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Viewing cable 04AMMAN3503, UNHCR AGAIN PUSHES FOR RESETTLEMENT OF IRANIAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04AMMAN3503 2004-05-10 05:59 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Amman
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 003503 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR PRM AND NEA, GENEVA FOR RMA, DHS FOR CIS, ATHENS 
AND ROME FOR DHS/CIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PREL PHUM IR IZ JO
SUBJECT: UNHCR AGAIN PUSHES FOR RESETTLEMENT OF IRANIAN 
KURDS FROM NO-MAN'S LAND CAMP ON JORDANIAN-IRAQI BORDER 
 
REF: A. GENEVA 1129 
 
     B. BRATTAIN/POLASCHIK E-MAIL OF APRIL 29 
     C. BRATTAIN/CAMPBELL E-MAIL OF APRIL 13 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary and Action Request:  During a May 4 
briefing, UNHCR urged resettlement countries to consider for 
resettlement the 1,047 Iranian Kurds who fled Iraq's Al Tash 
refugee camp in April 2003 and have remained camped on the 
Iraqi-Jordanian border ever since.  UNHCR presented specific 
cases with family links to resettlement countries, the vast 
majority with links to Sweden and just two families with 
distant ties to the U.S.  UNHCR argued that third-country 
resettlement was the only option for this group and 
particularly important for long-term asylum policies in 
Jordan.  However, UNHCR also acknowledged that resettlement 
from the no-man's land camp could create a pull factor and 
undermine local integration efforts underway in northern 
Iraq.  None of the resettlement countries present at the 
briefing made any commitment to consider the refugees, 
promising only to review the files and consult with capitals. 
 The Netherlands, Norway and Finland said they would be 
unable to consider these refugees at this time.  As 
instructed ref b, we will share the two cases with family 
ties to the U.S. with DHS Officer Todd Gardner during his May 
11-16 circuit ride.  While we continue to have concerns about 
the broader regional implications of this resettlement 
exercise, we also recognize that third country resettlement 
is the only viable solution for this group.  We request 
Department's guidance on how to respond to UNHCR before May 
15.  End summary and action request. 
 
2.  (U) As a follow-on to a briefing of resettlement 
countries in Geneva (ref a), UNHCR shared specific Iranian 
Kurdish refugee cases with representatives of resettlement 
countries on May 4.  While UNHCR has prepared a group 
referral for nearly the entire no-man's land caseload (1,047 
Iranian Kurds), it has broken down the group according to 
family ties to resettlement countries.  The vast majority of 
refugees has family ties to Sweden, with smaller numbers 
linked to Norway, Denmark, Finland, Canada, Australia, the 
U.K., the U.S. (two cases only, a total of 16 individuals) 
and Ireland.  An additional 16 cases do not have family links 
in any resettlement countries.  All of these resettlement 
countries, except Denmark and Ireland, were present at the 
briefing.  UNHCR asked for feedback from resettlement 
countries by May 15.  UNHCR was represented by Jordan 
Representative Sten Bronee and his senior protection and 
resettlement officers, as well as Geneva-based Senior 
Resettlement Consultant Phyllis Coven. UNHCR's Iraq mission 
(currently based in UNHCR's Jordan Branch Office) did not 
participate in the briefing. 
 
3.  (U) Bronee reviewed UNHCR's efforts to profile and 
prepare the group referral, repeating information shared with 
resettlement countries on April 16 in Geneva (ref a).  The 
group referral is limited to the 1,047 Iranian Kurdish 
refugees who fled Iraq's Al Tash refugee camp to the 
Jordanian border in April 2003 and have remained camped in 
no-man's land ever since.  Since UNHCR began the profiling 
exercise in September 2003, all Iranian Kurds in no-man's 
land have been photographed and interviewed.  Bronee 
emphasized that UNHCR is under increasing pressure from the 
GOJ to find solutions for this caseload and noted that 
UNHCR's ability to find solutions for this group will affect 
long-term asylum prospects in Jordan.  Without evidence that 
the international community is willing to resettle 
non-Palestinian refugees from Jordan, Bronee fears that the 
GOJ will tighten its borders still further and end its 
temporary protection policy for the estimated 300,000 Iraqis 
resident in Jordan.  (Comment:  We find this last fear a bit 
overblown.  End comment.) 
 
4.  (U) UNHCR Senior Resettlement Consultant Phyllis Coven 
elaborated on the modalities of this group referral.  UNHCR 
determined the group profile based on the following six 
criteria common to all adult members of the group: 
 
- Left Iran in 1979-80 as a result of the Iranian revolution 
or Iran-Iraq war 
- Fled to northern Iraq 
- Registered as refugees in Iraq's Al Tash camp from 1987 
onwards 
- Arrived in no-man's land following the fall of Saddam 
Hussein's regime in Iraq 
- Registered in no-man's land on September 16, 2003; and 
- Photographed on April 6, 2004 in the no-man's land camp. 
 
Based on interviews with adult members of the group, UNHCR 
has made a preliminary determination that Article 1F of the 
Refugee Convention does not apply to this group.  Separately, 
Coven noted that between 25 and 35 Iranian Kurdish single 
males currently resident in no-man's land do not meet the 
group criteria because they left Al Tash camp for an extended 
period between 1987 and 2003.  UNHCR Senior Protection 
Officer Jacqueline Parlevliet later confided to refcoord that 
the agency is concerned that these single men had been 
involved in paramilitary activities and therefore needed 
further interviews before any 1F determinations could be 
made. 
 
5.  (U) Drawing on ref c points, refcoord noted U.S. concerns 
that resettlement from the no-man's land camp could create a 
pull factor for refugees from throughout Iraq and undermine 
local integration efforts currently underway for the 1,000 
Iranian Kurdish families who relocated from Al Tash camp to 
northern Iraq during the last year.  Bronee acknowledged that 
resettlement activities on the border -- particularly while 
unrest continues in southern and western Iraq -- could indeed 
create a pull factor and that neither UNHCR nor coalition 
forces would be able to respond appropriately to a new flow 
of refugees toward Jordan.  The GOJ, Bronee predicted, would 
likely retain its current, de facto closed border policy for 
refugee arrivals in the event of new refugee flows. 
Parlevliet added that local integration in northern Iraq 
could not be considered as a possible solution for the 
no-man's land camp, as security conditions in Iraq prohibited 
UNHCR from advocating return to Iraq at this time.  Moreover, 
recent reports from UNHCR's local implementing partner in 
Sulaimaniyah indicated that the Kurdish Regional Government 
(KRG) was now reviewing its previous pledge to allow the Al 
Tash Kurds to remain in northern Iraq for at least fifteen 
years.  Without firm commitments from the KRG, she asked, how 
could local integration in northern Iraq be considered as a 
durable solution? 
 
6.  (U) None of the resettlement countries present at the 
briefing made any commitment to consider the refugees, 
promising only to review the files and consult with capitals. 
 Sweden (widely touted by UNHCR as having agreed to process 
the cases) noted several times that its Immigration Board 
would only compare the UNHCR lists to its Swedish family 
reunification lists.  The Netherlands, Norway and Finland 
told UNHCR that they would be unable to consider these 
refugees at this time.  As instructed ref b, refcoord 
informed UNHCR that will share the two cases with family ties 
to the U.S. with DHS Officer Todd Gardner during his May 
11-16 circuit ride, for informational purposes only. 
Refcoord also accepted a list of the 16 cases without family 
ties to any resettlement country, noting that we could not 
make any commitments regarding those cases. 
 
7.  (SBU) Comment and Action Request:  UNHCR still does not 
have good answers for our concerns that a resettlement 
exercise conducted from no-man's land could create a pull 
factor for the 4,500 Iranian Kurdish refugees who remain in 
Al Tash and undermine ongoing local integration efforts for 
the 1,000 families who moved from Al Tash to northern Iraq 
during the last year.  The absence of any UNHCR/Iraq staff 
from this briefing only underscored our impression that UNHCR 
Headquarters is rushing ahead with this group resettlement 
experiment without having fully considered the consequences 
for Iranian Kurdish refugee populations throughout the 
region.  Nevertheless, it is clear that this particular group 
of Iranian Kurdish refugees -- the 1,047 who fled Al Tash in 
April 2003 and have remained in the no-man's land ever since 
-- are very unlikely to voluntarily return to Iraq (either Al 
Tash or the north) and do not have any options for local 
integration in Jordan.  Resettlement outside the region 
therefore seems to be the only real solution for this group 
and one that would reassure the GOJ that it will not be 
expected to accept any new long-term refugee populations.  We 
request Department's guidance on how to respond to UNHCR. 
Please send guidance to Embassies Amman and Cairo, as well as 
US Mission Geneva. 
 
8.  (U) CPA Baghdad minimize considered. 
GNEHM