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Viewing cable 04BRASILIA795, AFRICAN DIPLOMATS DESCRIBE BRAZIL'S AFRICA FOCUS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04BRASILIA795 2004-04-02 11:30 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Brasilia
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000795 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT. FOR WHA/BSC, AF/S, AF/W AND AF/C 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON AF BR UNSC
SUBJECT: AFRICAN DIPLOMATS DESCRIBE BRAZIL'S AFRICA FOCUS 
            AS MUCH RHETORIC, LITTLE SUBSTANCE 
 
REF: 03 BRASILIA 2156 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  In 2003 the incoming Lula administration 
asserted it would refocus its foreign policy to place greater 
emphasis on Africa.  Some African diplomats here, however, 
believe that Brazilian interest in their countries has 
remained unchanged, despite the rhetoric. While they admit 
they may be out of the loop on issues dealt with in New York 
or Geneva, the diplomats could identify no specific 
initiatives or activities reflecting increased GOB attention, 
except for South Africa and the lusophone countries -- 
countries already marked for closer ties. They were also 
apprehensive that Haiti could distract Brazil from future 
African peacekeeping efforts.  The griping may be premature, 
but given recent GOB behavior, other areas of the globe may 
be capturing Brazil's interest, at least for now.   End 
Summary 
 
2.  (U) Since taking office in January 2003, the Lula 
Administration has emphasized its intention to rethink 
Brazil's foreign policy and, in particular, place increased 
focus on Africa. In various fora during the first six months 
of his administration, President Lula specifically targeted 
Africa, emphasizing Brazil's deep historical and cultural 
ties to the continent and the commonality of interests.  As 
noted reftel, this policy stems from President Lula's desire 
to demonstrate Brazil's leadership as an advocate for Third 
World issues and in global trade interests, which in turn 
will bolster Brazil's bid for a permanent UN Security Council 
seat. 
 
3.  (SBU) From one perspective, however, the reality of 
Brazil's new African focus has not, so far, met expectations. 
In an informal luncheon with poloffs, senior diplomats from 
Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Cameroon, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, and Angola described the Lula 
Administration's Africa-oriented foreign policy as more 
rhetoric than fact. True, they conceded, both President Lula 
and Foreign Minister Amorin visited Africa in 2003.  But the 
countries visited, the diplomats said, reflected existing GOB 
priorities to strengthen Brazil's leadership role among 
lusophone countries (Angola, Mozambique, Sao Tome & Principe, 
Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau) and ties with South Africa.  The 
diplomats, a few of whom have served in Brazil for many 
years, could point to no obvious change in GOB policy or 
attention towards their nations. 
 
4.  (SBU) The diplomats admitted that many issues of concern 
between their governments and Brazil -- particularly those 
involving the World Trade Organization -- are conducted in 
New York or Geneva, leaving their embassies out of the loop. 
Yet, it still appeared that the GOB was more concerned with 
counting heads for UNSC reform -- and support for Brazil's 
bid for permanent UNSC seat -- than in being a champion of 
Africa's interests, supporting African peacekeeping, or 
augmenting trade. The diplomats could not identify any 
examples of expanded commercial opportunities for African 
products nor any common trade negotiation strategies that 
would benefit Africa.  Several noted that Brazil and many 
African countries produce similar agricultural products and 
therefore Brazil is a competitor rather than a benefactor. 
 
5.  (SBU)  As one constraint to closer Brazil-Africa ties, 
all cited the dearth, difficulty, and expense of flights 
between Brazil and Africa.  Except for flights to 
Johannesburg and Luanda (not noted as a aviation hub), the 
diplomats could identify no direct service between Brazil and 
Africa. Instead, travelers had to transit Europe at great 
cost and significant delay. To remedy this, a few urged that 
the Brazilian Government press airlines to open up routes 
across the Atlantic. 
 
6.  (SBU)  Brazil's recent commitment of over one thousand 
peacekeepers to Haiti, as opposed to the GOB's paucity of 
commitment to African peacekeeping, was perceived as evidence 
of Brazil's true lack of interest in Africa's problems.  A 
few added that even if Brazil had been thinking of Africa 
before, Haiti would be a significant distraction and 
impediment to any future African peacekeeping mission. 
Diplomats from the DRC and Cote d'Ivoire, countries often 
mentioned by the GOB as possible peacekeeping focal points, 
stated there had been no effort by the Foreign Ministry to 
engage with them.  (Note: In a recent meeting senior Foreign 
Ministry officials confirmed to poloffs that GOB interest in 
participating in a Cote d'Ivoire PKO had been eclipsed by 
Haiti. End Note) 
 
7.  (SBU)  Comment: It may still be relatively early in the 
Lula administration to point to Brazil-Africa success 
stories, and we note the GOB's interest in HIV/AIDs relief 
efforts in Africa seems unabated.  Some of the complaints 
leveled against the GOB may be premature but the diplomats 
make a legitimate point. The Africa-focus rhetoric aside, 
Brazil's current foreign policy emphasis on South 
American/Caribbean and major, like-minded developing nations 
(ex. South Africa, India, China) may leave little room for 
paying closer attention to Africa. 
HRINAK