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Viewing cable 04ANKARA2330, PRESIDENTIAL CABINET CHIEF ATACANLI ON CYPRUS,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04ANKARA2330 2004-04-26 07:27 2011-06-15 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
Appears in these articles:
www.tanea.gr
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002330 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2014 
TAGS: CY GR PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CABINET CHIEF ATACANLI ON CYPRUS, 
GREATER MIDDLE EAST 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman, E.O. 12958, 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  On April 21, President Sezer's Cabinet 
Chief (also Senior Foreign Policy Adviser and Spokesman) 
Atacanli told Ambassador that Sezer remains concerned with 
making a Cyprus agreement primary EU law, and with 
implementation of the agreement's property arrangements.  In 
the event of a TC "yes" and GC "no" in the referendum, 
Atacanli urged concrete steps to help TCs and "in the other 
direction" for the GCs.  Ambassador urged restraint in GOT 
statements in the event of a "yes/no."  Ambassador explained 
that Turkey is not a "target" of the Greater Middle East 
Initiative (GME); it is up to Turkey to decide the role it 
wishes to play.  Atacanli emphasized the need for close 
U.S.-Turkey consultation as GME moves forward.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
 
President Sezer's Concerns on Cyprus 
 
 
2.  (C) On Cyprus, Ambassador Edelman emphasized that 
President Bush and Secretary Powell have been deeply engaged 
with all parties and a number of other leaders.  The U.S. 
shares  President Sezer's core concern that the agreement 
have some mechanism to prevent it from being picked apart in 
the European Court of Justice.  The Ambassador asked 
Atacanli's insights on what President Sezer thinks necessary 
for the agreement to be legally secure and whether Sezer has 
other concerns about the agreement. 
 
 
3.  (C) Atacanli acknowledged different viewpoints within the 
GOT on "modalities" of a Cyprus settlement but, with the 
referendum three days away, claimed the GOT is "past that 
stage."  Atacanli said Sezer is concerned about 
implementation of the agreement's property arrangements. 
This could open a Pandora's Box if property disputes escalate 
to threaten peace and stability.  Atacanli said there is 
still a valid question whether efforts to provide primary law 
guarantees are sufficient and this remains very important. 
He noted that in reaching the agreement, TCs accepted much GC 
legislation, some of it "anti-Turkish" (NFI), he added. 
 
 
4.  (C) (FYI:  We note that, in an April 20 meeting with 
Ambassador Edelman, MFA U/S Ziyal said Sezer has given the 
MFA "no clue" about his views on the agreement.  Ziyal noted 
with concern that Sezer's office has not replied to a recent 
MFA invitation to discuss the legal aspects of the agreement; 
this is the first time Sezer's office has not responded to 
the MFA on a Cyprus-related matter.  End FYI.) 
 
 
Thinking Ahead to "Yes/No" 
 
 
5.  (C) In the event of a TC "yes" and GC "no" to the 
referendum, Atacanli urged concrete positive steps toward the 
TCs and steps "in the other direction" for the GCs.  He 
worries that GCs will withstand initial pressure after a "no" 
and that pressure from the international community will fade 
after a few months.  The Ambassador noted EU High Rep 
Solana's recent statements when meeting with Secretary Powell 
as an example that the EU and others are beginning to think 
about next steps in the event of a "yes/no." 
 
 
6.  (C) The Ambassador also encouraged the GOT to react 
publicly with restraint in the event of a TC "yes" and GC 
"no."  The Ambassador advised letting the EU carry the burden 
of strong criticism, in order not to take the focus off GC 
rejection of the agreement.  Atacanli said he understood the 
point of modulating GOT reaction in the event of a GC "no." 
 
 
Greater Middle East 
 
 
7.  (C) The Ambassador noted that some parts of President 
Sezer's April 13 speech at the Istanbul War Academies 
appeared to be partially directed at Secretary Powell's 
later-corrected comment that Turkey is an "Islamic republic." 
 Atacanli interrupted to remark that the Sezer's comments 
were directed at others as well.  The Ambassador reiterated 
that there is no change in the long-standing U.S. view of 
Turkey as a secular democratic republic. 
 
 
8.  (C) Noting that Sezer's speech rejected the idea of 
Turkey as a GME "target," Ambassador Edelman emphasized the 
USG does not consider Turkey a target.  It is up to Turkey to 
decide what role it wishes to play in GME.  The Ambassador 
laid out regional economic, educational and political reforms 
that GME aims to support.  Turkey offers a powerful example 
of a successful Muslim-majority nation integrating into 
international institutions. 
 
 
9.  (C) Atacanli acknowledged the Secretary's correction of 
his comment but added that Sezer had come under fire for not 
responding quickly to the misstatement.  The secular nature 
of the Turkish state is the single most important issue for 
Sezer.  On GME, Atacanli emphasized the need for close 
consultation between the U.S. and Turkey.  He said Sezer's 
remarks were intended to state for the record the importance 
of keeping regional developments "under control."  Atacanli 
said he would convey the Ambassador's explanation to Sezer. 
EDELMAN