, of individual 
freedoms, and of social and economic justice.  We must work 
to promote these shared values here as we did in central and 
eastern Europe.  We are working to deliver messages of shared 
values despite the obstacles of a bureaucracy and military 
that often represent the past, an educational system designed 
to support the status quo, a media environment that 
propagates fiction and conspiracy theory, a business climate 
that stifles open markets and fair c 
ompetition, and an atmosphere that rejects personal 
responsibility. 
 
4.  (SBU)  There is no audience in Turkey that we can afford 
to ignore.  The balance of power between traditional elites 
and the heartland is slowly but perceptibly shifting, thanks 
in large measure to democratization.  Clearly, we must do a 
better job of engaging non-elites, as well as youth. 
Turkey's population is younger and faster growing than that 
of any other European country.  The complex status and role 
of religion in secular, yet 99 percent Muslim, Turkey serve 
as a constant reminder that there is no monolithic Muslim 
culture and there can be no single approach to engaging 
Muslim audiences.  What works in Cairo or Riyadh will not 
necessarily succeed in Istanbul or Ankara.  Turks are 
emphatic that their country, as a secular democracy populated 
by Muslims, is not a model for the Broader Middle East, 
although they accept that it may serve as an example of what 
can be accomplished by pursing reforms. 
 
5.  (SBU)  Religion is an important factor in the worldview 
and lives of most Turks, even if many are not devout.  In 
Turkey, it is imperative that we show respect for Islam.  One 
of the best ways to show respect for Islam is to know as much 
about it as possible.   A nuanced understanding of the 
history, culture, and diversity of views within Turkey is 
vital to the Mission's work, as is a reasonable knowledge of 
Islam.  FSI can contribute by doing a better job of teaching 
about Islam in general, as well as about the complexities of 
Islam in Turkey.  Our diplomats should learn not only about 
the history of Islam, but also about how Islam works, what 
its essential themes as well as its contradictions are, and 
how the Muslim world looks at us. 
 
6.  (SBU)  We can be effective by promoting ecumenical 
conferences in support of greater interfaith understanding 
and tolerance.  As President Bush said in his speech last 
month in Istanbul, "Whatever our cultural differences may be, 
there should be peace and respect in the House of Abraham." 
By bringing together top leaders of the three great 
monotheistic religions to stress the common roots of those 
religions and shared heritage of their followers, we could go 
a long way toward revealing terrorists as theological 
aberrations and false prophets. 
 
7.  (SBU)  Our single most important outreach tool is 
positive, personal contact between Americans and Turks.  In 
Turkey personal relationships are fundamental to 
communication and establishing trust.  We need to staff our 
missions sufficiently with language capable officers so that 
more people can get out of the office, travel, and put a 
human face on the U.S.  Since Ref (B) was sent, a new 
Assistant Information Officer position, which will be an 
important asset in outreach to the media, has been approved 
for FY-05.  We are making a concerted effort to get our 
officers from several sections and agencies out to visit 
schools, universities, civic and business groups, and other 
organizations.  Often we speak about policy, but it is 
important that we also engage Turkish audiences on social 
issues, culture, literature, and other topics that are not 
overtly political.  In addition, greater engagement with the 
business community, particularly associations of small-medium 
sized companies, helps build proponets for free markets and 
economic reform. 
 
8.  (SBU)  Ref (B) detailed a wide range of programs utilized 
by post to reach Turkish audiences.  We urgently require more 
funding for exchanges activities, particularly the IV 
program, Fulbright, and youth exchanges.  We need to support 
Turkey's democratic reforms in education.  In FY-03, the 
Mission received $315,000 in R Bureau Muslim outreach funding 
to support the placement of English Language Fellows 
throughout Turkey to teach, train teachers, and develop 
curricula.  These talented young Americans tangibly improved 
the quality of English language instruction while building 
ties between Turks and the United States.  Although the same 
source of funding was not available in FY-04, we have 
utilized post, ECA, and EUR/PPD funding, as well as micro 
scholarship monies from R, to maintain the program at nearly 
the same level.  Since Ref (B) was sent, post has also 
obtained nearly $800,000 for important Citizen Exchange 
programs in judicial reform, media training, and women's 
leadership. 
 
9.  (SBU)  Our American Corners provide program platforms in 
the culturally conservative cities of Gaziantep and Kayseri, 
as well as Bursa.  A fourth American Corner will be opened 
later this year in Izmir.  While the Corners serve a very 
useful purpose, they are no substitute for the American 
Center libraries that for decades served throughout the 
Muslim world, including in Turkey, as popular meeting places 
for students, professionals, and intellectuals.  While a 
return of libraries appears not to be in the cards, post 
applauds the Department for bringing culture back through 
such programs as Culture Connect and Jazz Ambassadors.  The 
value of exchanges, cultural programming, and other forms of 
people-to-people diplomacy in engaging Muslim audiences who 
may fundamentally disagree with our policies but nevertheless 
want to more fully understand and experience American culture 
and society cannot be overstated.  Our daily bread-and-butter 
is and should be policy, but to succeed we must communicate 
with audiences in the Muslim world, as around the world, 
about the sum total of our national experience. 
 
10.  (SBU)  The media are an essential point of engagement in 
Turkey.  The Islamist and mainstream press alike are often 
virulent in their anti-Americanism.  They miss no opportunity 
to distort the truth and completely invent fraudulent, 
damaging claims.  If unchallenged, this bogus reporting is 
quickly accepted as fact.  Post devotes significant time and 
resources to refuting disinformation as a means by which to 
counter anti-Americanism.  In addition, we have proposed and 
received funding for Citizen Exchange programs on media 
training and journalistic ethics for both working level and 
senior journalists.  With newspaper and television reporting 
in Turkey strongly influenced by the business interests and 
political views of media owners, we recognize that change 
will come slowly, but this exchange initiative is at least a 
step in the right direction.  Since more Turks get their news 
from television than newspapers, we should place greater 
emphasis on appearances by U.S. officials and experts on 
Turkish television. 
 
11.  (SBU)  Our assessment in Ref (B) of the prognosis for 
engaging Muslim audiences in Turkey has not changed.  The 
President has given us a challenge for the next generation. 
Developing open societies in the Broader Middle East that are 
joined to the modern world politically through democratic 
institutions and respect for individual freedoms (including 
religion) and economically through the prosperity of open 
markets is a challenge that begins by securing the success of 
reform in Turkey.  We need resources and political will to do 
the job, but we don't need to reinvent the wheel.  The tools 
are familiar.  Reaching out in Turkey and in the Broader 
Middle East requires understanding and flexibility, but we 
can succeed. 
DEUTSCH