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Viewing cable 04HANOI738, A/S TAYLOR DISCUSSES SECURITY AND COOPERATION WITH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04HANOI738 2004-03-12 08:00 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Hanoi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 000738 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
STATE FOR DS, S/CT, AND EAP/BCLTV 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PTER SNAR KCRM VM CTERR
SUBJECT:  A/S TAYLOR DISCUSSES SECURITY AND COOPERATION WITH 
MPS VICE MINISTER 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: In a meeting March 10 with visiting 
Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security Frank Taylor, 
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) Vice Minister Nguyen Van 
Huong said he wanted to see closer cooperation between MPS 
and the Embassy, including formal communication channels for 
CT and law enforcement information.  He repeatedly praised 
U.S.-Vietnam intelligence and information exchanges, noting 
that the GVN had carefully reviewed all U.S.-provided threat 
information and found it to be useful.  Huong noted U.S.- 
Vietnam cooperation on law enforcement issues and said that 
it was time to lay out a mechanism to make cooperation 
better and more effective.  A/S Taylor and Huong also 
discussed the surveillance detection (SD) program and the 
security of Vietnamese diplomats and official visitors in 
the U.S.  End summary. 
 
COOPERATION AND INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
------------------------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) In response to Ambassador Taylor's statement that 
the U.S. appreciated the greater cooperation demonstrated by 
the exchange of information on security issues, MPS VM Huong 
said that, until now, the exchanges of information had been 
unofficial, or else had been sent through "excessively 
bureaucratic" channels.  Huong said the U.S. normally sent 
the information under the cover of a diplomatic note to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which then sent it to MPS. 
This was inefficient, Huong complained, noting that MPS 
"usually" received untimely, incomplete information by this 
method.  When the information was late, he noted, it was 
impossible to act on, which was unfortunate because some of 
the information was "interesting and important."  For 
example, he said, the GVN greatly appreciated information on 
Islamic organizations that had transferred money into 
Vietnam.  In response, Huong said he had directed MPS to 
share information directly with the Embassy, especially when 
the information related to threats to U.S. or other 
diplomatic interests. [Note: Embassy already has a direct 
channel to MPS for counterterrorism/threat information.  RSO 
frequently passes information directly to MPS' 
Counterterrorism office, and RSO and the MPS CT office have 
a "hotline" established to exchange urgent information.  It 
is unclear what deficiencies Huong was referring to, since 
very little information of this nature, except concerning 
financial activities of terrorists, has actually been passed 
through MFA since 2002.  End note.] 
 
3. (SBU) Huong suggested establishing a direct, official 
channel between the Embassy and MPS, and proposed that the 
conduits for information be the RSO office in the Embassy 
and the General Criminal Department at MPS.  One way in 
particular MPS would like to work with the U.S. was on 
checking up on companies transferring large amounts of money 
into Vietnam, Huong added.  As a second step after 
establishing a formal channel between MPS and the Embassy, 
Huong said it was essential for the Embassy and MPS to work 
together on contingencies involving an attack on U.S. 
facilities in Vietnam.  Huong noted that he thought the 
prospect of an attack on U.S. facilities in Vietnam 
unlikely, but said it would be valuable to determine 
specifically what the U.S. would need from MPS in various 
attack scenarios and what roles the U.S. and MPS would play 
in responding to an attack. 
 
4. (SBU) Ambassador Taylor noted that the meeting itself 
demonstrated the growing strength of the U.S.-Vietnam 
relationship.  He added that he appreciated the "excellent 
security" MPS provided to U.S. diplomatic properties and 
persons in Vietnam, and hoped the U.S. and Vietnam would be 
able to develop the relationship further.  Terrorism, he 
said, is a phenomenon greater than just two nations, and the 
exchange of information was important to the U.S. and all 
its partners in the war on terrorism.  Huong agreed, and 
added that in the area of counterterrorism, "the U.S. and 
Vietnam speak the same language."  He praised "the United 
States' important role in the fight against terrorism" and 
rejected any possible suggestion that Vietnam did not 
actively support the U.S. in the war on terrorism. 
 
5. (SBU) VM Huong noted that Ambassador Taylor's visit was 
"well timed" to occur when there was such an improvement in 
bilateral relations.  Huong said that while the U.S. and 
Vietnam had many areas of active ongoing cooperation, law 
enforcement cooperation was a "special domain."  He added 
that the U.S. and Vietnam have "much to do to gain mutual 
understanding" on law enforcement cooperation, and said the 
two nations should "map out a direction" to improve 
cooperation in this area.  Ambassador Taylor said relations 
between the U.S. and Vietnam were developing, and both sides 
were learning how best to work together on counterterrorism 
and transnational crime.  He said he was "pleased to see the 
exchange of information flowing more freely" and hoped to 
see that exchange develop more fully between the two 
countries. 
 
SPIRITED EXCHANGE ON U.S. SD TEAMS 
---------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Ambassador Taylor thanked VM Huong for the 
cooperation on security both in Hanoi and in Ho Chi Minh 
City.  An important part of the relationship, he stressed, 
was full transparency as both sides worked together on 
security and combating criminal activity.  Ambassador Taylor 
acknowledged that MPS had primary responsibility for 
security, and that the U.S. must work with MPS in security 
situations, but added that the U.S. had a great deal of 
experience to share on these issues.  He identified the SD 
program as one that existed around the world, and said he 
wanted to see the program in Vietnam operating transparently 
with the cooperation of MPS. 
 
7. (SBU) Huong stated that the GVN took its security 
responsibilities extremely seriously, and that when it came 
to the security of foreign missions, MPS was experienced and 
capable.  For years, Huong noted, there had been no 
incidents and no threats on diplomats from any source. 
Huong said that in 1995, he himself had worked with U.S. 
security personnel to secure the new U.S. chancery, and had 
worked with U.S. officers again in 2001 to strengthen 
security after September 11.  Vietnam, he said, had a 
different, but still effective, approach to security. 
Vietnam is a peaceful place, and putting too many uniformed 
guards in front of Embassies paints a "false picture" of the 
security situation, he added.  MPS attaches importance to 
identifying terrorists or anyone else posing a threat to 
U.S. interests, and watches over U.S. properties carefully, 
he said.  One example of this was that when the U.S. 
deployed SD personnel in HCMC, they were arrested by MPS 
officers who "pay special attention" to U.S. facilities, he 
said.  "They were easy to spot," he noted. 
 
8. (SBU) MPS did not have any need for additional capacity 
in protecting U.S. facilities, Huong continued.  Even while 
in this meeting, he said, he was in full control of the 
security situation at U.S. facilities.  For example, he 
added, he knew that SD teams were deployed near the Embassy, 
even though MPS was in the area and in control.  There was 
no need for the SD teams, Huong stated.  If the situation 
were to require a higher level of alert, MPS would consider 
using the SD teams.  The SD teams were a good idea, he said, 
but only when they were truly needed.  He also noted that 
the Embassy's placement of sandbag-filled shipping 
containers in the street in front of the Chancery was "not 
in accordance with traffic laws, and unattractive" but MPS 
"tolerated" them.  He suggested that the Embassy and MPS 
should work together to find an alternative to blocking the 
street. 
 
SECURITY OF VIETNAMESE CG IN SAN FRANCISCO 
------------------------------------------ 
 
9. (SBU) Ambassador Taylor said he appreciated the work MPS 
did to keep U.S. personnel and facilities safe, and noted 
that DS had the same responsibility for Vietnamese 
facilities in the U.S.  Huong said he was very concerned 
about the situation in San Francisco, where the residence of 
a staff member of Vietnamese ConGen had been shot at twice. 
Huong said he had heard that the shootings had been 
classified as "random" but felt that the issue should be 
investigated more closely.  Huong said that if the DCM in 
Hanoi had been shot at twice, he himself would be in "deep, 
deep trouble."  Ambassador Taylor told Huong that he had 
been told that the shootings were in fact random, but that 
he would look into the case and provide a report personally. 
 
10. (SBU) Huong also asked Ambassador Taylor to pay 
attention to the security of high-level GVN visitors to the 
U.S.  In the past, he said, "undesirable groups had done 
things to GVN officials, including a deputy prime minister." 
Ambassador Taylor said that protecting official visitors was 
one of DS' top priorities, and that MPS could assist in that 
effort by providing information on potentially disruptive 
groups or individuals before the delegations arrived.  A/S 
Taylor said he would meet with Ambassador Chien to discuss 
security issues any time. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
11. (SBU) Comment: The atmospherics of the meeting were 
formal but friendly.  Amb. Taylor and VM Huong both made 
much of their mutual law enforcement credentials, with Amb. 
Taylor saying they shared "the brotherhood of the badge" and 
Huong noting that they "spoke the same language."  The 
extremely formal MPS main meeting hall format, with the two 
sides seated 25 feet apart and speaking through interpreters 
over microphones, somewhat limited the give and take. 
Despite this, Huong was frank and reiterated the GVN's 
desire to move forward on creating cooperation mechanisms 
both for security and law enforcement issues.  His statement 
about wanting to "map out a direction" for how to improve 
law enforcement cooperation is another indicator that 
Vietnam may be open to creating a framework to allow some 
kind of real operational law enforcement cooperation. 
 
12. (SBU) Huong's discussion of extra uniformed guards 
presenting a "false picture" of the security situation in 
Vietnam is indicative of another basic difference in 
Embassy's and MPS' views of security.  The Embassy believes 
that a public, forceful security presence around U.S. 
facilities acts as a deterrent to any potential attack. 
MPS, in contrast, prefers a "softer" security presence 
because it reinforces their carefully cultivated image of 
Vietnam as a safe place to visit and do business.  Further 
dialog is necessary for Embassy and MPS to resolve this 
difference of opinion. 
 
13. (SBU) Huong's comments on the SD program as well as 
complaints about the traffic impact of sandbag-filled 
containers positioned in front of the Embassy to provide 
additional setback were repetitions of previously expressed 
MPS views.  However, MPS has conspicuously avoided a 
confrontation over these issues, allowing them to continue 
but noting MPS' preference that they be eliminated. 
Embassy's (so far successful) strategy of continuing to try 
to raise MPS' comfort level with these necessary measures 
without making a formal request for approval is designed to 
avoid forcing MPS into a position where it would have to 
actively oppose these measures.  End comment. 
BURGHARDT