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Viewing cable 04PANAMA802, PANAMA'S DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (PRD) AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04PANAMA802 2004-04-06 13:23 2011-05-31 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Panama
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PANAMA 000802 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN/BRIGHAM 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETRD PM POL CHIEF
SUBJECT: PANAMA'S DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (PRD) AND 
MARTIN TORRIJOS -- WHERE WILL THEY LEAD PANAMA?  WHAT DOES 
THAT MEAN FOR U.S. INTERESTS? 
 
 
REF: A. PANAMA 0040 
     B. PANAMA 0145 
     C. PANAMA 0615 
     D. 03 PANAMA 3294 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR LINDA WATT FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 

1.  (C) The prospect of a PRD government assuming power on 
September 1 is high, barring an unforeseen development. 
Martin Torrijos enjoys a big lead in the polls barely four 
weeks before Panama's May 2 presidential election.  According 
to many observers, Martin has consolidated his control over 
the PRD after wresting it away from former president Ernesto 
Perez Balladares (EPB).  Today's PRD, dominated by Martin and 
his friends, is quite different from the 1979-1989 political 
arm of the now-defunct Panama Defense Forces and dictators 
Omar Torrijos (Martin's father) and Manuel Noriega.  Embassy 
believes that Torrijos will keep PRD radicals -- the 
anti-U.S. nationalist/leftist intellectuals known as "La 
Tendencia" -- and high-level EPB supporters on the sidelines. 
 A Torrijos government would actively pursue and advance 
shared bilateral interests in security and law enforcement 
matters and free trade policy, and views Canal expansion as a 
priority.  Whether and to what degree Torrijos will be an 
effective agent of anti-corruption and social change in 
Panama remains to be seen.  End Summary 
 
 
Martin's PRD 
------------ 

2.  (SBU) With over 400,000 members, the PRD is Panama's 
oldest, biggest, most disciplined, and best organized 
political party.  (See Ref A).  PRD candidates garnered 33% 
of the presidential vote in 1994 and 38% in 1999, when Martin 
Torrijos lost to Mireya Moscoso.  Although EPB kept control 
of the party during Martin Torrijos's failed 1999 
presidential bid, Torrijos wrested it away from him later 
that year and has effectively controlled it ever since. 
Martin has democratized the party, which now chooses its 
candidates in open primaries.  At the same time, he has 
promoted his close friends and schoolmates, many of whom have 
strong U.S. connections like himself, to positions of 
prominence.  Although a last-minute "April surprise" is not 
out of the question, all indications suggest that Martin 
Torrijos will defeat his opponents by a solid margin.  As the 
youngest candidate in the race, Torrijos (age 40) appeals to 
Panama's thousands of youthful voters.  (Note: Over 55% of 
Panama's registered voters are under 40 years old.  End 
Note.)  The PRD also looks set to control the Legislative 
Assembly, possibly with the help of its Partido Popular (PP) 
ally. 
 
 
Who is Martin Torrijos? 
----------------------- 

3.  (SBU) Martin Torrijos is running for president of Panama 
because of his last name.  The son of Panamanian dictator 
Omar Torrijos and Xenia Espino, a former Air Panama flight 
attendant who was not his wife, Martin Torrijos was born in 
1963.  Omar Torrijos recognized Martin as his son when he was 
in his teens, and sent him to St. John's Military Academy in 
Wisconsin.  Martin, who spent ages 15-29 (1978-1992) mostly 
in the United States, earned bachelors degrees from Texas A&M 
in political science (1986) and economics (1988).  (He 
married Vivian Fernandez Bello, whose parents are Cuban, in 
1990.  They have three children, Daniella, Martin Jr., and 
Nicolas.)  Until EPB called him back to Panama to help 
reorganize the PRD in 1992, Martin spent four years managing 
a McDonald's restaurant in Chicago.  Martin eventually became 
PRD Youth Committee chairman.  When EPB became president in 
1994, he named Martin as vice minister of government and 
justice.  After EPB lost a 1998 referendum to permit him to 
run for another term, EPB grudgingly allowed Torrijos to run 
for president in 1999. 
 
 
A Credible Democratic Ally 
-------------------------- 

4.  (C) The PRD under Torrijos has forged an electoral 
alliance with the Partido Popular (the ex-Christian 
Democrats), historically the fiercest and most consistent foe 
of Panama's military governments and the PRD.  The PP's 
retired chief, ex-vice president Ricardo Arias Calderon, 
recently told POL Counselor, that he initially shunned 
Torrijos, as the son of the dictator who exiled him from 
Panama in 1969 but he changed his mind after meeting Martin. 
"I made a mistake," Arias Calderon said.  "He's (Martin) a 
good man.  He's the son of his mother, not the son of his 
father."  Martin sometimes is excessively cautious and takes 
too long to make decisions, the veteran politician added, but 
he has demonstrated his political "claws" in taming the PRD 
to his will. 
 
 
Torrijos, the PRD, and U.S, Interests 
------------------------------------- 

5.  (C) Martin Torrijos has shown every indication of his 
intention and his ability to work closely with U.S. officials 
should he and his party assume the presidency.  His advisors 
have told us that Martin's supreme foreign policy priority is 
to maintain good relations with the United States, pursuing 
mutual interests in security and law enforcement matters, 
free trade, and Canal expansion.  (Note: Embassy is doing due 
diligence on rumors of possible choices for key positions in 
a future government.  See Ref C.  EmbOffs will use the four 
months between the May 2 election and the September 1 
inauguration to bolster contacts with whichever party wins so 
that we can ensure a smooth transition to the new 
administration.  End Comment.) 
 
 
Good Choices for VP 
------------------- 

6.  (C) Most observers agree that Martin made good VP 
choices.  For first vice president, he chose non-politician 
Samuel Lewis Navarro, son of former Noriega foreign minister 
(later anti-Noriega exile) Gabriel Lewis Galindo.  The PRD's 
chief "Gringo handler," the articulate, intelligent, pro-U.S. 
Lewis Navarro is a successful businessman with multi-national 
interests in fruit and packaging.  He also is rumored as 
Martin's first choice for foreign minister.  (See Ref B.) 
Martin's candidate for second vice president is soft-spoken 
Partido Popular chief Ruben Arosemena.  Arosemena is rumored 
to be slated for anti-corruption coordinator in a Torrijos 
government. 
 
 
Martin's Anti-Corruption Credentials 
------------------------------------ 

7.  (C) Martin has little credibility so far on his pledge to 
reduce corruption.  The prior PRD administration under EPB 
was notably corrupt and after five years out of power, PRD 
stalwarts are hungry for power and its perquisites, observers 
say.  Martin's first cousin, Hugo Torrijos, until recently 
Martin's campaign manager and finance chief, is heavily 
implicated in a multi-million dollar scandal involving Ports 
Engineering and Construction Company (PECC -- See Ref  D). 
Many observers think that Martin himself may be implicated in 
the multi-million dollar CEMIS scandal (although we have not 
seen any evidence yet to support these allegations).  Martin 
is rumored to have a mutual non-prosecution pact with Mireya 
Moscoso.  Martin skillfully handled the PRD primaries, but 
opponents have criticized him for promising government jobs 
to primary losers to keep them in the party. 
 
 
A Dictator's Creation 
--------------------- 

8.  (SBU) The Partido Revolucionario Democratico (PRD) was 
founded on October 3, 1979 as the political arm of the Panama 
Defense Forces, eleven years after an October 1968 military 
coup brought the military to power, and one year after the 
Carter-Torrijos treaties forced dictator Omar Torrijos to 
tolerate the reemergence of political parties.  The PRD 
flourished under the military, who used it to staff a bloated 
government bureaucracy, supply puppet presidents, distribute 
patronage, and spy on the populace.  Through a rigged and 
repressed political system, the PRD provided Panama's 
dictators with a democratic "cover story" and 
"anti-imperialist" (read anti-U.S.) ideology and rhetoric to 
enhance their image and lend them international 
respectability. 
 
 
9.  (SBU) After Operation Just Cause ended Panama's 
dictatorship in December 1989, the PRD lapsed into sullen 
opposition and disarray, and led violent but politically 
fruitless anti-U.S. demonstrations to protest the loss of 
life associated with the U.S. invasion.  In 1994, former 
close Noriega crony Ernesto Perez Balladares (EPB) squeaked 
by to win the presidential election with just 33% of the vote 
in a crowded and divided field. 

Dictator Dad 
------------ 

10.  (C) A 2004 PRD campaign poster attempt's to capitalize 
on Omar's lingering mystique with certain voters, showing 
Martin giving a speech superimposed on a photo of his 
uniformed dictator dad puffing on a cigar.  Despite his role 
in the destruction of Panama's democracy, Omar Torrijos (who 
died in a 1981 plane crash) was popular with poor 
Panamanians, who saw him as the scourge of the traditional 
"rabiblanco" ("white-tailed") upper class.  Omar Torrijos 
connived with the rich, bankrupted the country and stole it 
blind, while engaging in drug running and other kinds of 
criminal activities, but many poorer Panamanians benefited 
from his policies to expand the bureaucracy and to reduce 
racial discrimination.  The core PRD constituency is still 
about one-third of the electorate.  But at least one-third of 
Panamanians regard the PRD as an anathema and they would 
never vote for it. 
 
 
What About "La Tendencia"? 
-------------------------- 

11.  (C) The PRD, Panama's oldest party, ran the government 
for 15 years (1979-89 and 1994-99), much longer than any 
other Panamanian party.  Many former high PRD officials were 
associated with an internal grouping of anti-U.S. "leftist," 
pro-dictatorship intellectuals known as "La Tendencia." 
Although the term is less often used today than in the past, 
most of the individuals associated with La Tendencia are 
still around.  An informal rule-of thumb puts internal PRD 
support for La Tendencia at 15-20% and for EPB at around 20%, 
leaving the pro-Torrijos faction with 60-65%. 
 
 
EPB "in a Box" 
-------------- 

12.  (C) Ambitious, arrogant, corrupt, wily former president 
Ernesto Perez Balladares (EPB), who openly flaunts his 
ill-gotten wealth, is still a force to be reckoned with in 
the PRD, although his political career has fizzled.  EPB 
wants to be president again, although he lost a 1998 
referendum to permit him to hold two terms by a 3-to-1 
margin, and he still has his sights set on the 2009 election. 
 To that end he repeatedly attempted to sabotage Martin 
Torrijos's nomination and campaign, believing that his 
re-election prospects are better if a PRD candidate does not 
win in 2004.  (Comment: The Department revoked EPB's visa in 
2000 for alien smuggling, which became a high-profile case in 
Panama and makes EPB's prospects for re-election even more 
remote.  End Comment.) 
 
 
Love-Hate 
--------- 

13.  (C) Observers say that EPB and Martin Torrijos have a 
love-hate relationship.  EPB was instrumental in launching 
Martin's career but would have tried to control him if he had 
become president in 1999.  Although he is wary of EPB, Martin 
cannot afford to antagonize EPB and his supporters during an 
election campaign, and EPB will need Martin's good graces for 
his future political plans.  Therefore the two have been 
careful not to antagonize each other, despite their mutual 
mistrust.  Observers have given Martin high marks for 
managing EPB, and for bringing a sizable number of former EPB 
supporters to his side. 
 
 
14.  (C) Martin also reportedly has "bottled up" former EPB 
cabinet loyalists (and U.S. betes noires) Mitchel Doens and 
Francisco Sanchez Cardenas, marginalizing them from the party 
mainstream decision-making process.  (Comment: We also 
understand that ex-EPB foreign ministers Jorge Ritter and 
Ricardo Alberto Arias, vocal anti-U.S. nationalists who in 
the late 1990s opposed establishing a U.S.-backed 
anti-narcotics center in Panama, have put the past behind 
them and are ready to work with us if the PRD wins.  End 
Comment.) 
 
 
Worth Watching: A "New" Balbina Herrera 
--------------------------------------- 

15.  (C) An ambitious PRD legislator with known presidential 
ambitions and links to "La Tendencia," Balbina Herrera is a 
savvy political operator, well on her way to becoming one of 
the most powerful women in Panama.  She is number-two in 
command of the party and, if Martin is elected president, 
will become acting secretary general and will gain the 
ability to control PRD appointments to the government, 
payroll, and PRD "businesses."  Observers speculate that her 
ambitions may run afoul of Vivian Torrijos, who also will 
become one of Panama's most powerful women if her husband 
becomes president. 
 
 
The Proof is in the Pudding 
--------------------------- 

16.  (C) Many observers are convinced that Martin Torrijos 
means what he says about "leading by example."  But he cannot 
govern by himself.  As we have repeatedly told PRD leaders, 
including Torrijos, the U.S. will judge his government (or 
whoever wins the elections) by the quality of appointments to 
top positions and by the willingness of these individuals to 
work with us in areas of mutual interest, especially on 
security, law enforcement, and trade/investment matters. 
While we believe Torrijos is truly committed to establishing 
good relations with us, we are less certain of his ability to 
deliver quality people in key positions.  Nevertheless, we 
will continue to hammer home the importance that we attach to 
a mutually beneficial relationship, and that we are prepared 
to work constructively with whichever party wins on May 2. 
 
 
MCMULLEN