Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 04ANKARA2341, TURKEY'S WAY FORWARD ON CYPRUS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #04ANKARA2341.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04ANKARA2341 2004-04-26 13:51 2011-06-23 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
Appears in these articles:
http://www.tanea.gr
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002341 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2014 
TAGS: CY GR PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S WAY FORWARD ON CYPRUS 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman, E.O. 12958, 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Despite the wake of the GCs' "no," we need 
to move toward an eventual GC "yes" to the Burgenstock 
agreement.  On the Turkish side, we should help Ankara 
preserve the its delicate balance for Cyprus settlement; 
encourage the Erdogan government to continue its "one step 
ahead" policy; reach out to Turkish Cypriots; and engage the 
EU.  End Summary. 
 
 
Help Preserve the Balance in Ankara 
 
 
2.  (C) The Erdogan government and the MFA pieced together a 
tenuous Cyprus balance with the military, the President, the 
bureaucracy and Parliament that enabled them to move forward 
for the past four months.  The possibility of receiving a 
date in December to begin EU accession negotiations may help 
preserve the balance over the next few months.  However, this 
balance is not locked in:  it remains precarious and subject 
to the vagaries of Turkish politics. 
 
 
3.  (C) We must work preemptively to help maintain the 
balance in Ankara.  In the event the GCs ever bring 
themselves to endorse the basic terms of the Annan Plan, a 
settlement will still require Turkish Parliament's and 
President Sezer's formal approval.  While the military has no 
formal role, it still wields enough behind-the-scenes power 
to scuttle an agreement. 
 
 
4.  (C) Progress in two key areas will help maintain the 
balance: 
 
 
-- Primary law:  We should work with the UK to gain more 
specific guarantees that the terms of an ultimate settlement 
will become primary EU law.  This will help meet President 
Sezer's and the military's principal reservations and dampen 
the effect of domestic political critics. 
 
 
-- TCs' situation:  We must act on our promise to ameliorate 
the TCs' situation (more below).  This will strengthen the 
hand of pro-solution forces in the Turkish government and 
bureaucracy, allowing them to point to "progress" on the 
island stemming from Turkey's pro-settlement orientation. 
 
 
Encourage Turkey to Continue "One Step Ahead" 
 
 
5.  (C) Erdogan's Cyprus mantra has been to stay "one step 
ahead" of the GCs.  This has played well domestically and in 
Europe.  We should encourage its explicit continuation.  We 
expect the GOT to push back, arguing Turkey's efforts and TC 
referendum approval already put it one step ahead and now it 
is the GCs' turn.  Still, many Turks worry that, come 
December, the EU will have forgotten Turkey's achievements. 
We can effectively use this argument to urge continued steps 
ahead, albeit small ones.  In doing so, we need to be careful 
not to cross the line that would fuel expectations of 
re-opening negotiations; the specter of new negotiations will 
unravel Ankara's support for the agreement. 
 
 
6.  (C) For starters, we should again raise the idea of 
easing passport requirements for GCs.  Although Ziyal told us 
on April 20 this will not happen, "TRNC Interior Minister" 
Murat told Nicosia DCM on April 22 that discussion on this 
were still ongoing.  We can also press the Turks to complete 
unfinished technical work on the agreement. 
 
 
Speak Promptly, Act Concretely To Help Turkish Cypriots 
 
 
7.  (C) We need to speak out promptly and then act concretely 
on our promises not to leave TCs out in the cold.  While the 
EU reaction is key, we cannot be seen in Ankara to be merely 
the tail on an EU dog.  We should begin by announcing 
specific steps the U.S. plans to take, followed by their 
gradual implementation.  This will have the twin salutary 
effects of helping maintain Ankara's pro-settlement stance 
and demonstrating to GCs the cost of a continued "no."  At 
the same time, keeping in mind that the ultimate goal is a 
united Cyprus, we should take great care not to raise Turkish 
expectations of a divided island.  Some steps should include 
honoring "TRNC" export documentation; helping TCs gain 
economic assistance, including from the IMF, World Bank and 
EU; opening TDA and ExIm operations to the Turkish Cypriots, 
particularly in the tourism sector;  removing the ban on 
direct travel by USG officials to Cyprus via the north; 
offering technical assistance to build rule of law and to 
combat money laundering;  ending restrictions on flights to 
the north; a visit to Washington by Talat; upgrading the 
status of the "TRNC's" representation in Washington. 
 
 
Engage the EU 
 
 
8.  (C) The goal of getting a date to begin EU accession 
negotiations remains an effective, largely-accepted external 
discipline in Ankara.  We should encourage the EU to 
explicitly recognize Turkey's positive efforts on Cyprus in 
the months leading up to December.  This will reassure Turkey 
its efforts have not been in vain and will help 
pro-settlement forces hold the line in Ankara.  We should 
raise the idea of opening some channel for TCs to express 
themselves within the EU.  While staying out of technical 
details, we should keep reminding the EU of the importance of 
working to give Turkey the primary law guarantees it needs to 
keep President Sezer and the military on board. 
EDELMAN