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Viewing cable 04BRASILIA913, BRAZIL AND U.S. HOLD FRANK, CONSTRUCTIVE TALKS ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04BRASILIA913 2004-04-15 17:27 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Brasilia
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

151727Z Apr 04
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000913 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
SANTO DOMINGO FOR SECRETARY OF ENERGY ABRAHAM; RIO FOR 
JSCNEC DELEGATION MEMBER BURKART 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2009 
TAGS: ENRG KNNP PREL KSCA BR NPT
SUBJECT: BRAZIL AND U.S. HOLD FRANK, CONSTRUCTIVE TALKS ON 
NUCLEAR NON-NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES 
 
 
Classified By: Sci/C Daniel Rubinstein; Reasons 1.5 (B), (D). 
 
1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: U.S.-Brazil policy discussions in the 
Joint Standing Committee for Nuclear Energy Cooperation were 
positive, non-confrontational, and useful to both sides. 
While Brazil did not express new policy positions on 
high-profile issues such as the Additional Protocol (AP) or 
the Resende enrichment facility safeguards in these talks, 
the Brazilian interaction with the USDEL strongly suggests 
that the GoB is feeling the need to respond to IAEA pressure 
regarding the Resende enrichment facility, and that the GoB 
is reviewing its position on the AP.  A/S Wolf emphasized 
that universal adherence to the AP is a keen interest of the 
U.S., and that while the USG is not pressuring the GoB, it is 
pressing the IAEA to strengthen the credibility of the 
safeguard system across the board.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (U) The first U.S.-Brazil Joint Standing Committee on 
Nuclear Energy Cooperation (JSCNEC) opened April 14 in 
Brasilia.  The USDEL was led by A/S for Non-Proliferation 
John Wolf, and included representatives from State, DOE, the 
NRC, and three national laboratories.  The Brazilian side was 
led by the Foreign Ministry's Director for International 
Organizations (A/S-equivalent) Antonio Guerreiro and included 
Ambassador at Large for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation 
Sergio Duarte, representatives from the Foreign and S&T 
Ministries, and the National Nuclear Energy Commission 
(CNEN).  Technical-level discussions on safeguards, nuclear 
security and safety, and technical cooperation will occur in 
Rio de Janeiro April 15-16.  Septel will cover A/S Wolf's 
April 13-14 meetings with Guerreiro, Duarte, and Defense 
Minister Viegas. 
 
3. (C/NF) After a brief look back at U.S.-Brazilian nuclear 
ties, A/S Wolf reviewed the key elements of the President's 
February National Defense University address, as well as 
global developments and abuse of the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that led to this new policy 
direction.  Wolf urged that Brazil show leadership on 
non-proliferation and that there be no distance between 
Brazil and the U.S. on the non-proliferation front. 
Emphasizing the centrality of the AP to U.S. efforts, Wolf 
highlighted the recent advice and consent of the U.S. Senate 
to the AP and encouraged Brazil to consider signing the AP as 
well.  Wolf noted that the Resende enrichment facility 
safeguards issue is one to be settled by the GoB with the 
IAEA, not with the U.S.  The USG is, however, pressing the 
IAEA to strengthen the NPT safeguards system across the 
board.  IAEA Director General El-Baradei has spoken of the 
need to "close the loopholes," and the U.S. fully agrees. 
The USG will continue to work hard to prevent the spread of 
proliferation-sensitive fuel cycle technologies.  The U.S. is 
comfortable with the IAEA's commitment to preserve the 
confidentiality of sensitive technologies, and Brazil needs 
 
SIPDIS 
to work with the IAEA to reach a similar comfort level.  Wolf 
urged the GoB to accelerate discussions with the IAEA 
regarding the Resende facility. 
 
4. (C/NF) In response, Brazilian Delegation Head Guerreiro 
reiterated long-standing GoB points on the need for the 
disarmament leg of the NPT to receive equal attention and for 
universal adherence to the NPT to precede the 
universalization of the AP.  On Resende, Guerreiro said the 
GoB has "complete confidence" that it will reach agreement 
with the IAEA about a safeguards regime; since the facility 
is not yet operational, it is not yet time for it to be 
safeguarded.  Guerreiro explicitly acknowledged that it is 
the IAEA, not the USG, that is pressuring the GoB on the 
Resende issue. 
 
5. (SBU) After the USDEL presentation on the USG's own AP 
implementation plans in the afternoon session, the Brazilians 
queried the USDEL in detail on several fronts, including our 
interpretation and use of the national security exclusion, 
our understanding of the measures that can be used under the 
"managed access" regime, and our preliminary estimates of the 
costs associated with compliance with the AP.  The exchanges 
were substantive, candid, and constructive.  USDEL suggested 
that Brazil consider the creation of an Action Sheet activity 
within the bilateral U.S.-Brazil safeguards sphere to expand 
on these questions and themes, as well as the possible 
provision of an intern to assist working through these 
issues.  The Brazilian delegation took the suggestions on 
board. 
 
6. (SBU) Beyond the AP and Resende issues, the delegations 
made presentations and discussed respective views on the next 
NPT Review Conference, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the 
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, the Convention for the 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, and the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group.  The delegations also briefed on each 
country's respective nuclear programs and policies, as well 
as issues regarding the transport of nuclear materials. 
Brazil reviewed the triangular (IAEA, ABACC, and CNEN) system 
of safeguards in place at Brazilian nuclear facilities, and 
answered USDEL questions regarding the extent of IAEA-ABACC 
cooperation.  USDEL in turn described the safeguards system 
in place at U.S nuclear facilities. 
 
7. (C/NF) Given the extensive coverage of specific regional 
non-proliferation concerns during A/S Wolf's 4/13 meetings 
with GoB officials, the theme was lightly revisited during 
the JSCNEC.  The Brazilian delegation, however, sought U.S. 
views regarding Iran, with particular emphasis on the degree 
to which Iran's statement that it is implementing its AP 
affects USG concerns.  A/S Wolf reiterated that the U.S has 
seen no Iranian statement or action that mitigates these 
concerns, and that we are convinced of the Iranian strategic 
decision to pursue nuclear weapons capabilities.  COMMENT: It 
is clear the Brazilian and U.S perspectives on Iranian 
nuclear intentions remain divergent.  END COMMENT. 
 
8. (C/NF) COMMENT (cont.): A/S Wolf's meetings with key GoB 
non-proliferation figures (septel) before the JSCNEC provided 
an opportunity to clear the air and remove any sting 
emanating from the recent media controversy on Brazilian 
nuclear intentions kicked off by an April 4 Washington Post 
article about the Resende facility.  While the Brazilians did 
stick to long-standing policy positions on many issues, their 
willingness to state categorically and on the record that 
there will be an agreement between the GoB and the IAEA 
regarding the Resende enrichment facility before it commences 
operations shows that IAEA pressure on the GoB is working. 
Similarly, the Brazilians' intense focus during the JSCNEC on 
the USG's own implementation plans regarding the Additional 
Protocol is likely an indication that the GoB is carefully 
reviewing its own approach to the issue. 
 
HRINAK