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Viewing cable 04BRASILIA862, FTAA: INITIAL BUENOS AIRES FALLOUT IN BRASILIA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04BRASILIA862 2004-04-08 19:38 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000862 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/BSC, WHA/EPSC, EB/TPP 
PASS TO USTR FOR PALLGEIER, RWILSON, KLEZNY, RSMITH, SCRONIN 
USDOC FOR APREACHER 
USDA FOR JB PENN, U/S, FFAS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2014 
TAGS: ETRD BR FTAA
SUBJECT: FTAA: INITIAL BUENOS AIRES FALLOUT IN BRASILIA 
 
REF: BUENOS AIRES 1009 
 
Classified By: ECONOFF JANICE FAIR FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) AND (d) 
 
1. (U)  Summary.  Following the informal FTAA discussions in 
Buenos Aires March 31-April 1, which ended without agreement 
(reftel), Brazilian Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty) officials 
launched an aggressive media campaign to get the word out 
that U.S. intransigence was to blame for the impasse. 
Foreign Minister Amorim was widely quoted, claiming a U.S. 
pullback from the compromise achieved in the FTAA Ministerial 
in Miami last November.   Although the level of public 
outrage was lower than that following the Trinidad & Tobago 
TNC meeting last year, the private sector and other 
ministries have apparently communicated to Itamaraty their 
consternation regarding its negotiating posture.  Despite 
headlines heralding an end to the FTAA, high-level officials 
from the Ministry of Development, Industry and Trade (MDIC) 
informed Ambassador that the GoB has not abandoned the FTAA 
negotiations and is formulating new proposals, including 
improved market access offers.  End Summary. 
 
---------- 
Blame Game 
---------- 
 
2.  (U) Immediately following adjournment of the informal 
FTAA discussions in Buenos Aires, Itamaraty launched a media 
blitz to assign blame for the impasse that prevented progress 
in negotiating a common set of rights and obligations under 
the new FTAA framework.  U.S., and to a lesser extent 
Canadian, intransigence was identified as the main culprit. 
In interviews and in discussions with members of Brazil's 
Congress, Foreign Minister Amorim accused the U.S. of trying 
to reopen the Miami Ministerial compromise, most probably in 
reference to a proposal to allow for additional provisions in 
the common set in the future.  He reiterated Brazilian claims 
that the U.S. is unwillingly to provide real market access 
for Brazilian agricultural products, specifically in 
addressing domestic support and export subsidies, while it is 
trying to reintroduce new rules in Brazil's sensitive areas 
of services, investment, IPR and government procurement.  As 
in the past, Amorim argued for moving on from the 
"philosophical" discussion on rules and instead beginning 
market access negotiations; he reaffirmed that Brazil will 
not negotiate services market access in any format other than 
bilateral.  On April 7 and 8, there was widespread reporting 
on the contents of a letter Minister Amorim sent to USTR 
Zoellick on April 5, outlining GoB concerns with U.S. 
positions within the common set negotiations. 
 
3.  (U) Similar commentary was attributed to Regis Arslanian 
and Tovar da Silva Nunes, Director General of Itamaraty's 
Trade Negotiations Department, and Head of its FTAA Division, 
respectively.  In addition to bemoaning the lack of U.S. 
flexibility, Nunes asserted to journalists that the outcome 
of the Buenos Aires talks had prompted Itamaraty to shift its 
trade policy focus toward negotiation of agreements with some 
30 developing countries, with the EU, and toward WTO trade 
talks.  Negotiations with the EU were singled out as 
exemplifying a more collaborative process than the FTAA and a 
higher probability of success, a questionable assertion. 
Striking a more balanced tone, Amorim told Brazilian Deputies 
on April 6 that the GoB plans to focus more on the WTO 
negotiations, unwilling to concede anything within the 
regional FTAA or bi-regional EU agreements that would 
undermine Brazil's interests within the global trade talks. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Not Everyone is On Board with Itamaraty 
---------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (U) Despite Itamaraty's best efforts, not everyone 
appeared to accept its characterization of the problems 
besetting the negotiations nor its supposed readjustment in 
policy focus.  While less public than after the contentious 
Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) meeting in Trinidad & 
Tobago last September, press reports cited divergent 
positions within the GoB, and private sector demands that 
Itamaraty demonstrate more flexibility in the FTAA 
negotiations.  In addition, an "O Estado" editorial last 
weekend refused to play the blame game and called for 
Itamaraty flexibility, pointing out how much Brazil stands to 
lose from failure of FTAA negotiations. 
 
5.  (C) MDIC's more forward leaning position on the FTAA was 
confirmed in informal discussions with Minister Furlan and 
staff during a dinner hosted by Ambassador April 7.  DCM, 
Deputy Senior Commercial Officer and Econoff also attended. 
Mario Mugnaini, Executive Secretary of Camex, the GoB's 
formal decision-making body for trade policy, rejected 
assertions that the GoB does not want to negotiate the FTAA. 
However, he conceded that subsequent to the informal Buenos 
Aires talks, Itamaraty is being forced to moderate its 
positions.  He was adamant that pressure from, among others, 
Minister Furlan would ensure a more pragmatic approach by 
Brazilian negotiators in the future, and argued that TNC 
Co-Chars should meet soon to consider how to get the process 
moving again. 
 
6. (C) Expressing optimism on an eventual successful outcome 
for the FTAA, Mugnaini pressed the Brazilian line that the 
current impasse on the common set language would more easily 
be overcome if market access negotiations could proceed 
immediately.  At least part of Mugnaini's optimism seems to 
flow from his expectations of a positive response by the U.S. 
toward improved Mercosul market access offers in goods, 
services and investment, which he intimated would be unveiled 
soon.  (Note, one press report admitted that Mercosul's 
initial goods market access offer was the "worst" of any FTAA 
delegation.)  Ambassador insisted that Brazil must work 
seriously according to the directions from Ministers in Miami 
and negotiate the common set before market access talks could 
begin.  Mugnaini made references to Itamaraty moving "in the 
right direction" regarding positions on common set issues, 
but provided no further detail.  Articles the same day 
reported a lack of support within the Ministries of 
Development, Agriculture, and Finance, as well as within the 
private sector, for Itamaraty's insistence on including 
within the common set a mechanism to compensate for 
agricultural domestic support within the U.S. and Canada. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
7. (C) Recent events and statements would seem to confirm 
Itamaraty's lack of commitment toward the FTAA negotiations. 
That being said, there remain pro-FTAA forces within the 
Brazilian government and private sector that make it very 
difficult for Itamaraty to just walk away.  There is plenty 
of room for continued mischief, however.  The GoB will likely 
continue to press for four-plus-one market access talks to 
begin forthwith.  Eventually, Itamaraty may present a 
reformulation of some of its positions within the common set 
talks, but these may not prove useful in bridging the gaps 
that currently exist between FTAA delegations.  We suspect 
that representatives from other ministries and from the 
private sector who are pushing for more flexibility by 
Itamaraty, may not prove as effective checks on Itamaraty 
excesses as would be hoped, due to a less than full 
appreciation of the nuances within the common set text 
negotiations. 
 
8.  (C) Post recommends a continued neutral posture regarding 
blame for an inability to reach consensus on the common set 
elements so that domestic interests will have the space to 
make their own case for a change in GoB posture.  However, 
reinforcement of the message that what we are seeking is a 
"balanced" common set would be helpful in keeping the focus 
on revising or eliminating the more problematic GoB positions. 
HRINAK