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Viewing cable 04HARARE768, GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE CANCELS CRITICALLY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04HARARE768 2004-05-07 10:12 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Harare
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000768 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AID FOR DCHA/FFP LANDIS, CRUMBLY, MUTAMBA, 
PETERSEN 
DCHA/OFDA FOR PRATT, BARTON, KHANDAGLE, 
MENGHETTI, BORNS, MARX, HALMRAST-SANCHEZ 
AFR/SA FOR FLEURET, LOKEN, COPSON, MACNAIRN 
EGAT FOR HOBGOOD, THOMPSON 
STATE/AF FOR RAYNOR 
PRETORIA FOR DISKIN, HALE, SINK, REYNOLDS 
ROME FOR FODAG FOR LAVELLE, DAVIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREL US ZI
SUBJECT:  GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE CANCELS CRITICALLY 
NEEDED CROP AND FOOD SUPPLY ASSESSMENT MISSION WITHOUT 
EXPLANATION. 
 
Refs: (a) Harare 00569 (b) Harare 00646 
 
1.   Summary.  Less than a week after it started, the 
Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) canceled the World Food 
Programme (WFP) and Food and Agriculture Organization's 
FAO) long-awaited crop and food supply assessment 
mission (CFSAM), which was expected to provide the most 
authoritative estimates to date of the country's grain 
harvest.  The GOZ orally informed the UN Agencies of 
the cancellation and has yet to confirm it in writing, 
although the UN has requested written confirmation 
several times.  The GOZ has provided neither an 
explanation nor justification for its decision. 
Speculation abounds amongst donors as to the reason. 
The implications for this action are far reaching, both 
in terms of the lack of credible data on which any 
potential food appeal can be based, and in terms of 
prospects for GOZ-donor coordination of humanitarian 
assistance.  End summary. 
 
2.   Despite initial rumors that the GOZ would not 
allow the CFSAM, the GOZ requested in writing in late 
March that the UN agencies conduct the assessment.   In 
fact, a number of donors congratulated the GOZ on its 
decision to move forward with the CFSAM at a UN 
sponsored meeting on March 31st between the donors and 
the GOZ (see Reftel A).  Donors noted to Minister of 
Public Service, Labor and Social Welfare, Paul 
Mangwana, who represented the GOZ at this meeting, that 
the CFSAM would, hopefully, reveal authoritative data 
on the country's harvest, based on which donors would 
be able to begin initial planning regarding possible 
support for food and other humanitarian assistance. 
With the cancellation of the CFSAM, all major donors 
agree that it is difficult, at best, to justify the 
need for continued food assistance. 
 
3.   WFP/FAO started field work on the CFSAM on 
Saturday, May 1, 2004, almost two weeks after UN 
agencies and the GOZ began field work on a 
vulnerability assessment (which just concluded).  The 
day before the CFSAM field work was scheduled to begin, 
however, the Ministry of Agriculture refused to let 
donors participate as observers, contrary to long- 
standing practice in Zimbabwe and other countries.  The 
GOZ proffered no real explanation for this decision. 
Several days after UN agencies and donors complained 
about the decision to exclude donor officials as 
observers on the CFSAM, the GOZ announced the 
cancellation of the assessment. 
 
4.   The GOZ continues to maintain publicly, and in 
private meetings with UN officials, that the grain 
harvest will be sufficient to meet the country's needs 
- approximately 1.8 million metric tons.  If the 
harvest is less than projected, the GOZ insists that it 
will import grain to fill any gap from its own 
resources.  Most donors believe that the GOZ's harvest 
projections are wildly inflated and that the GOZ has 
significant financial constraints that would impair its 
ability to import substantial amounts of grain.  [Note: 
European Unions (EU) officials in country assert that 
the GOZ has obtained a US$60 million line of credit 
backed by tobacco futures, with which it has already 
contracted to import approximately 210,000 metric tons 
of grain. End Note.]  In addition to the domestic 
harvest and imports, the GOZ's existing grain stockpile 
will be an important factor to consider.  At this 
point, however, the GOZ has still refused to offer any 
information to confirm the reported 200-300,000 metric 
tons of grain in its silos or plans for distribution. 
Most donors believe that the GOZ has been releasing 
stocks from the silos of its Grain Marketing Board, in 
anticipation of the upcoming harvest and imports.  This 
belief is consistent with the relatively good 
availability of maize on the open market.  EU officials 
speculate that current stocks may only be as high as 50- 
60,000 metric tons. 
 
5.   Speculation varies amongst donors as to the 
reasons for the GOZ's latest obstinacy.  Some believe 
that the 4 days of research the CFSAM had concluded 
thus far was indicating a significantly lower harvest 
than the GOZ's public pronouncements.  Faced with 
potential embarrassment, the GOZ decided to cancel the 
assessment mission.  Post believes this explanation is 
unlikely.  The GOZ's harvest projections have been way 
off the mark for several years running and the risk of 
embarrassment has never seemed to be motivating factor 
for the GOZ.  The more likely explanation is that this 
current action is part of the GOZ's electioneering 
strategy.  With the scheduled March 2005 Parliamentary 
elections approaching, the GOZ has an interest in 
controlling the vast majority of food stocks.  For the 
same reasons, the GOZ would be reluctant to have 
substantial numbers of international and NGO staff in 
the field who would be positioned to observe its 
election tactics.  This analysis is consistent with 
increasing reports of NGO harassment in rural areas. 
 
6.   Comment:  Whatever the reasons for the GOZ's 
decision, it signals to donors that the GOZ is 
uninterested in cooperation with the international 
community on humanitarian assistance, even to assess 
the state of the country's crop.  Although all major 
donors express concern about the prospect of the GOZ 
controlling most grain stocks as we enter the 
Parliamentary election cycle, at the same time, the 
lack of any credible data on the harvest and the GOZ's 
unwillingness to collaborate on even the simplest 
actions mean that the international community is unable 
at this time to mount or even plan for food assistance 
for the coming season.  The UN, for its part, intends 
to express strong public disappointment at the GOZ 
decision.  The recently concluded vulnerability 
assessment may reveal some useful information to enable 
initial planning, but a number of observers and 
analysts have questioned the quality of the data - 
apparently due to inadequate training of the surveyors. 
For the immediate future, donors will have to take a 
wait and see position on food assistance.  We are 
working closely with other donors to examine options to 
do a comprehensive assessment or to pull together crop 
assessments that some NGOs conducted recently in the 
districts in which they work.  End Comment 
SULLIVAN