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Viewing cable 04SANAA867, YEMEN TO TRY TERRORISTS/COLE BOMBING SUSPECTS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04SANAA867 2004-04-14 11:35 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Sanaa
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000867 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA, DS/DSS, 
CENTCOM FOR POLAD, FBI HQ (ATTN: DIRECTOR'S OFFICE), FBI 
IOU (ATTN: SANDY FOWLER), FBI CTD, FBI ITOS'1/ETIU (ATTN: 
RALPH HORTON AND DEBBIE MANCHAS) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PREL IZ YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: YEMEN TO TRY TERRORISTS/COLE BOMBING SUSPECTS 
 
1.  (U) Summary:  On 11 April 2004, The Ambassador met with 
ROYG Attorney General (AttGen) Dr. Abdullah Al-Ulfi to 
discuss progress on turning over terrorist cases for 
prosecution, formally request rendition of Cole Bombing 
suspects Al-Badawi and Al-Quso, and to request/offer USG 
participation in any upcoming trials.  The AttGen told the 
Ambassador that 15 individuals involved in 5 cases (2000 Cole 
bombing, 2002 Qadissiya attack, 2002 Hunt Oil Company 
helicopter attack, 2003 plot to assassinate the Ambassador, 
2002 M/V Limburg bombing) were to be prosecuted in the near 
term by the ROYG Prosecutor General.  The meeting concluded 
with a discussion of access to the prosecution team and their 
evidence against the accused, and an offer of 
assistance/sharing of evidence gathered by U.S. investigatory 
bodies.  Also present were ROYG Justice Ministry Chief of 
Staff Ahmad Al-Jundubi, LEGATT, FPD and Embassy 
Counterterrorism Coordinator.  End summary. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
 
RENDITION OF BADAWI AND QUSO 
 
------------------------------------------ 
 
2.  (U)  The Ambassador formally presented the USG's request 
for rendition of U.S.S. Cole bombing suspects Jamal Muhammad 
Ahmad  Ali Al-Badawi and Fahd Muhammad Ahmad al-Quso.  As 
these two men have been specifically charged with acts of 
terrorism against American targets, the USG has interest to 
see them tried in the United States.  Failing rendition, the 
Ambassador requested a swift trial in the Yemeni courts 
system for the same crimes. 
 
3.  (U)  The AttGen told the Ambassador that rendition 
remained a constitutional issue, but that all requests would 
be taken under advisement.  The AttGen requested that such a 
request be followed-up in a diplomatic note and routed 
through the MFA.  (note:  the Embassy is doing so.  End 
note.) 
 
------------------------------------------ 
 
TRANSFER OF CASES 
 
------------------------------------------ 
 
4. (U)  The AttGen informed the Ambassador that his office 
had formed a special team on 8 April to receive the transfer 
of files on 15 individuals currently incarcerated in 
Political Security Organization (PSO) jails for charges of 
terrorism.   The prisoners were to remain in PSO custody 
throughout the trial period.  Transfer of all files was 
expected to be completed on/about 15 April.  This team would 
then review the files in preparation for transfer to 
individual prosecutors.  These prosecutors would then 
supervise the cases through the investigation (which began on 
10 April) and trial phases.  Modeled on the French system, 
two different judges would preside over 
pre-trial/investigation period and the actual trial itself. 
Venue for trial was not yet decided but was expected to be 
either the criminal court or the court of appeals, both 
secure locations.  When pressed for a notional timeline for 
onset/completion of the trials, the AttGen demurred but said 
that 6-8 weeks was possible.  He made clear to the Ambassador 
that the trials would be swift and just.  The AttGen 
recommended USG hire a Yemeni lawyer to assist US team. 
 
5.  (U)  The 5 cases are:  the attack on the U.S.S. Cole of 
October 12, 2000; the plot against American interests which 
culminated in the explosion in the Al-Qadisiyya district of 
Sana'a on August 9, 2002; the plot to assassinate the 
Ambassador circa Fall/Winter 2002; the rocket attack on the 
Hunt Oil Company helicopter of November 3, 2002; the bombing 
of the M/V Limburg October 6, 2002. (note:  The Embassy 
requested the identities of the 15 charged with these crimes 
in a diplomatic note sent on 13 April, 2004.  End note.) 
 
------------------------------------------ 
 
USG PARTICIPATION IN THE TRIALS 
 
------------------------------------------ 
 
6.  (U)  Speaking generally, the AttGen told the Ambassador 
that the ROYG Justice Ministry was open to any requests made 
by the Embassy regarding access during the trials and would 
do its best to include American representatives.  This 
participation would be based in two capacities:  access as 
representation of the victims and access as assistance to the 
prosecution.  Of the former, appropriate and named 
representatives for the victims would be allowed 
participation via the prosecutor to bring questions against 
the accused, present and view existing evidence, and would 
have a role in sentencing.  The AttGen noted that these 
privileges were standard in the Yemeni court system and did 
not constitute an exceptional request.  Concerning assistance 
to the prosecution, the LEGATT suggested that the Embassy 
would present one team of experts from the FBI and Department 
of Justice that would interact and liaise with the 
prosecution team, share evidence and provide forensic 
assistance as required.  NCIS would also be represented on 
the team for all trials of Cole suspects. 
 
7.  (U) Action requested:  USG should constitute ASAP a team 
to represent USG and victims' interests in all phases of the 
judicial investigation, trial and sentencing.  The official 
U.S. representation should have a written mandate from or on 
behalf of the victims to document that role.  Official USG 
representation should be assigned for the duration of the 
process -- one team from beginning to end.  Embassy will 
designate LEGATT and NCIS representatives as its 
representatives.  DOJ/FBI should also prepare for sharing 
with Yemeni prosecutors appropriate evidence or documents to 
strengthen prosecution in cases where we have such materials. 
HULL